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I. NATURE AND DISEASE 
The view that romanticism represented an irresponsible and 
pathological escape from the empirical world still lingers on, in 
spite of efforts to correct the image; in fact, the newly emerging 
view that romantic poets are "mythmakers" often only reinforces 
old stereotypes: both the commonplace and the sophisticated view 
give inadequate attention to the curiosity with which romantic 
poets approached organic and human nature. The poetic realms 
of Wordsworth, Keats, Shelley, Coleridge, or Novalis were 
created not through the exclusion but the transformation of the 
empirical world: if they were more intensely poetical than previ-
ous creations of the eighteenth century, they were also more 
directly reflecting the natural world and its newly emerging 
study, the sciences; if it was frequently felt tbat nature was a 
counterpart to the human mind, and science a new mode of 
thought threatening the primacy of poetic imagination, fear was 
nevertheless mingled with fascination. The romantics showed 
consistent efforts to master and humanize the new scientific 
experience because they recognized that science was to alter 
radically and permanently all areas of individual and social life. 
Hand in hand with the interest in science went a curiosity for 
the physiologically or psychologically unnatural and the socially 
unaccepted. After the fall of the "ancien regime" and the failure 
of the French Revolution to realize the enlightened optimism of 
the eighteenth century, hopes for new syntheses seemed to lie 
only in radical individual efforts subjecting to scrutiny all aspects 
of the fragmented world-without regard to traditional tabus. 
These attempts are perhaps most dramatically and representa-
tively expressed in Faust, although Goethe himself was clearly 
unwilling to carry through a radical "transvaluation of all 
values". Much of his wisdom-and some of his pedantry-may 
be ascribed to that hard-fought-for and only temporarily achieved 
balance between the "two souls" of Faust, in which the human 
mind had deep affinity with a benevolent nature, and the inherent 
moral qualities of organisms provided a basis for a humanism. 
To this Goethe, any human activity or thought which had no 
organic attachment to nature, be it Newton's physics, Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason, or Kleist's metaphysical desperation, 
appeared fallacious and morbid. He described the romantics as 
sick because he disliked their irreverence and their unrestrained 
penetration into life's secrets. 
Indeed, the "poete maudit" and Marquis de Sade are faces of 
romanticism, together with ennui, the addiction to drugs, and 
morbid introspection. The intent to explore the "dark recesses 
of the soul" informs Blake's "Sick Rose", Keats's "La Belle 
Dame Sans Merci", as well as Navalis' Hymnen an die Nacht. 
Morbidity is manifest, among other things, in an unusual 
concern for pathology itself; yet the preoccupation with disease 
need not always be a sign of decadence and abandon. As in the 
psychoanalytical theory of Freud-for which the romantics 
prepared the ground- in the profoundest romantic investi-
gations of disease the clinical-therapeutic and scientific elements 
more than balanced the rolling "in abysses of despair and 
ennui" .1 The final aim was not anarchy but the conquest of 
hitherto uncontrolled forces and the illumination of darkness. 
As Thomas Mann-who was unable to decide whether to trace 
nazism to excessive romanticism or those opponents of romantic 
mentality who demanded mental hygiene-once characteristi-
cally stated: "Das Interesse fur Tod und Krankheit, fur das 
Pathologische, den V erfall ist nur eine Art von Ausdruck fur das 
Interesse am Leben, am Menschen, wie die humanistische Fakul-
tat der Medizin beweist; wer sich fur das Organische, das Leben, 
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interessiert, der interessiert sich namentlich fur den Tod; ... 
Keine Metamorphose des Geistes ist uns besser vertraut als die, 
an deren Anfang die Sympathie mit dem Tode, an deren Ende 
der EntschluB zum Lebensdienste steht."2 
The passage belongs to the speech "Von deutscher Republik" 
(1922) in which Thomas Mann defended the Weimar Republic by 
calling upon the testimony of Friedrich von Hardenberg 
(Novalis).3 Mann, no less than his audience, was surprised to 
learn that Navalis, this "Traumer von ewiger Brautnacht", 
had relevant things to say both about German politics and 
physiology. In the nineteenth century Navalis was remembered 
only as an ethereal sickly poet who created the symbol of romantic 
yearning, the "blue flower", who mystically exalted his adoles-
cent fiancee after her death, and died himself a premature ro-
mantic death. According to Hegel he was dominated by a noble 
but unhealthy yearning for the unattainable, Heine classed him 
with E. T. A. Hoffmann and felt that both wrote morbid poetry, 
in France he found followers among the purists of poetry, es-
pecially Maeterlinck. 4 Yet N ovalis remarked towards the end of 
his life: "Ich bin uberzeugt, daB man durch kalten, technischen 
V erstand, und ruhigen, moralischen Sinn eher zu wahren 
Offenbarungen gelangt, als durch Fantasie, die uns bios ins 
Gespensterreich, diesem Antipoden des wahren Himmels, zu 
leiten scheint."6 Those who come to his works expecting only 
dark romanticism must be struck by his preoccupation with 
philosophy, his interest in nature and the natural sciences, and 
his sober acceptance of everyday life. 6 The exceedingly 
complex intertwining of scientific and pathological elements, 
which is unique for Navalis and yet in some way so characteristic 
of our culture ever since the romantic period, brought me 
originally to Navalis and prompted the first plans for this book. 
II. HARDENBERG: LIFE AND CHARACTER 
Friedrich von Hardenberg's life has often been mythologized, 
though it was relatively uneventful. He was born in 1772 at 
Oberwiederstedt, the small country estate of his family, near 
Halle. His father belonged to the prominent old Hardenberg 
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family, but had himself only moderate means and gained his 
income from supervising the royal salt mines of Saxony. When 
he became district director in 1784, the family moved to the 
middle-sized town of Weissenfels, about twenty miles west of 
Leipzig. 
Novalis entered the university of Jena in 1790 to study law. 
However, he seemed to bemore interested in Schiller's lectures 
and the trappings of student life, and finally, as result of parental 
pressure and perhaps a moderating intervention by Schiller 
himself, he moved to the University of Leipzig in the autumn of 
1791. In Leipzig he made his lasting friendship with Friedrich 
Schlegel and continued to live a gay student life until in a 
moment of love-sickness he suddenly decided on a military 
career and left. However, parental persuasion prevailed once 
again and Novalis enrolled at the University in Wittenberg. This 
time he showed his powers and quickly obtained his degree in 
1794· 
The same year Novalis took a minor job in Tennstedt to gain 
practical experience, and encountered in the neighboring 
Gruningen the thirteen-year-old Sophie von Kuhn. This proved 
to be the decisive experience of his life: they got engaged in 
the spring of 179 5, but Sophie soon contracted consumption 
and she passed away in the spring of 1797. At the end of the 
same year Novalis went to the School of Mining Technology at 
Freiberg-near Dresden-and he studied there science and 
technology till the spring of 1799. Upon return to Weissenfels 
he worked in the Directorate of the salt-mines of Saxony. He 
was engaged for a second time when he fell sick, and he died 
on March 25, 18o1 after prolonged sickness. 
The only existing picture of him shows a small elongated head 
where the protruding cheekbones contrast with the long hair 
femininely curling over his shoulders. 7 In Friedrich Schlegel's 
first description one finds a similarly curious blend of traits: 
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Ein noch sehr junger Mensch-von schlanker guter 
Bildung, sehr feinem Gesicht mit schwarzen Augen, 
von herrlichem Ausdruck, wenn er mit Feuer von 
etwas Schonem redet-unbeschreiblich viel Feuer-
er redet dreimal mehr und dreimal schneller wie wir 
andre-die schnellste Fassungskraft und EmpHing-
lichkeit . 
. . . Nie sah ich so die Heiterkeit der Jugend. Seine 
Empfindung hat eine gewisse Keuschheit, die ihren 
Grund in der Seele hat, nicht in Unerfahrenheit. 
Denn er ist schon sehr viel in Gesellschaft gewesen 
(er wird gleich mit jedermann bekannt) ... (IV, 417). 
The picture of robust health that emerges from the reminiscences 
of Tieck is even more surprising since Tieck was largely respon-
sible for the myth of the ethereal poet: 
,Wie er auch am liebsten die Tiefen des Gemiites im 
Gesprach enthiillte, als begeistert von den Regionen 
unsichtbarer Welten sprach, so war er doch fri:ihlich 
wie ein Kind, scherzte in unbefangener Heiterkeit 
und gab sich selbst den Scherzen der Gesellschaft 
hin" (IV, 457). ,Er warder gesundeste, frohsinnig-
ste Mensch, der keckste Reiter, unermiidlicher Berg-
steiger und Wanderer, schlief fast nicht, indem er 
praktisch und schreibend immer tatig war-aber 
freilich starb er, und unerwartet, an der Schwind-
sucht" (IV, 459). 
And finally, Friedericke von Mandelsloh's remark which is in 
sharp contrast with Tieck's protrayal: 
[N ovalis] , war zu aller Zeit korperlich krankhaft und 
leidend und sein friiher Tod vorher zu sehen" (IV, 
438). 
How are we to correlate these seemingly incompatible obser-
vations? Even after allowing for inaccuracies in the re-
collections-Mandelsloh's were made forty years after the 
poet's death-and variations in individual judgement, the answer 
is difficult. For the disagreement on Novalis' features, his social 
behavior, and his health extends to all aspects of his personality 
and life; the volatile poet with an impulse towards the meta-
physical was also a careful scholar and a conscientious high 
official in the Directorate of the salt-mines of Saxony. His 
sensibility, his exalted love, his physical suffering and early death 
contrast so much the toughness and discipline with which he 
applied himself to everyday matters or problems of philosophy 
that one would be inclined to believe he was among the first of 
those modern St. Sebastians of whom Thomas Mann has said 
that their art, born of suffering, represents a triumph over 
biological frailty and hostile environment. Indeed, if one reads 
the diary Navalis kept after the death of his fiancee, one is 
moved by his heroic and touching efforts to transcend everyday 
life and enter a mystic union with the beloved. And yet, a 
confrontation between "spirit" and "matter" or "art" and "life", 
as Schopenhauer later dramatized, is not typical of Navalis, and 
his letters seldom reveal such an agonizing self-division as is so 
familiar to us from the writings of Baudelaire, Flaubert, Kaf-
ka, Mann, and many others. Navalis is difficult to comprehend 
because he himself sensed no inconsistency in the diversity of his 
personality, and his poetry often appears as deceptively simple. 
The paradoxes of his mind and life are ultimately explainable 
only in terms of a supple and accommodating spiritual dispo-
sition which resolved these conflicts in Navalis himself, but 
which appears at times as admirable, and at others as 
inconsistent or naive to the skeptical modern reader. 
A critical assessment of Navalis has to start with this para-
doxical unity in multiplicity, for whatever aspect of Harden-
berg's life or thought one takes under the magnifying glass, 
one quickly recognizes the outlines of his personality. The stuff 
of his life-his love, the course of his studies, and his final 
disease-seems to be incidentally encountered raw bits of ex-
perience upon which this personality printed a shape and colour 
of its own. Carlyle is therefore surely right when he remarks 
about the Sophie experience: "We cannot but think that some 
result precisely similar in moral effect might have been attained 
by many different means; nay, that by one means or another, it 
would not have failed to be attained."8 On similar grounds 
Theodor Haering can assert that in the final analysis Navalis 
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absorbed only those influences for which there was an a priori 
basis in his mind. 9 As Novalis had formulated it even more 
radically: "Jeder geliebte Gegenstand ist der Mittelpunkt eines 
Paradieses" (II, 43 3), which means that through the transforming 
power of love almost any object, event, or person may achieve 
ultimate significance, or saving grace.l0 
It seems then that the facts of Novalis' life, the nature of his 
disease, or the list ofhis readings would be of little value to those 
who wish to understand the products of his mind: the poetry and 
the ideas in his writing.11 Yet,it has become clear in recent years 
that in the case of Novalis a precise knowledge of biographical 
circumstances and background material, above all an acquaint-
ance with his readings, is indispensable for unraveling his 
complex, sometimes cryptic notebooks. As Novalis himself 
wrote about encounters with other minds. "Man studirt fremde 
Systeme urn sein eignes System zu finden" (III, 278); "Bin 
junger Gelehrter muB mit specieller Kritik anfangen. Am 
fremden Faden und Gewebe lernt er eigene Ideen entwickeln 
und zu Faden und einem vollst[andigen ], regelmaBigen Gewebe 
auszuspinnen" (III, 3 So). 
Due to Hardenberg's early death, his contacts with other 
minds seldom crystallized in finished works of his own: apart 
from an early poem, published in the Teutscher Merkur in 1791, 
only two slim fragment collections, Bliithenstaub and Glau-
ben und Liebe, and the cycle lfymnen an die Nacht were published 
during his lifetime. The remaining poetry and fiction-
including the Geistliche Lieder, other poems, and the two 
novel-fragments: Die Lehrlinge zu Sais and Heinrich von Ofter-
dingen-were posthumously published by Hardenberg's friends, 
Ludwig Tieck and Friedrich Schlegel. This collected edition 
also contained fragments from the essay "Die Christenheit 
oder Europa" and miscellaneous notebook-material selected and 
arranged by Tieck under such headings as "Philosophic und 
Physik" or "Asthetik und Literatur". Tieck: entitled the whole 
last section "Fragmente" -in analogy to the collections pub-
lished by N ovalis himself. 
The first steps towards a representative and reliable edition of 
Hardenberg's works were taken at the beginning of this century 
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by Jacob Minor and Eduard Havenstein, but only in the first 
critical edition of 1929 were Paul Kluckhohn and Richard 
Samuel able to accomplish the task in a satisfactory way by 
returning to the manuscripts. However, this edition was still 
selective. 
The manuscripts were auctioned by the Hardenberg family 
in 1930. Some of them went into unknown hands, others 
disappeared during the war, most of them, however, were 
bought by Salman Schocken and resold to the Freies Deutsches 
Hochstift in I 96o. Through this last sale new possibilities opened 
up to the editors of the second critical edition: in the second and 
third volume of this edition all of Hardenberg's known note-
books were printed for the first time, with original orthography 
and in vastly improved chronological order. The resultant text 
necessitated an important revision concerning the notion and 
use of "fragments" in Hardenberg's writing. 
The term "fragment" was defined by Friedrich Schlegel in the 
course of "Symphilosophieren" -a joint venture of the friends 
to establish a set of guidelines for the romantic artistic credo: 
"Ein Fragment muB gleich einem kleinen Kunstwerke von der 
umgebenden Welt ganz abgesondert und in sich selbst vollendet 
sein wie ein Igel."12 However, Schlegel's definition is not very 
applicable to Hardenberg's Bliithenstaub or Glauben und Liebe: 
the individual pieces in these collections are seldom self-
contained, their structure is dialectical and discontinuous, 
while their ending is open and suggestive.l3 
More important, the term "fragment" cannot be applied at all 
to the rest of the material in Hardenberg's notebooks-with the 
exception of a half-finished collection usually referred to as 
"Teplitzer Fragmente" (II, 5 96-622). These notebooks, espe-
cially the ones on science, are filled with excerpts from books or 
notes on them, interspersed with sketches, brief memos, or even 
plans for reading and daily activity. The return to the original 
manuscripts has made it evident that many of Hardenberg's 
cryptic "fragments" were artificially manufactured by Tieck, 
who tore passages from their context, thereby masking their 
origin and giving them a. semblance of self-contained finality. 
That many of these notes become illuminated by the underlying 
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foreign text was conclusively demonstrated by Professor Miihl, 
who discovered important sources for Novalis' notes and was 
thereby able to characterize the way in which Hardenberg's 
mind seized upon seemingly unimportant matters and extracted 
from them what it needed.14 
With the exceptions mentioned then, Hardenberg's notebooks 
contain no "fragments", and one should rather refer to the 
material as notes being at various stages between raw material 
and finished product. In particular, the meaning of individual 
notes on science and their interrelation can only be explored by 
giving attention to the works and the ideas that stimulated the 
poet's mind: Hardenberg's natural philosophy has to be pieced 
together from the comments he makes on the scientific theories 
and practices of his day. 
III. THE VALUE OF HARDENBERG'S NOTES ON SCIENCE 
What may one expect from studying the scientific notes of a 
romantic poet? I assumed that Novalis' natural philosophy will 
be of interest to historians of science as well as students of 
literature, that his thoughts on science have an intrinsic value 
beyond the aid they might provide to understand his poetry. 
This is by no means obvious and could hardly have been defend-
ed on the basis of earlier unsatisfactory editions. Wilhelm 
Dilthey, an admirable critic of Novalis who was first to claim 
that his "fragments" were not merely confused aggregates of 
contradictory remarks, treasured the notebooks for those 
metaphysical and humanistic ideas that he found still alive and 
important from the point of view of his own philosophy. But 
he saw no intrinsic value in Novalis' scientific writings. Even 
in retrospect, when Dilthey included the essay in his volume 
Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, he defended this position: "Und 
auch dabei muB ich bleiben, daB ich mit meiner Abschiitzung des 
wissenschaftlichen Wertes der Fragmente damals das Richtige 
getroffen habe.... In den metaphysischen und geisteswissen-
schaftlichen Fragmenten sah ich die Bedeutung des Nachlasses. 
Meine Absicht war, zu zeigen, welchen Wert die letzteren auch 
noch fiir die heutigen Geisteswissenschaften haben."15 In fact, 
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Dilthey felt vindicated by the first studyofHardenberg's notes on 
science, a dissertation by W. Olshausen which appeared in 1 90 5 .16 
Although Olshausen differed from Dilthey on specific points of 
interpretation, he agreed with him that Hardenberg's scientific 
studies were erratic and chaotic, and therefore worthless from a 
scientific point of view.17 
Both Dilthey and Olshausen had to rely on very incomplete 
editions ofNovalis' works which were particularly misleading in 
the presentation of the scientific material. Olshausen's conten-
tions have been challenged on that account in several studies, 18 
but only now, with the publication of all the scientific notes, 
a better chronological ordering, and a clearer delineation of 
context, can the validity of Olshausen's findings be judged. I 
believe that Novalis' studies were on the whole thorough and 
consistent and one should not judge them on the ground of 
occasional excentric speculations. He had a comprehensive 
knowledge of contemporary views and achievements in medi-
cine and science, and his selective attention in the notebooks was 
not a sign of insufficient information, but a critique he applied. 
In emphasizing the breadth of his readings and the contemporary 
scientific context I kept, as far as was possible, the discussion of 
Novalis' conception of disease in terms of contemporary 
thought on pathology, physiology, and philosophy, and not, 
as for instance in the works of R. Unger and W. Rehm,19 in 
terms of the theology and metaphysics of romanticism. 
The scientific and philosophical value of Navalis' natural 
philosophy has been a particularly vexing question to German 
historians of medicine who felt torn between their scientific 
credo and their attachment to the cultural tradition of 
romanticism. 20 In the compromise which seems to be generally 
accepted now, Navalis' stature is vindicated by the claim that 
"Romantic Medicine" -a peculiar chapter in the history of 
German medicine covering the first decades of the nineteenth 
century-was decisively shaped by Hardenberg's thoughts on 
the nature of disease and the art of healing. Yet, this argument 
can hardly be construed as a compliment since to many historians 
of medicine the romantic period was merely an aberration from 
the forward march of science. As P. Diepgen put it: "Mit dem 
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diffusen Reizbegriffliel3 sich schon spekulieren. Das haben denn 
auch Schelling, der ihm nahestehende ... Andreas Roeschlaub ... 
und der Dichter ( !) [sic] N ovalis ... griindlich getan, nicht ohne 
zahlreiche Anhanger zu gewinnen, abet ohne die wissenschaft-
liche Medizin auch nur im leisesten zu fordern."21 There is no 
concrete evidence that Navalis had authority among doctors of 
medicine and we have to assume that whatever Navalis shared 
with the doctor-philosophers of the succeeding generation was 
derived from common sources and the general intellectual 
atmosphere of the age. 
At any rate, even from a historical and scientific point of view 
what is at issue is not Navalis' contribution to cumulative 
knowledge but the consistency and reasonableness of his ideas 
in terms of eighteenth-century science. Historians of science 
recognize the inadequacy of the assumption that science 
develops through the gradual and uninterrupted accumulation 
of facts, or that it is historically possible to separate neatly 
discoveries from "errors" or "myths". Wrong theories might 
contain partial truths, valuable discoveries might result from 
incorrect hypotheses, and even complete errors may serve as 
stimuli for constructive efforts. As Professor T. S. Kuhn 
remarks, one ought to examine scientific attitudes in the context 
of their age and ask about their inner coherence and integrity: 
"Out-of-date theories are not in principle unscientific because 
they have been discarded."22 
IV. THE VARIETY IN 
HARDENBERG'S SCIENTIFIC INTEREST 
It has often been asserted that romanticism represents pure 
organicism, anthropomorphically directed among the sciences 
towards biology and anthropology since these define man and 
his position in nature. It has even been suggested by Professor 
Gillispie that romanticism may be defined by its preference for 
biology over physics and mathematics: "... we may be in a 
position to venture that consistent account of romanticism 
which eludes us in the history of politics, philosophy, and the 
arts. Romanticism began as a moral revolt against physics, 
II 
expressed in moving, sad, and sometimes angry attempts to 
defend a qualitative science, in which nature can be congruent 
with man, against a measuring, numbering science which alien-
ates the creator of science from his own creation by total 
objectification of nature. For physics romanticism would 
substitute biology at the heart of science."23 
Professor Gillispie's remark may be applied to Blake and 
Goethe, both of whom had a long-standing quarrel with 
Newtonian science, and to a lesser extent to Wordsworth and 
Schelling who were organicists uninterested in mathematical 
thinking. But Navalis' conception of mathematics was more 
complex. He did, of course, look for an organic and personal 
relationship with nature. But if he wrote a little poem which 
anticipates a future where poetry and fables will take the place 
of numbers and figures (I, 344 and 36o), he also remarked that 
letters ought to become numbers and languages mathematics 
(III, 5o). In fact, to Navalis mathematics did not consist merely 
of numbers. As Kate Hamburger has shown, his idea of mathe-
matics was related to Kant's interpretation of it, and his concepts 
anticipated such modern terms as function and continuity. 
From Kant he accepted that mathematical operations were a 
priori synthetic judgments and that consequently all the sci-
ences should become mathematics (III, 5o and 59 3). In the search 
of unity, coherence, and certainty in knowledge, mathematics 
showed to him how, from a few basic principles, a universally 
applicable system may be constructed. 
From Kant Navalis differed, however, in the interpretation 
he gave to synthetic judgments. If such judgments always were 
beyond empirical proofs, mathematical knowledge required an 
affirmation of faith: "In allem Wissen ist Glauben". He felt the 
need for reinforcing mathematics with "Glauben und Liebe" 
and followed the Pythagorean tradition of raising it to a mystic 
and divine science. 
While the sciences were in need of an a priori mathematical 
structure which the pattern of the mind would supply, the study 
of the mind, and the body in general, necessitated the develop-
ment of biology, physiology, anatomy, psychology, and the 
other life sciences. Medicine, as the most humane and inclusive 
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of the sciences, was therefore of central importance to many of 
the romantics. As Schelling stated in the Introduction to the 
Jahrbiicher der Medicinals Wissenschaft, medicine was the crown of 
all the sciences, because it studied man who was himself the 
center and image of the universe. Discussing Navalis' "Natur-
philosophie", one has to devote therefore greatest attention to 
his notes on medicine, physiology, and psychology. These were 
indeed the sciences that concerned him most: physics and 
chemistry were important to him for their practical value in 
the technology of salt mining and for what they revealed of the 
method of science in general, but in the formation of his 
philosophy they had relatively little significance. The phenome-
na of galvanism and magnetism form an exception, because it 
was believed that these constituted a link between physical and 
psychic forces. 
V. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
It might be asked whether the picture of Navalis emerging from 
this study of his notebooks will be representative, since I shall 
neither discuss his best-known poetic works nor even all 
aspects of his theoretical writings. Although the ideas of 
Hardenberg's natural philosophy do enter into his poetry and 
fiction, one has to admit that these works do not center on 
science and medicine, and an exclusively scientific analysis would 
damage their poetic fabric. Nevertheless, the notes on science do 
play an important role in Hardenberg's intellectual development. 
In spite of some older views, Navalis achieved no genuine and 
lasting synthesis during his life, and very likely he had no 
illusions about realizing one in general-except in an eschato-
logical future. Not only did he believe that there can be no 
unique and universal mode in which men perfect themselves, 
but he also saw man's crucial relation to nature from several 
different angles. His earliest philosphical studies in 1794-96 
centered on the works of Fichte, where nature was reduced to a 
mere not-I. Emerging from, but never fully rejecting Fichte's 
exaltation of the self, Navalis turned to the sciences and for a 
while he inclined to agree with Schelling that nature and mind, 
subject and object were corresponding to each other. The stay 
in Freiberg vastly enlarged his understanding of the empirical 
sciences, but, paradoxically, it also brought his differences from 
Schelling in sharper relief: philosophically he moved away from 
empiricism and theories of correspondence. The attempt at an 
encyclopedia, "Das allgemeine Brouillon", and, briefly after-
wards, Die Lehrlinge were Novalis' attempts to construct a 
synthesis, to give a poetic, moral, and religious meaning to the 
empirical world and to its systematic explanation-science. The 
incompleteness of both, as well as the shift from the encyclo-
pedic form in the "Brouillon" to the poetic form in Die Lehrlinge, 
indicates that Novalis was dissatisfied with his attempts and 
moved towards a more consistently poetic view of the world. 
In the discussion of Die Lehrlinge I attempt to show that the 
ironies and ambiguities in this work issue from a clash between 
contradictory states of mind. After this unsuccessful attempt 
the polar forces clearly separated and remained active only in a 
realm of their own: the empirical and scientific talents of 
Novalis, no longer employed in the construction of scientific 
philosophies, found an outlet in his technical-professional work, 
while his poetic and visionary self became actively engaged in 
the writing of poetry. The late poetic works, above all Heinrich 
von Ofterdingen, do not encompass the empirical world as the 
"Brouillon" or Die Lehrlinge set out to do: they are primarily a 
synthesis within a delicately woven poetic structure, incor-
porating, perhaps by necessity, only linguistic reminiscences of 
science. 
It is possible to look upon this development from a different 
angle, and describe it not in terms of change but as a single undu-
lating interaction of radical philosophical and historical positions. 
In connection with Hardenberg's reading of Schelling I attempt 
to show that already during his early study ofFichte there appears 
a pantheistic strain in his thought. According to this there is an 
organic unity between man and the universe, and the human 
mind is not radically separated from the realm of nature. 
Hardenberg's later preoccupation with the interaction of polari-
ties, with the nature of organisms, and with the relationship 
between parts and the whole indicate that he was in search of a 
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theory of correspondences and a holistic view of the universe. 
Yet, Fichte's (and Schiller's) notion that nature will have to be 
overcome through the assertion of human freedom never 
disappears from Harden berg's thought: it dominates the "Brouil-
lon" and his crowning poetic works. There is no unanimity in 
these works as to what human forces ought to propell this 
transformation. At times it appears as a purely ethical task, as 
the assertion of practical reason only, at others as a work of the 
imagination, of man's creative powers. Neither of these positions 
is consistently upheld in Hardenberg's works: he repeatedly 
questions the guiding power of the imagination, and towards the 
end of his life he becomes convinced that moral development 
can only result from an exposure to sin. 
A complete treatment of what has been sketched here is 
beyond the scope of my book, even though I have tried to stress 
throughout Hardenberg's "bifocality". Too often in the past 
critics tended to overemphasize the unity of his thought, by 
giving exclusive attention to only one aspect of it. I hope to 
illuminate the variety in him, those tensions and hesitations 
between mind and nature or ethics and aesthetics that make him 
a poet of our problems too. 
I 
Aspects of Eighteenth-Century Science 
I. LOCKE, BACON, AND DESCARTES 
He that in physic shall lay down fundamental 
maxims, and, from thence ... shall reduce 1t into the 
regular form of science, has indeed done something 
to enlarge the art of talking and perhaps laid a 
foundation for endless disputes; but, if he hopes to 
bring men by such a system to the knowledge of the 
infirmities [of men's] bodies, the constitution, na-
ture, signs, changes and history of diseases, with the 
safe and discreet way of their cure, takes much what 
a like course with him that should walk up and down 
in a thick wood ... and draw a map of the country .... 
True knowledge grew first in the world by experi-
ence and rational operations .... 1 
In more than one way, this passage from the hand of the young 
Locke defines a point of reference and a perfect antithesis to the 
romantic conception of medicine and science. It not only 
asserts that medicine is an empirical science based on careful 
bedside observations and that the "fundamental maxims" of 
physics and chemistry can contribute little to the art of curing, 
but shows also a general skepticism of the potentials of science 
and of the value of erecting abstract structures of the mind-a 
somewhat surprising view considering Locke's enthusiastic 
reception of Newton's discovery. The scientific method that 
Locke endorses here, as well as in An Essery Concerning Human 
Understanding, 2 is based on empirical observation and induction, 
according to the principles that Bacon had formulated eloquently 
some seventy years earlier in his fight against scholastic logic: 
" ... the logic which is received, ... is not nearly subtle enough to 
deal with nature; and in attempting what it cannot master, has 
done more to establish and perpetuate error than to open the 
way to truth."3 "There is none who has dwelt upon experience 
and the facts of nature as long as is necessary."4 
Locke's modest claims for science were founded on Bacon's 
empiricism and on Descartes' theory of sensation. For in 
Descartes' dualistic system the physical realm (res extensio) 
became sharply separated from consciousness (res cogitans) 
and a serious problem arose when the motions of the external 
world were to be correlated with the perceptions of the self. 
Like Descartes, Locke assumed that many little corpuscules 
moved about in the external world, creating sensations when 
impinging upon the senses. But since such mechanical move-
ments and collisions were very incongruent with our ideas of 
such secondary qualities as colour, sound, or temperature, the 
exact correspondence between the world and the self remained 
undefined, and science rested on shaky grounds. 
II. LEIBNIZ, HALLER, AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF BIOLOGY 
Neither the Baconian conception of empiricism and induction, 
nor the Descartian mechanical conception of the world in space 
became widely held in eighteenth-century Germany. At the dim 
beginnings of German science one perceives the towering 
figure of Leibniz who gave a different direction to scientific 
research, by opposing equally the method of induction, Locke's 
theory of no innate ideas, and Descartes' mechanical inter-
pretation of the physical world. To this eminently mathematical 
mind the constructs of mathematics proved without doubt that 
certain truths do not originate from sensory experience: " ... It 
would seem that necessary truths, such as are found in pure 
mathematics and especially in arithmetic and in geometry, must 
have principles the proof of which does not depend on examples, 
nor, consequently, on the testimony of the senses, although 
without the senses we would never take it into our heads to 
think of them."5 
Leibniz believed that he delivered himself of the deceptive 
demon of the senses that haunted both Descartes and Locke and 
he set the course for a scientific method which became prevalent 
in Germany: with a few notable exceptions, such as Albrecht 
Haller, German scientists of the eighteenth century and the 
romantic period were more inclined to argue deductively 
from general principles than empirically and inductively. The 
success of Newtonian science only strengthened this tendency, 
for, by ignoring its empirical and analytical method, scientists 
and philosophers frequently understood only the simplicity and 
beauty of the final Newtonian equations, which captured such 
vastly different motions as the falling of an apple and the orbital 
revolution of planets. Newton's way of synthesizing and sys-
tematizing knowledge in a highly abstract and mathematical 
form fascinated those who were preoccupied with the unity of 
nature and the foundations of knowledge. Among them was 
Kant, who found a priori synthetic judgments exemplified in 
mathematics. 
Equally important for eighteenth-century German science was 
Leibniz's rejection of mechanisms and mechanical interactions. 
True, he went even further than Descartes in separating mind 
and body by rightly contesting the Cartesian claim that the 
direction of a body's motion may be altered through the action 
of the mind. According to Leibniz, bodies obeyed only natural 
(efficient) causes, and coordination between mind and body was 
possible only because of a divinely pre-established harmony. 
Yet nothing would have been more alien to him than a mecha-
nistic machine-like view of bodies. The "simple substances" of 
his philosophy, the self-contained and "windowless" monads, 
were independent of external forces and subjected only to their 
internal nature: " ... the natural changes of the monads proceed 
from an internal principle, since an external cause could not 
influence their inner being."6 This internal principle or force, 
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which made the monad the source of its own internal activity 
and moved it teleologically from one state into another, was to 
Leibniz the Aristotelean entelechy. Since every such monad was 
a microcosm of the universe, and since each particle of matter 
was made up of an infinite number of simple substances, the 
universe was an organic structure where the tiniest part 
reflected the whole. 
This organic view of nature became dominant in eighteenth-
century German science, even though Leibniz's radical separa-
tion of body and mind was not always accepted. In the powerful 
"animistic" or "vitalistic" school, founded by Georg Ernst Stahl 
(r66o-1734), it was assumed that the mind can directly intervene 
in the natural processes, and the entelechy was made directly 
responsible for all changes in organic matter, 7 including patho-
logical ones. Stahl's colleague at Halle, Friedrich Hoffman 
(r66o-1742), rejected the theory that a spiritual principle might 
guide the body, nevertheless he believed that health was 
regulated by a central agent. He assumed that the organic body 
was made up of fibres contracting and expanding upon the 
action of a "nervous ether" concentrated in the brain. He was 
thereby among the first to ascribe a central function to nerves in 
the body. 
The emerging school of neuro-pathology was opposed by the 
somewhat older school that stressed the physiological function 
of fluids. According to the outdated Galenic conceptions, 
four fluids (blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile) existed 
in the body, and the particular mixture of these determined 
whether the temperament of the person was sanguinic, phleg-
matic, choleric, or melancholic. With the slow development 
of chemistry and physiology this conception was abandoned but 
the basic principle, that the interaction of fluids determined the 
constitution, was retained. The founding of iatrochemistry 
is usually associated with the name of Van Belmont (r 5 77-r 644), 
a student of Paracelsus who caught N ovalis' interest (see Ch. VI). 
The corresponding theory of pathology, resting on the analysis 
of bodily humours (fluids) was termed humoral pathology. 
The greatest physician of the early eighteenth century, the 
Dutch Hermann Boerhave (r668-r738), was neither an adherent 
of the humoral pathologist school nor an advocate of animism, 
but an empiricist without a theory, collecting "true knowledge" 
through "experience and rational operations" by working in 
hospitals and laboratories. This too was the method of his most 
gifted student, Albrecht Haller (r7o8-1777), who is chiefly 
remembered today in literary history for his poem "The Alps". 
But Haller was above all a scientist and a scholar, the dominating 
figure in the early history of the university at Gottingen, where 
he lead the scientific society and contributed prodigiously 
(around ten-thousand reviews!) to the Giittingische Gelehrte 
Anzeigen. He was also the founder of modern physiology, 
principally through his famous experiments which separated 
irritability, the muscles' capacity to answer stimulation, from 
sensibility, a reaction to stimuli involving not only the muscles 
but the whole nervous system and even the soul. As Haller 
reported to the scientific society at Gottingen on April 22, I 752: 
I call that part of the human body irritable, which 
becomes shorter upon being touched; very irritable 
if it contracts upon a slight touch . . . I call that 
a sensible part of the human body, which upon 
being touched transmits the impression of it to the 
soul; and in the brutes, in whom the existence of a 
soul is not so clear, I call those parts sensible, the 
Irritation of which occasions evident signs of pain 
and disquiet in the animal. 8 
Everybody agreed that these were important experiments, but 
there was little consensus concerning their meaning and histo-
rians of medicine still disagree widely on the issues in the debate 
ensuing from Haller's paper. Some believed that by establishing 
sensibility as the transmission of physiological impulses to the 
soul Haller's theory supported Stahlian animism; on the other 
end, Lamettrie, the author of L'homme machine (1747), claimed 
that Haller's concept of irritability actually disproved the soul 
and affirmed the exclusive existence of mind-a conclusion 
which greatly chagrined the pious Haller. In England, Robert 
Whytt defended a form of animism and violently fought Haller's 
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separation of irritability and sensibility by claiming that the soul 
was diffused throughout the nervous system and always 
responsible for muscular movements. Whytt was supported 
by a professor from Prague, Georg Prochaska (I 7 49- I 8 20 ), 
whose book on physiology was in Novalis' possession. 9 
The reaction to Haller's experiments was generally favorable 
in Germany for they seemed to confirm the widely held belief 
that physical and psychological phenomena were inseparable 
from each other. Sensibility appeared as the "missing link", the 
palpable evidence for the unity of life: at last, the Descartian 
dualism seemed defeated by the irrefutable evidence emerging 
from the laboratory of the physiologist. It was still in the wake 
of Haller's experiments that in 1774 F. C. Medicus coined the 
term "Lebenskraft", a mysterious, immaterial agent guiding the 
life and the development of organisms.10 The stage was now 
set for the biology of the "Goethezeit", according to which 
everything was interrelated and alive, striving to unfold the 
potentials dormant in the womb of nature. 
In fact, a friend of Goethe and one of the first evolutionists 
formulated this principle most clearly and coherently. J. F. 
Blumenbach (1752-I84o) saw nature as an unceasingly changing 
being that regenerated, reproduced, and organically developed, 
so that the related organs, the species of nature, continually 
showed their kinship. The vision of organic unity in nature led 
him to initiate the study of comparative anatomy, a science which 
recognized everywhere a basic vital force that drove life from the 
seed towards its teleological end: "[ich bin uberzeugt ], daB in 
allen belebten Geschopfen . . . ein besondrer, eingebohrner, 
lebenslang thatiger wurksamer Trieb liegt, ihre bestimmte 
Gestalt anfangs anzunehmen, dann zu erhalten, und wenn 
sie ja zerstort worden, wo moglich wieder herzustellen."11 
Blumenbach named this force "Bildungstrieb" (nisus jormativ11s), 
which indicates that he regarded it not merely as a symbol of 
unity in nature but as an assertion of individuality in the sense 
in which Goethe's "Bildung" meant a harmonious and ultimately 
self-centered development of individual potentials; as in Goethe's 
understanding of life, in Blumenbach's biology the dynamic 
indestructibility of "Gestalt" was claimed. 
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But scientific concepts should in some way be observable or 
measurable, and attempts to find a physically measurable 
correlative for the "Bildungstrieb" in galvanism or magnetism 
remained unsuccesful. It was not a scientific "discovery", but 
an index to the intellectual climate of the age: in the decades 
following it emerged as a useful expression of organic drive 
which was felt to be operating in individual lives as well as in 
the movement of history. 
For instance, "Bildungstrieb" provided the biological pattern 
to Herder's historical scheme in Ideen zur Philosophie der 
Geschichte der Menschheit, where it was claimed that a unique force 
pervaded the universe and moved the tiniest part of it. Following 
Blumenbach, 12 Herder imagined that this universal power was 
constitutive in a number of component forces, each with a 
peculiar function and value within a hierarchical order. 
Production and reproduction as muscular activities were on the 
lowest level; higher forms were supposed to exhibit a more 
delicate structure, and a division of labor guided by the nerves 
and the brain. The latter was the center and director of recepti-
vity and activity.l3 This way Herder combined Haller's ideas 
on sensibility and irritability with Blumenbach's conception 
of a unitary force, and projected a vast dynamic movement along 
an evolutionary scale. 
Herder's impact upon the German intellectual life of the last 
two decades in the eighteenth century is well-known and need 
not be discussed here; Navalis entered his university studies 
with a copy of the ldeen-the only book in his library at that time 
which had some relevance to scientific problems.I4 Later he also 
acquired a copy of a speech by the biologist C. F. Kielmeyer 
(1765-1844) which seems to be a codified version of Herder's 
sketchy ideas on the hierarchy of organic forces.15 Kielmeyer 
recognized five different properties unequal in value but all of 
them indispensable for the maintenance of life. On the lowest 
level were the mechanical forces of secretion and propulsion 
providing for the proper distribution, absorption, and secretion 
of fluids. Above these vegetative forces rose the tripartite 
hierarchy of "higher" properties, an arrangement that owes 
much to the experiments of Haller for Kielmeyer defined these 
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properties as sensibility, the passive property of internalizing 
external impulses, irritability, the contractility of muscles, and 
finally the reproductive capacity of the organism.l6 Although 
Kielmeyer's speech was hailed by Schelling as epochmaking 
(Sch, I, 633), it was never seriously adopted in scientific in-
vestigations, perhaps because the list seemed arbitrary. Like 
Blumenbach's theory, Kielmeyer's scheme became important, 
however, in the emerging "Naturphilosophie", where it met 
with medical and biological speculations also related to Haller's 
experiments but originating from England. 
III. JOHN BROWN'S MEDICAL THEORY 
Although the conclusions of Haller's experiments were not 
universally accepted in England, they were received with 
interest and subjected to scrutiny; as a consequence, the 
functioning of the nervous system received increased attention in 
medical research and thinking. The word "neurosis" was 
coined in the Synopsis Nosologiae Methodicae (London, 1769) of the 
Scot William Cullen (1710-179o),U professor of chemistry and 
medicine at Edinburgh and founder of the medical school at 
Glasgow. Cullen was among the originators of the neuro-
pathologist school of medicine by claiming that the nervous 
system regulated the organism, and nervous atony and spasm 
were responsible for diseases. 
It remained, however, for a student and later opponent of 
Cullen, John Brown (1735-1788), to simplify and popularize 
these ideas. This odd genius founded an illustrious family 
which includes Ford Madox Brown the painter and Ford 
Mad ox Ford, 18 opened an odd chapter in the history of medicine, 
and exerted a remarkable influence on the intellectual life of 
Goethe's age. 
Brown's chef d'oeuvre, the Elementa Medicinae, 19 appeared 
a year after its author graduated from medical school, to answer 
the momentuous question posed by the author himself: "whether 
the medical art, until then conjectural, incoherent, and, in the 
great body of it, false, was not, at last, reduced to a demon-
strated science, which might be called the science of life."20 
This rhetorical question, prompted in Brown by the shining 
success of Newton, he answered himself in a modest footnote: 
"That question has been answered in the affirmative by every 
one who had been at due pains to understand the doctrine."21 
This "science of life" rested on the central idea that in "all 
states of life, man and other animals differ from themselves in 
their dead state, or from any other inanimate matter in this 
property alone: that they can be affected by external agents, as 
well as by certain functions peculiar to themselves."22 Thus 
internal and external stimulations enter the organism much the 
same way as ideas enter consciousness in Locke's theory of 
ideas. But whereas the Lockean stimuli impinge on a tabula rasa, 
in Brown's definition the organism was not quite passive with 
regard to external stimulation (a central feature of his philosophy 
for Schelling and Novalis), for at the outset of life it was 
supposed to have received a fixed quantity of excitability: 
"We know not what excitability is, or in what manner it is 
affected by the exciting powers. But whatever it be, either a 
certain quantity, or a certain energy of it is assigned to every 
being upon the commencement of its living state."23 External 
agents, such as heat, food, and air, and internal stimuli, due to 
thinking and the emotions, constantly feed upon this excit-
ability, which recovers a part, but never the totality of its loss 
during rest or sleep. According to Brown, internal and external 
stimuli constitute together the exciting powers, and if excitability 
or either of the two exciting powers is withdrawn, life ceases, for 
"nothing else is necessary to life."24 Paradoxically, the exciting 
powers support life but simultaneously exhaust it-which gives 
a touch of melancholy to Brown's theory: "It is not therefore 
true, that some powers are contrived by nature for the preser-
vation of life and health, others to bring on diseases and death. 
The tendency of them all is indeed to support life, but in a 
forced way, and then to bring on death, but by a spontaneous 
operation. "25 
Brown believed that the health of an organism depended 
solely on the proper amount of stimulation, sicknesses could 
therefore arise only from a lack or an overdose of it and had to 
be one of two types: overstimulation brought the body into 
a state of excitement called sthenic, while organisms with a 
debility in stimulation and excitement were said to be asthenic. 
The two states also differed insofar as the extreme of the sthenic 
state converted into exhaustion, called Indirect Debility (or 
indirectly asthenic state), while the extreme of the asthenic 
diseases directly led to death. 
Since all diseases merely depended on the quantity of stimu-
lation, the aim of healing was to reestablish the proper amount 
of it: stimulation and excitement were to be reduced in sthenic 
diseases and increased in asthenic ones. 25 Brown considered 
most diseases asthenic, and therefore his cure usually consisted 
in the application of stimulating and strengthening medicaments 
and foods-a positive contribution to the medical practice of the 
time, still steeped in debilitating methods such as bloodletting.26 
Yet Brown's fortifying cure was a mixed blessing. He 
believed that "spirituous or vinous drink . . . stimulates more 
quickly, and more readily, than seasoned food, and its stimulus 
is in proportion to the quantity of alkahol which it contains." 
More important: ". . . there are stimuli, which possess an 
operation as much quicker, and more powerful, than these just 
now mentioned ... the highest of all, as far as experiments have 
yet reflected light upon the subject, is opium."27 Perhaps these 
stimulating yet life-consuming powers inspired Brown's 
resigned and poetic meditation on human fate: ". . . life is a 
forced state; . . . the tendency of animals, every moment, is to 
dissolution; ... they are kept from it by foreign powers, and 
even by these with difficulty, and only for a little; and then, 
from the necessity of their fate, give way to death."2B 
The "foreign powers" caught up with Brown-in 1788 still 
poor and neglected-and the years to come did not bring him 
more recognition in England. Yet his works were embarking 
upon a curious new life all over the world: in the United States 
his fellow-student from Edinburgh, Benjamin Rush, published an 
edition of the Elements which was followed by five more; there 
were several Spanish translation both in Spain and in Mexico; in 
Italy the reception was so serious that versions of his theory 
dominated Italian medical thinking into the third decade of the 
nineteenth century; in France it was published and according 
to Walter Scott even Napoleon was a confirmed believer in the 
theory. One medical authority claims, however, that Brown's 
treatment had more casualties than all the Napoleonic Wars. 
IV. BROWN'S THEORY IN GERMANY 
Brown's theory had its most serious intellectual impact in 
Germany. Although Blumenbach, Goethe, Kielmeyer, Herder, 
and many others may be regarded as forerunners, romantic 
science and medicine did not come to full life until Brown's 
ideas invaded Germany. The precise date of this is, however, 
somewhat obscure. During his tour in 1798-99 Coleridge noted 
with curiosity that in Germany, where foreign ideas were as a 
rule taken up quickly, Brown's theory had found only a late 
reception. 29 We know now that this remark, copied almost 
verbatim from the Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung, was not quite 
correct. As early as 1790 an article in Rosier's journal de P~sique 
described a medical theory ominously resembling the Elementa, 
deviating from it only insofar as it ascribed the degree of 
irritability (excitability) in the body to the quantity of oxygen in 
it.30 The article was written by a German, Christoph Girtan-
ner, and received much critical attention in Germany; but a few 
years later the plagiarism was discovered and Girtanner had to 
defend himself by claiming that he had written a parody of 
Brown which the sullen Germans had missed. 31 Later he became 
serious enough to write a two volume critique of Brown's work 
and to close the affair with the feeling of victory: "Nunmehr 
aber, nachdem ich meinen miichtigen Gegner durch die Waffen 
der V ernunft bekiimpft, und ihn so zu Boden geworfen habe, 
daB er nicht wieder aufstehen kann, trete ich, mit dem ange-
nehmen Gefiihle des Siegers, von dem Kampf-Plaze ab, und 
hiinge, gleich den Gladiatoren des alten Roms, meine Waffen-
Rustung auf."32 
Another entry in Coleridge's notebook throws light both on 
himself and on the philosophical conditions prevailing in 
Germany when Brown's ideas penetrated there. Answering 
Girtanner's accusations that Brown attributed universal validity 
to ideas which were built on induction and analogy, 33 Coleridge 
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wrote that "Brown was no Kantian & probably held nothing 
but high degrees of Probability possible."34 Once more, 
Coleridge's remark holds only partially: although Brown was 
indeed no Kantian, he was, for all practical purposes, turned into 
one by German philosophers and physicians. To the same 
objection by Girtanner, an avid supporter of Brown remarked 
in the spirit of Kant: Excitability was no object of spatial 
perception but an a priori concept of the mind and that both 
induction and analogy were indispensable modes of under-
standing in all the natural sciences.35 
In 1798, when Girtanner believed he had eliminated Brown 
from the ring, the Elements of Medicine actually enjoyed 
rising reputation in Germany. Its most loyal defender was 
M.A. Weikard (1742-I8o3), a former court physician to Empress 
Catherine of Russia. He had published a German translation 
of the Elements in 179 5 together with his own Entwurf einer 
einfachern Arzenrykunsf36 which also dealt with the teachings of 
Brown. In the following two years W eikard added to these a 
handbook and a magazine,37 all of which were to disseminate 
the "dogmas" in a fittingly dogmatic manner; he was a passionate 
but untalented and intolerant disciple of the new gospel, advo-
cated the discarding of nosology and diagnostics, and held all 
former medical knowledge in contempt. His ruthless, personal 
attacks against members of the establishment and critics of the 
new system polarized opinions, and while they alienated many 
of the older doctors they won him a significant section of the 
young students. The spirit of revolution was smuggled with 
Brown into Germany. 
Of Weikard's medical practice we possess a charming little 
souvenir in Justinus Kerner's Das Bilderbuch atts meiner Knaben-
zeit. The young Kerner, who suffered of a nervous stomach, was 
once brought to the "Wunderdoktor" of Heilbronn and was 
subjected to a lengthy examination, at the end of which he 
fainted. Weikard, the "Wunderdoktor", until then evidently 
undecided whether to call the disease sthenic or asthenic, now 
unhesitatingly declared that the disease was asthenic and 
prescribed for it "Hoppelpoppel" and "Pfefferkorn". Since 
"Hoppelpoppel", a Russian concoction of tea, egg yolk, and 
cherry brandy, did not appeal to the young Kerner, he promtly 
decided to throw up whenever it was administered to him. The 
"Wunderdoktor", in turn, remarked with firmness and decorum 
upon departure: "Furchtbare Asthenie durch zu schnelle 
Entwickelung ist es, sonst nichts ... und da miissen nur starken-
de Mittel gereicht werden"38 - which might have been the 
correct diagnosis after all. 
For all his zeal, Weikard probably did more harm than good, 
and the fad would have quickly passed, had more imaginative 
minds not seized, developed, and reinterpreted the dogma. 
A. F. Marcus and A. Roschlaub were engaged in such a re-
valuation at the clinic of Bamberg, which became the center for 
the study of Brown's theory. Marcus, the chief physician, 
published the Priifung des Brownischen Systems der Heilkunde 
between 1797 and 1799, a book consisting of bedside observa-
tions and case histories interpreted in terms of Brown's theory.a9 
Roschlaub, in turn, published the Magazin zur Vervollkomnm11ng 
der theoretischen und practischen Heilkunde which became the 
mouthpiece of Brown's followers after the quick foundering of 
Weikard's magazine. 
Even more important was the appearance of Roschlaub's 
Untersllch11ngen iiber Pathogenic, a book which started from 
Brown's premises but subtly and perhaps unknowingly read-
justed them according to German philosophical ideas. The 
young Schelling was deeply impressed by it even though he 
disagreed with its mechanistic premises, and when he decided 
that his medical knowledge needed reinforcement he went to 
observe Marcus and Roschlaub at work. He spent the ill-fated 
summer of r 8oo in Bamberg while Karoline Schlegel and her 
daughter, K. Bohmer, stayed in the nearby Bocklet; it was 
rumored that Schelling applied Brownian cure to the girl who 
suddenly died at the end of the summer-at least this is what the 
Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung asserted years later in its war against 
the romantics.40 Schelling remained, however, a friend of the 
physicians at Bamberg and became with Marcus co-editor of the 
Jahrbiicher der Medicinals Wissenschajt( r 8o6-o8). By that time both 
Marcus and Roschlaub became followers of his "Naturphilo-
sophie". 
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Goethe too had his experience with Brown's treatment, 
though this was considerably milder. As recorded in the Tag-
und jahreshefte, Goethe once accepted from a young friend a 
Brownian medication with opium against pains in his chest. The 
pains deceptively ceased for a brief period but soon returned 
with increased vigor.41 As a result, both Brown and Roschlaub 
found their way into the pantheon of Goethe's enemies: 
Wenn ich nun im holden Baine 
Unter meinen Freunden wandle, 
Mogens meine Feinde haben, 
Die als Kegel ich behandle. 
Kommt nur her, geliebte Freunde! 
LaBt uns schleudern, laBt uns schieben; 
Seht nur, es ist jedem Kegel 
Auch sein Name angeschrieben .... 
Brown steht hinten in dem Grunde, 
Roschlaub aber trutzt mir vorne, 
Und besonders diesen letzten 
Hab ich immer auf dem Korne. 42 
Goethe's criticism was shared by others, and most medical 
authorities expressed some reservations about the new ideas. 
The opposition grouped around the dignified C. W. Hufeland 
(1762-1836), a court physician at Weimar who published the 
influental]ourna/ der practischen Arznrykunde und Wundarznrykunst 
and Bibliothek der practischen Heilkunde, and ran a series of 
critical articles on the Brownians and their theory. As a student 
of Blumenbach Hufeland was not unfavorably disposed towards 
theories of excitability (which did seem to be a form of "Lebens-
kraft"), but the Brownian movement in Germany appeared to 
him as a misguided revolution. He claimed that in science 
development was evolutionary and not revolutionary, 43 and he 
shared with Locke the view that medicine ought to be put 
together piecemeal, by the slow accumulation of bedside obser-
vations. A priori constructs of pure reason had no place in 
medicine, for its theories were always contingent upon ex-
perience.44 Even worse, the adherents of Brown, like the 
Jacobins in France, were not heralds of a new freedom, but 
would-be dictators of a new dogma and oppressors of the mind's 
freedom to inquire. 4 5 
Hufeland was of course right in regarding the Brownians as a 
group of zealots in defence of a "dogma" which promised all 
too easy solutions for life, death, and disease. But he was too 
deeply steeped in seventeenth-century rationalism to recognize 
that only on the elementary level did science develop through 
the evolutionary process of collecting facts. The history of 
eighteenth-century science was dotted with important dis-
coveries which were made in the name of an imaginative scheme 
or a theory which later proved to be wrong. It remained for the 
romantics to recognize the role that imagination, conviction, 
and even partisan fanaticism have in the apparently objective and 
neutral sciences. As Wordsworth put it, the poet "considers 
man and nature as essentially adapted to each other, and the 
mind of man as naturally the mirror of the fairest and most 
interesting properties of nature" -thus theory need not wait 
till all empirical evidence is collected. Novalis was acquainted 
with Hufeland's magazines,46 but the editor's approach seemed 
pedestrian and pedantic to him: Hufeland's "Makrobiotik", a 
popular work on how to prolong life through moderation, 
upheld a "principle of mediocrity" (II, 464) against which 
Novalis developed his own vision of qualitatively raising and 
projecting humanity into the infinite. 
II 
Sources and Impulses 
I. IMAGINATION AND HYPOCHONDRIA 
In the only source about Novalis' early youth, a biography 
which was drawn up by his brother Karl, one finds an interesting 
note on his nature and development: 
Er war der erste Sohn und das zte Kind frommer 
Eltern; in seinen ersten Kinderjahren war er 
schwachlich doch ohne schwere Krankheit his in 
das 9te Jahr, auch schien er his dahin keinen auBer-
ordentlichen Geist zu versprechen, und nur die vor-
zugliche Liebe und zartliche Anhanglichkeit zu 
seiner Mutter zeichnete ihn vor seinen andern 
Geschwister a us; ... In seinem 9ten Jahre bekam er 
die Ruhr, und als Folge dieser Krankheit eine Atonic 
des Magens die nur dutch die schmerzhaftesten 
Reizmittel und eine langwierige Cur konnte gehoben 
werden;-Jezt schien sein Geist auf einmal zu er-
wachen; .. .I 
The medical terminology in Karl's report clearly indicates the 
penetration of Brownian medicine into the parlance of everyday. 
Since the theory was yet unknown at the time when Novalis 
had actually fallen sick (but was widely used when Karl wrote 
his reminiscences), the trustworthiness of the report-at 
least from a medical point of view-is open to question. It 
seems therefore unwarranted to conclude, as K. J. Obenauer 
did, that the description of this disease and its remarkable 
similarity to a passage in Book VI of Goethe's Wilhelm Meisters 
Lehrjahre signified a latent mystic potential in the poet. 2 From 
a variety of reports we get the picture of a rather healthy and 
normal child that showed no extraordinary signs of introspection 
and withdrawal. His main interest did, however, foreshadow 
his ultimate field of excellence: a list of books he took to Jena 
at the beginning of his university studies contains almost 
exclusively works from men of letters and perhaps only some 
papers of Herder foreshadow Hardenberg's later interest in 
science. A somewhat later note, probably from Leipzig, lists 
plans to study theater, philosophy, law, history, and languages, 
but mentions none of the sciences. It is therefore more than 
likely that he had neither training nor any great knowledge in 
these fields by the time he received his law degree in Witten-
berg.3 
While medicine was a discipline which needed special 
concentration, sickness was a universal experience into which 
Novalis was initiated early in his life. His concern with hypo-
chondria demonstrates well that personal experiences in his 
early life interacted later with philosophical and scientific 
attitudes. 
In the Nachlese there is a report on a premature childbirth in 
1783 which seriously upset the psychological balance ofNovalis' 
mother: 
Zwar schwand die Lebensgefahr nach einigen Wo-
chen, aber es blieb eine Art Hypochondrie zuriick, 
die zeitweise in Schwermuth auszuarten drohte und, 
verbunden mit korperlicher Hinfiilligkeit, die sonst so 
kraftige, lebensfrische Frau fur mehrere Jahre un-
fahig machte, sich urn ihren Haushalt zu bekiim-
mern. Es traten Monate ein, wo sie entweder in 
volliger Theilnahmlosigkeit verharrte oder durch 
alles aufs Aeu13erste erregt und geangstigt wurde 
(p. 17)· 
As the context indicates, hypochondria denoted in the eighteenth 
century states of mental depression which affected the physiol-
ogical functioning of the body, diseases which would today 
be called psychosomatic. Although there is no way to know 
how the mother's hypochondria affected Novalis, her illness 
was surely one reason why the mysteries of hypochondria were 
foremost in his mind and became indicative of the problematic 
nature of the imagination itself. A second biographical factor 
was the prolonged sickness of Erasmus, who suffered from 
various diseases and passed away on April 14, 1797, a month 
after the death of Sophie. 
Novalis referred to hypochondria for the first time when he 
reported to his father that Erasmus, who was studying with 
him in Leipzig, had an attack [sic] of this disease during Christ-
mas of 1792 (IV, 36). Soon after, when Novalis left Leipzig to 
embark on a military career, he wrote a letter to Erasmus. 
It may be thought that the paternal tone of this letter reflects 
admonitions that Novalis himself received at this time from his 
father. But it is more true to say that the rules of conduct given 
to Erasmus are meant for Novalis: he was critical of those 
traits in Erasmus which he found questionable in himself. Hence 
the discussion of Erasmus' hypochondria reflects Novalis' own 
uncertainty concerning the use and the value of the imagination: 
[der Natur] getreulich folgen, nie ungeduldig zu 
sein, immer das Gute anzuerkennen, was wir haben, 
und nicht von der kranken Empfindung und Phanta-
sie Parallelen ziehn zu lassen, die hochst unniitz, 
schadlich und unwahr sind, nicht zu raffinieren auf 
Empfindung oder Situation, nichts unterdriicken, 
was gesundes, wahres Gefiihl ist, ... das ist das, was 
uns zu tun iibrig bleibt .... Reine Wil/enskraft, ohne 
alles Gewiihl von raffinierten Gefiihlen, ist das, 
wodurch wir einzig leben und handeln konnen .... 
Sie ists, wodurch wir gesund sind und werden. 
. . . Wo kranke Phantasie, da ist auch kranke Emp-
findung und kranker V erstand. Eins wird durch das 
andre gesund. So wirkt auch Gesundheit des Kor-
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pers und der Seele ineinander, obgleich nie oder 
hochst selten Krankheit des Korpers wesentlich 
nachteiligen EinfluB auf das Gemut haben kann, 
wenn reine, feste, ewige Willens kraft da ist .... 4 
Even if one discounts some of the excesses, which are due to the 
didactic form and purpose of the letter, this is a remarkable 
document in romantic literature that sharply contrasts with 
the self-assured and at times jubilant affirmation of the imag-
ination one is accustomed to in the writings of Wordsworth, 
Keats, Shelley and others. Within Novalis' oeuvre, however, 
the letter represents not merely a juvenile stage which he 
overcame later, but a recurring theme which may be followed 
through the notebooks and letters. It has been insufficiently 
realized that although Novalis later assigned a positive and 
important function to the creative imagination-which he 
denoted with Fichte's "produktive Einbildungskraft" 5-he 
nevertheless retained to the very end of his life an ironic distrust 
of the imagination, of his own poetic talents, and of the value of 
poetry. He remarked that the seat of his own harmful qualities 
was the imagination (IV, IIo), and he described it as an amoral 
if not immoral force which, like dreams, prefers the night and 
times of loneliness when the moral and intellectual powers relax 
their hold on consciousness. Hence he felt the constant need to 
curb it. 
Since the letter to Erasmus repeatedly mentions "kranke 
Phantasie" and "kranke Empfindung", one might at first sight 
be inclined to agree with Professor Haering that one ought to 
distinguish between a healthy and a decadent form of "Empfin-
dung" and that Novalis judges only the diseased version as 
harmful. But Novalis indicates only the symptoms and the 
results; is there a way of knowing when he means the healthy 
and when the diseased form? Let us return to the letter to 
Erasmus for clarification: 
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Kannst Du so viel tiber Deine Einbildungskraft 
gewinnen, wie mir es sehr moglich scheint, daB sie 
Dir nicht immer andere Zustande vorspiegelt, die 
eine gewisse, bloB idealische Behaglichkeit haben, 
und hingegen der V ernunft und Empfindung so 
untergeordnet ist, daB sie Dir bloB zur V erschone-
rung und inneren Unabhangigkeit von der AuBen-
welt client: so wirst Du mutig und fest die Bahn 
gehen, die Dir der Genius Deines Schicksals jetzt 
hier vorzeichnet (IV, 4 5); Nur nicht zuviel uber-
haupt und zuviel untereinander gelesen. . . . Schiller 
gar nicht .... Philosophic und Verse sind jetzt fur 
Dich nichts nutze und die letztern werden es nie 
sein .... Rousseau gar nicht (IV, 48). 
Knowing that Hardenberg had a deep respect for Schiller and 
devoted his own life to poetry and philosophy, it could hardly be 
maintained that he talks here about the "decadent" form of 
imagination. 6 It seems much more reasonable to assume that 
there was only one kind of imagination for Navalis, which 
appeared in different lights according to the circumstances and 
his disposition; the judgements of the letter have to be taken 
as partial truths, as inversions of equally valid positive views. 
In fact, the clash between the negative ,bloB" and the positive 
expressions "idealische Behaglichkeit" and "innere Unabhangig-
keit von der Aui3enwelt" suggests that even within the letter 
there is ambiguity. All we can say is that Novalis condemns 
here the harmful effects of the imagination: the sickly fantasy, 
and the refined aesthetic enjoyment of sophisticated feelings 
which undermines the willpower and results in hypochondria. 
Probably in the fall of 1797, the theme of hypochondria 
emerged again amidst thoughts about Sophie and the phi-
losophies of Kant and Fichte: "Hypochondrie ist eine sehr 
merckwurdige Kranckheit. Es giebt eine kleine und eine 
erhabene Hypochondrie. Von hier aus muB man in die Seele 
einzudringen suchen. (Ubrige Gemuthskranckheiten. /"(II, 3 9 5 ). 
Although Novalis did not spell out the distinction between 
minor and sublime hypochondria-the blur manifests the 
ambiguity of his thought-the split evidently served to separate 
the petty disease from that useful cognitive function which by 
now Novalis attributed to hypochondria. He not only believed, 
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as Freud did later, that the study of this peculiar form of self-
deception leads us to a knowledge of character, he also recognized 
in hypochondria the workings of a creative force that can 
objectify emotions. The idea was repeated in a note from the 
first half of 1798: "Uber Hypochondrie und Eifersucht-2 sehr 
merckwurdigen Phaenomenen zur Kenntnifi der Seele etc." 
(II, 55 5). 
Amidst notes written a few months later, Navalis went a step 
further and specified the forces that may be harnessed through 
hypochondria: "Die Hypochondrie bahnt den W eg zur korperli-
chen Selbstkenntni13-Selbstbeherrschung-Se/bstlebung" (II, 6o7). 
The typically disjunct mode of Novalis' prose proceeds here 
from "Selbstkenntni13" through "Selbstbeherrschung" to 
"Selbstlebung". While "Selbstkenntni13" merely reiterates the 
idea that hypochondria may provide us with knowledge, the 
antithetical terms "Selbstbeherrschung" and "Selbstlebung" 
suggest that Novalis took now a wider perspective of this 
disease. He did so probably in response to an open letter by 
Kant to Hufeland entitled "Von der Macht des Gemutbs durch 
den blo13en V orsatz seiner krankhaften Gefuhle Meister zu 
seyn", in which Kant regarded hypochondria as a mere sign of 
excessive sensibility that should be overcome through reason 
and determination. 7 N ovalis held a very different view. Not 
only did he believe that hypochondria may be utilized for useful 
purposes, but he saw in it a proof that factual knowledge was 
inseparable from morality and faith: hypochondria was both 
"Selbstkenntni13" (knowledge) and "Selbstlebung" (moral 
action). The need to bring these two together was first expressed 
by him amidst excerpts from Hemsterhuis-"Wir wissen nur, 
insoweit wir machen"8 -and this theme became subsequently 
important in the notebooks. Characteristically, in the passage on 
hypochondria the link between knowledge and action is 
"Selbstbeherrschung", the "reine Willenskraft" of the earlier 
letter to Erasmus. In opposition to Kant Novalis held then that 
the potentially dangerous imagination may be rendered pro-
ductive and creative by fusing it with the disciplined will; 
this implication is spelled out and developed in an other note: 
"Absolute Hypochondrie-Hypochondrie mu13 eine Kunst 
werden-oder Erziehung werden" (II, 6r4). Hypochondria is 
defined here both as a form of future artistry- because its 
cultivation would necessitate the shaping power of the artist-
and a moral excercise. As a result this psychological aberration 
could be transformed into an educated form of the imagination. 9 
In summary, hypochondria was to Navalis the sign of genius, 
but also of excessive imagination and of mental derangement. 
Indeed, one may define Navalis' often discussed concept of 
"magic" as a mental activity so intense and so imaginatively 
deranged that it becomes the order of the world. It is Rimbaud's 
"immense et raisonne dereglement de tous les sens" applied not 
only to the task of the poet but all of human consciousness: 
"In der Periode der Magie client der Korper der Seele, oder der 
Geisterwelt. f Wahnsinn- S chwarmerry.f Gemeinschaftlicher 
Wahnsinn hort auf Wahnsinn zu seyn und wird Magie. Wahn-
sinn nach Regeln und mit vollem Bewu.Gtseyn" (II, 547). 
II. FIRST STUDIES 
Hardenberg's study of the technical sciences, such as geology, 
mineralogy, and mining technology, may be traced to the 
circumstances of his life, while his concern with mathematics was 
essentially philosophical. What initiated his study of medicine? 
It has often been suggested that biographical circumstances 
forced upon him this interest, even though medicine had no 
relation to his professional work. These assumptions were 
apparently supported by A. C. Just, Novalis' superior and friend 
from Tennstedt, who was the first to link Sophie's disease and 
Hardenberg's interest in medicine: "Ihre Krankheit hatte ihn 
indes veranla.Gt, sich mit der Arzneiwissenschaft naher bekannt 
zu machen" (IV, 429 ). Yet Just was sensible enough to 
realize that the medical studies, which extended over a con-
siderable period of time, were at best only initiated by this tragic 
experience and that the deeper reasons were probably internal 
and philosophical: "Zwei Studien waren es, deren eine er nun 
vorzi.iglich zu trciben wi.inschte: Arzneiwissenschaft oder Berg-
werkskunde. Zu jener zog ihn die Neigung, zu dieser bestimmte 
ihn die Pflicht. Schon mit d:::n herrschenden Systemen und 
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neusten Entdeckungen der Heilkunde bekannt, wi.inschte und 
strebte er, sie auf ein einfaches Prinzip begri.inden und ihr 
dadurch GewiBheit geben zu konnen" (IV, 43 r). 
Reading the letters and notes of Novalis from the first half 
of 1797, one indeed feels that Novalis did not turn to science and 
medicine because these promised to give him immediate aid in 
combating disease and suffering, but because he attempted, as 
Just said, to base them upon a simple principle. In February 
he wrote to Erasmus: 
Dein EntschluB, Algebra zu studieren, ist gewiB sehr 
heilsam. Die Wissenschaften haben wunderbare 
Heilkrafte-wenigstens stillen sie, wie Opiate, die 
Schmerzen und erheben uns in Spharen, die ein 
ewiger Sonnenschein umgibt. Sie sind die schonste 
Freistatte, die uns gegonnt ward. Ohne diesen Trost 
wollt ich und konnt ich nicht leben. Wie hatt ich 
ohne sie seit anderthalb Jahren so gelassen S[o-
phiens] Krankheit zusehn und auBerdem so man-
chen V erdrieBlichkeiten ausgesetzt sein konnen? 
Es mag mir begegnen was will; die Wissenschaften 
bleiben mir-mit ihnen hoff ich alles Ungemach 
des Lebens zu bestehn.1° 
Two weeks later the imminent death of Sophie made him write 
that the realm of science was as dead and barren as the world 
itself (IV, r 79), but at the end of March, i.e. after Sophie's death, 
he reported to Just that he studied the sciences this time from 
"a higher point of view" .11 The course of these studies was 
not even interrupted by Sophie's sickness and death, for 
sporadic diary entries between January and April 1797 record 
readings in mathematics and philosophy, and specifically refer 
to the names of Schelling and Pascal.I2 The study of Schelling's 
works must have continued after Sophie's death, for in a letter 
to Schlegel (June 14) we find the remark: "Mit Schelling such 
ich je eher, je Heber bekannt zu werden. In einem Stucke ent-
spricht er mir mehr als Fichte. Ich will bald wissen, was ich 
an ihm haben kann" (IV, zo8). In addition, there are several 
entries about Schelling in the diary that Navalis kept after the 
death of Sophie, between April I 8 and July 6: "Gestern friih 
schrieb ich philosophische Gedanken von Wert auf, las in 
Schellings Briefen iiber Dogmat[ismus] und Kriti[ zismus J ... 
[June z8]; Nachmittags blattert ich in Schellings 'Ich' ... [June 
30 J; Ich las friih in Schelling ... [July I]; Sonntag friih Schelling 
... Abends Bosen getroffen-Schellings 'Ideen' erhalten ... [July 
2 ]."13 
All these scattered remarks indicate that by the middle of 
1797 Navalis was familiar with Schelling's early works, in-
cluding the Ideen, the first work which showed that after his 
arrival at Leipzig in I 796 Schelling turned to the natural sciences 
and attempted to form a coherent "Naturphilosophie". The 
turn to "Naturphilosophie" accelerated Schelling's alienation 
from Fichte, hence Navalis' interest in Schelling was a sign of 
his own separation from Fichte. After the thorough studies of 
Fichte's works in I795-96 Navalis also entered upon a new phase 
of his intellectual development, freeing himself from the cold-
ness and abstractions of the Wissenschaftslehre.l4 In Schelling's 
works he found not only a philosophical approach to nature but 
also an inclination towards Spinoza's ecstatic and mystic love 
of the universe, elements which were altogether absent from 
Fichte's philosophy of the self. The paths of Schelling and Na-
valis diverged soon after the initial encounter, but Navalis 
remained the only major figure in the romantic movement who 
shared with Schelling an interest for science and medicine and 
an understanding of them.15 
III. SCHELLING'S EARLY PHILOSOPHY 
The title of Schelling's first important work, Vom lch als 
Princip der Philosophie, shows that he started as a disciple of 
Fichte. Yet in even this work the author's respect for Spinoza 
throws a curious light on his espousal of Fichte's idealism. The 
Philosophische Briefe iiber Dogmatismus und Kriticismus of the same 
year puts this duality in Schelling's mind in a sharper relief: 
although the work purported to defend criticism (i.e., Fichte's 
idealism), Schelling confessed later that these letters were 
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written not so much against dogmatism as against some follow-
ers of Kant who fashioned from their preceptor's philosophy a 
moral proof for the existence of God. To Schelling, their 
argument was logically circular and morally timid compared to 
consistent dogmatism which quietly surrendered the self to the 
cosmos: "Der consequente Dogmatism us geht nicht auf Kampf, 
sondern auf Unterwerfung, nicht auf gewaltsamen, sondern auf 
freiwilligen Untergang, auf stille Hingabe meiner selbst ans 
absolute Objekt ... " (Sch, I, 2o8). 
Although Schelling finally rejected this dogmatic submission 
so supremely exemplified in Spinoza's philosophy, he could do 
so only practically, i.e., for personal and not for theoretical 
reasons. Moreover, the rejection was mellowed by the profound 
admiration that Schelling expressed for the aestheticism and 
heroism which he discovered in Spinoza's submission to the 
forces of the universe: "Die stille Hingabe ans UnermeBliche, 
die Ruhe im Arme der Welt, ist es, was die Kunst auf dem 
andern Extreme jenem Kampfe entgegenstellt: stoische 
Geistesruhe, eine Ruhe, die den Kampf erwartet, oder ihn schon 
geendigt hat, steht in der Mitte" (Sch, I, 208). 
A major portion of Schelling's essay is taken up with the 
attempt to understand Spinoza's "quiet surrender to the 
unfathomable". To the student of Fichte for whom the highest 
philosophical principle was the "courage to be", it was quintes-
sential to unravel Spinoza's heroic "courage to suffer and to 
disintegrate". Schelling's search revealingly yielded two major 
points, each of which became important in his own philosophy: 
in Spinoza Schelling had found material for his organic views 
and his concept of "intellektuale Anschauung". 
Both of these elements in Spinoza's philosophy became im-
portant to Novalis: against Fichte's disdain for the not-I he 
worked out an organic view of nature, and his frequent use of 
"intellektuale Anschauung" is traceable to Schelling's-and not 
Fichte's-use of it.l6 Spinoza's sensibility became of growing 
importance to Schelling and Novalis once they turned to the 
philosophy of nature and the study of science.17 
Novalis was also in agreement with Schelling's judgement 
that Spinoza's passive subservience ran counter to the "highest 
demand" of critical philosophy: "Be!". This is probably the 
meaning of a somewhat cryptic remark by Novalis, in which 
he entertained the idea of synthesizing Spinozism with hylozo-
ism (the teaching that all matter is self-animated) (II, 5 2.9). 
While Fichte asserted that the original act of the absolute self 
was self-generated, and that even the empirical self was a 
morally free agent, in Spinoza's philosophy thought and action 
were predetermined. Novalis, however, believed that all 
philosophy was a self-ignition of the mind so that the resultant 
chain of thought was determined by the shape of the acting 
intelligence (II, 53 o). 
Even after departing from Schelling, Novalis returned to 
Spinoza: there are notes in the "Brouillon" on Spinoza and 
Plotinus which were occasioned by Novalis' reading of D. 
Tiedemann's Geist der spekulativen Philosophic in the fall of 1798. 
Although Tiedemann traced Spinozism to the cabbala and neo-
Platonic thought, both of which were alien to his cast of mind, 
he mentioned it in his discussion of Plotinus and gave it a rather 
fair and detailed description in the sixth volume of his work. 
He pointed out that since, according to Spinoza, everything was 
attribute and modification within God, there could be no 
emanation or "chain of being" in his philosophy. Perhaps this 
ubiquitousness of God and this tight universal organization in 
Spinoza's philosophy appealed to Novalis as "wolliistiges 
Wissen", sensuous and immediate knowledge. For this insight 
he valued the Dutch philosopher more than such contemporaries 
as Ritter, Baader, and Schelling (IV, 263). 
Schelling's ldeen zu einer Philosophic der Natur, which Novalis 
read during the summer of 1797, directs our attention to more 
specifically scientific matters, for with this work Schelling 
quietly departed from Fichte and turned to "Naturphilosophie". 
The question to which he addressed his essay (and all later works 
on the philosophy of nature) was still within the context of 
Fichte's philosophy, but his method and his answer were 
certainly incompatible with Fichte's solution. In the Wissen-
schaftslehre the question of how the mind knows about things 
outside was unfolded through a chain of dialectical arguments 
which started with the first and unconditional statement about 
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the primeval act of positing.18 Schelling's epistemology started, 
however, with a critique on one hand and the body of empirical 
knowledge on the other, working its way back to a hypothesized 
primeval unity of dialectical opposites, such as spirit and 
matter, object and subject (Sch, I, 7o6). In this search for 
original unity Schelling ignored the unity of consciousness in 
Fichte's absolute self and turned first to such dogmatist solutions 
as Spinoza's unity of an infinite substance and Leibniz's "pre-
established harmony". Eventually he found these too unsatis-
factory and turned his attention to organisms. He thought that 
each organism contained its own reason of existence, that 
it was its own cause and effect(Sch. I, 69o ). In a surprising devia-
tionfromidealisticthought Schelling assumed in this work that 
the idea of an organism resided in the phenomenon itself: "DaB 
ihr aber jede Pflanze als ein Individuum denkt, in welchem alles 
zu Einem Zweck zusammenstimmt, davon miiBt ihr den Grund 
in dem Ding auBer Euch suchen; ... ihr miiBt also einriiumen, 
daB die Einheit, mit der ihr es denkt, nicht bloB logisch (in 
euern Gedanken), sondern real (auBer euch wirklich) ist" (Sch, I, 
693). Nature appeared then as a huge supra-organism where 
every part contained a degree of life and the parts were sub-
ordinated to each other through an organizing and animating 
principle, the world-soul.I 9 Since, according to Schelling, 
human consciousness was part of this purposeful organization 
which united spirit and matter, nature expressed the laws of 
the mind not incidentally or through the mediation of a third 
entity-e.g., the God of Descartes' philosophy-but through 
the postulated primeval unity which necessitated that nature be 
the inverse side of human consciousness. Hence Schelling 
hoped to resolve the ancient problem of mind and matter, and 
the possibility of knowing about things outside of us: "Die 
Natur soll der sichtbare Geist, der Geist die unsichtbare Natur 
seyn. Hier also, in der absoluten Identitat des Geistes in uns 
und der Natur auBer uns, muB sich das Problem, wie eine 
Natur auBer uns moglich sey, auflosen" (Sch, I, 7o6). 
With this well-known statement in the Introduction, the 
Ideen reached a crescendo and outlined the aim and content 
of the coming papers on the philosophy of nature. The main 
body of the essay plunged into the chaotic profusion of con-
temporary science, in an attempt to fashion from it a coherent 
system that would conform to the ideas of the Introduction. 
Unfortunately, in spite of the expressed desire to build on the 
body of existing knowledge, Schelling fell prey to the dangers 
of philosophical speculation about science, distorted, overrated, 
and ignored ideas, and exposed himself to criticism. The essay 
treated of the inorganic realm only, and the planned second part 
about organisms was never written, although the Weltseele may 
be regarded as a substitute. 
What could have interested Navalis in this uneven, at times 
disjointed, at times fuzzy, and yet even today immensely 
stimulating work of Schelling? Above all, the Ideen was an 
example to him of how the body of empirical sciences may be 
treated within a single vision and comprehension. In addition, 
Schelling's book was probably the first among Navalis' 
readings in which the latest achievements and speculations in the 
empirical sciences were discussed, and thus the work probably 
served him as a guide in entering this foreign territory. For 
instance, Schelling gave great praise to a work by the still 
unknown C. A. Eschenmayer, stating that he had applied the 
Kantian principles of dynamics to the empirical sciences in a 
true philosophical temper (Sch, Suppl. I, 3 20 ). A few months 
after reading the Ideen Navalis made excerpts from the German 
version of Eschenmayer's Latin dissertation, probably upon 
Schelling's praise. Similarly, Navalis' reading of Kant's Meta-
physische Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschajt might be traced 
to Schelling's Ideen, where frequent reference was made to this 
work. 
Beyond these cases of mediation, the Ideen provided a new and 
detailed presentation of two concepts which preoccupied 
Navalis later: r. the concept of the organism; 2. the duality of 
primeval forces (attractive and repulsive) which, according to 
Schelling, structure the universe and all components of it. To 
be sure none of these were unique to Schelling: romantics in 
general uphold organic theories in poetry and philosophic 
thought. Yet, Schelling was the first among the professional 
philosophers to gather up a wealth of empirical evidence into a 
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single encompassing idea to which he was able to give eloquent 
expression in his papers on the philosophy of nature. Schelling 
was also a former follower of Fichte and a student of Kant; his 
"Naturphilosophie was therefore a response to the Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft and the Wissenschajtslehre, two works which had 
formed the intellectual background from which Navalis had to 
emancipate himself. Indeed, when Navalis reported to Schlegel 
on June 14, 1797 that he struggled his way through Fichte's 
"furchtbares Gewinde von Abstraktion", he also indicated 
that this was related to the reading of Schelling's works 
(IV, zo8). 
This early enthusiasm for Schelling did not last; by the end of 
the year the remarks on Schelling's conception of nature became 
increasingly critical. While the exact nature of the differences 
will have to be discussed later, it might be said in anticipation 
that Navalis agreed with Schelling on the local and temporal 
significance of such concepts as the dualism of forces and the 
organism, but he did not accept them as the universal and final 
forms of reality. Thus, for instance, as an immediate reaction 
to his reading of passages from Schelling and Spinoza he could 
remark in the "Brouillon": "Unser Geist soll sinnlich wahr-
nehmbare Maschine werden-nicht in uns, aber auBer uns. fUm-
gekehrte Aufgabe mit der AuBern Welt.f" (III, 252)-for this 
was in accordance with the principles of his own philosophy. 
Similarly, he could agree with Schelling that organisms cannot 
be explained without accounting for the spirit's secret tie with 
the body: "Leben ist vielleicht nichts anders, als das Resultat 
dieser Vereinigung-die Action dieser Beriihrung" (II, 643). 
But when Navalis interpreted the universe as a purposeful orga-
nism, he was likely to posit its animating soul not in the organism 
itself, as Schelling did, but outside it. In other words, he con-
ceived of a rational God as coordinator of a "preestablished 
harmony", and not of an entelechy moving the universe from 
"inside". The difference is made clear in the first sentence of the 
last quoted note which was probably made in reference to 
Schelling: "Den Organism wird man nicht ohne V oraussetzung 
einer Weltseele, wie den W eltplan nicht ohne V oraussetzung 
eines Weltvernunftwesens, erkHiren konnen" (II, 643). 
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The case is similar with Schelling's idea that the inter-
action of two basic universal forces constitutes the dynamism of 
everything living. This idea, apparent already in the Ideen but 
worked out only in the Weltseele, was, of course, transferred from 
Newtonian celestial mechanics into the sphere of organic living. 
Consequently, Schelling considered these forces to be chemical 
and internal rather than mechanical and external (Sch, Suppl. I, 
I93)· In many of Novalis' remarks on polarity such a back-
ground of mechanics or electricity is evident: "Zentripetalkraft 
-ist das synthetische Bestreben-Centrifugalkraft-das analy-
tische Bestreben des Geistes ... " (II, 5 89); "Alle Dinge haben 
eine Centrifugaltendenz-Centripetal werden sie durch den 
Geist ... " (II, 58 I). But additional factors provided for dis-
agreement. Schelling's dual forces not only represented a 
dialectic more concrete than Fichte's abstract confrontation of 
plus and minus or reality and negation, they also seemed to be 
modern correspondences to ancient mystic, Zoroastric, and 
Gnostic notions about the dualistic reality underlying the 
universe. It is with respect to these last associations that 
Novalis disagreed with Schelling. While he accepted the univer-
sality of dual forces on the spatial and temporal level, he could 
not posit these as ultimate realities. Since his conception of evil 
lacked concreteness he had no affinity with dualistic ethical 
theories, and since he was profoundly monistic he was instinc-
tively drawn to the emanation theory of Plotinus. The quoted 
fragment about centripetal and centrifugal forces continues: 
" ... Streben nach Einheit-Streben nach Mannichfaltigkeit-
durch wechselseitige Bestimmung beyder durch Einander-
wird jene hohere Synthesis der Einheit und Mannichfaltigkeit 
selbst hervorgebracht-durch die Eins· in Allem und Alles in 
Einem ist" (II, 5 89). 
IV. EXCERPTS FROM KANT AND ESCHENMAYER 
The study of Schelling's ldeen was only one of many signs 
suggesting that Hardenberg had a serious interest in the natural 
sciences even before he departed in December I 797 to study at 
the mining academy of Freiberg. The change in outlook and 
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interest may already be observed in his notebooks from the fall 
of this year, where among studies and excerpts from Fichte and 
Hemsterhuis we also find excerpts from Kant's Afetap~ysische 
Anjangsgriinde der Naturwissenschajt, from a book by the anatomist 
S. Sommering, and from C. A. Eschenmayer's Saze aus der Natur-
Metaphysik auf chemische und medicinische Gegenstande angetvandt.20 
In topic and tenor, particularly through the fusion of scientific 
and philosophical thoughts, these works have much in common, 
and so it seems only appropriate that in Navalis' notes the 
excerpts from the Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde should form the 
beginning and the end of the MS (cf. II, 342). 
Kant erected his philosophical scaffold of the natural sciences 
in the Introduction of the Metaphysische Anjangsgriinde, where he 
distinguished between "historische Naturlehre", containing 
only systematically ordered facts, and "Naturwissenschaft". 
The latter he subdivided once more: "Die Naturwissenschaft 
wi.irde nun wiederum entweder eigentlich, oder uneigentlich 
so genannte Naturwissenschaft sein, wovon die erstere ihren 
Gegenstand ganzlich nach Principien a priori, die zweite nach 
Erfahrungsgesetzen behandelt."21 Accordingly, Kant asserted 
that a true science ( eigentliche Naturwissenschaft) rests on 
mathematics, for mathematical knowledge is neither wholly 
empirical nor metaphysical (constructed of pure concepts), 
but a priori and synthetic, i.e. metaphysical concepts are com-
plemented by an a priori intuition. Hence the famous statement 
which reaffirms the tradition of Leibniz in German philosophy 
of science: "Ich behaupte aber, daB in jeder besonderen Natur-
lehre nur so viel eigentliche Wissenschaft angetroffen werden 
konne, als darin Mathematik anzutreffen ist."22 Accordingly, 
since contemporary chemistry and medicine contained only a 
collection of empirical data and no mathematics, Kant excluded 
them from the pure sciences. 
Kant's definitions, especially his charges against chemistry, 
became the subject of many scientific treatises; the treatment of 
chemistry in Schelling's Ideen, for instance, shows a strong in-
fluence by Kant-even though Schelling's view of nature was 
essentially amathematical-and in Schelling's later Weltseele and 
Erster Entwurf one finds an attempt to give a priori if not 
mathematical foundations to medicine. Hardenberg's reaction 
to Kant's work was somewhat more complex. He had a better 
knowledge and understanding of mathematics than Schelling 
and he certainly recognized its great value in constructing 
scientific theories. About chemistry he knew something from 
his studies with the well-known scientist Wiegleb in January 
I 796. Yet he maintained a fundamental reservation with 
respect to Kant's position; this may be seen in two of his notes 
concerning chemistry: "Das chymische Princip-die Idee der 
Chymie-die Materialien der Chymie sind Zerstreute Glieder 
der urspriinglichen Idee der Chymie-das beseelende Princip-
wodurch die Chymie zur Kunst a priori wird-muB ich hin-
zubringen" (II, 5 84 f.); "Kann die Chymie Kunst werden? 
Hauptfrage. Sie soils durch Moralitaet werden" (III, 25 3). 
To Novalis, Kant's question of how to turn chemistry into 
an a priori science is not identical with the question of 
applying mathematics to it, for he is in search of the "idea of 
chemistry", a "beseelendes Princip" that would turn the science 
into an art. Like Shelley, Novalis assumes that poetry "is at once 
the centre and circumference of knowledge; it is that which 
comprehends all science, and that to which all science must be 
referred". The transformation should be achieved by imprinting 
upon the material the structure of the self (this is the Fichtean 
element in Hardenberg's thought) and the end product would be 
created artistically: "Kunst". But this does not amount to a 
rejection of mathematics, since Novalis admits the synthetic 
nature of mathematical knowledge. The argument is implicitly 
directed against Kant's separation of mathematics from the 
synthetic postulate of practical reason which Novalis had 
already questioned upon reading the Metapl!Jsische Anfangs-
griinde. If pure mathematics and the pure natural sciences use 
the forms of external intuition, could there be an analogous 
science relying on internal intuition? Is there extra-sensuous 
cognition? Could there be other ways open to reach out from 
the self to other beings or to be affected by them (II, 3 90)? The 
title "Glauben und Liebe" implies already Novalis' affirmative 
answer ( cf. II, 42 I), and in a sense the "Brouillon" represents a 
more elaborate reply. 
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The purpose of Eschenmayer's little booklet was to prepare the 
philosophical foundations for the backward empirical sciences, 
especially chemistry and medicine, by working out the principles 
of "Naturmetaphysik", a link through which the applied sciences 
were to be secured to the philosophical ground. Following 
Kant, Eschenmayer declared that every science ought to be 
based on rational principles that follow from the metaphysical 
foundations. But chemistry and medicine had only empirical 
principles deduced from experience, and such principles were 
hypotheses, permitting only limited generalizations and neces-
sitating further secure proofs even if they happened to be cor-
rect. 23 Eschenmayer attacked a problem that Kant posed, 
but he employed Fichtean ideas insofar as he accused the chem-
ists and doctors of positing at the pinnacle of their disciplines 
such unprovable concepts as affinity and excitability. Following 
Fichte, Eschenmayer stated that only the philosopher may 
posit the ultimately unprovable first principle from which all 
further knowledge be deducible, and he set out to form a 
"Naturmetaphysik" to fit the concepts of chemistry and medicine 
within the logical chain of Fichte's argument. 
Eschenmayer's classification and analysis of the various 
sciences, as well as the terminology, followed Kant, albeit with 
some surprising results. Since Kant associated the category of 
quality with dynamics and Eschenmayer believed that chemistry 
was the science of qualitative material relations, he came for 
the wrong reason to a half-truth and analyzed chemistry in 
terms of the attractive and repulsive forces of Newtonian 
dynamics. (He could not know that modern chemistry would 
explain chemical properties with the forces that electric charges 
exert upon each other.) According to Eschenmayer, all matter 
was a particular configuration of two ever-present forces, and 
the qualitative differences between substances were ultimately 
reducible to quantitative force-relations. 24 To this structuring 
of nature he gave the name "dynamische Naturphilosophie", a 
term which, to my knowledge, he uses for the first time, since 
Schelling's works on "Naturphilosophie" appeared only later. 
Eschenmayer, however, was looking back to Fichte and asso-
ciated the duality of forces in dynamics with the transcendental 
acts of positing and counterpos1t1ng, thereby g1v1ng to the 
principles of chemistry an ontological foundation in the very 
structure of consciousness.25 Hence Eschenmayer's broadly 
conceived dualistic view of nature complemented Navalis' 
readings in philosophy and science and this might explain why 
he returned to Eschenmayer's theory in his later notebooks.26 
No less important to Navalis was the second part of Eschen-
mayer's book, which dealt in a similar way with questions of 
medicine: as the first part attempted to give foundations to 
chemistry, so the second part, entitled "Etwas fur die Patholo-
gic", set out to give philosophical grounding to the art of 
healing which, as Navalis ironically remarked later, collected 
experience by filling cemeteries. Eschenmayer's procedure 
exactly followed the pattern of his analysis of chemistry. Here, 
as there, he accepted as the basis of his "Naturphilosophie" 
the Fichtean categories of Reality and Negation and went out in 
search of medical concepts that could be subsumed under them. 
Given the climate of medical thought in Germany, it was 
inevitable that he should adopt the Brownian concepts of 
stimulation and excitability, and the division of diseases into 
sthenic and asthenic: Brown's theory of medicine lent itself 
well to dialectic interpretations. If matter was built upon the 
polar forces of attraction and repulsion, analogously, life was an 
interaction of the principles of excitability and stimulation-
medicine was thereby grounded in a priori philosophy (II, 3 3 3). 
Unlike Weikard, Eschenmayer did not merely transmit 
Brown's ideas; he unintentionally distorted the original doctrines 
by giving to excitability as much power in the sustenance of 
life as to stimulation. Besides, as a would-be philosopher 
Eschenmayer had only contempt for Brown's "mere empiri-
cism". Eschenmayer, as well as Roschlaub and Schelling, 
acknowledged that Brown's principles were the starting point 
for a true science of medicine, but he accused Brown of in-
sufficient philosophic acumen, 27 and felt that his inadequate 
theoretical grounding was detrimental both to medical philo-
sophy and praxis. Specifically, Eschenmayer thought that 
Brown committed an error when he refused to speculate on 
the nature and meaning of excitability, and he was looking for 
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a third and synthetical principle to complement Brown's 
dialectic. 
Novalis' excerpts from Eschenmayer's book do not cover the 
section on medicine, but since his notes on the first part contain 
two important remarks on Brown, we must assume that at the 
time of their writing N ovalis already had some knowledge of his 
theory. 28 The first of these notes refers to Eschenmayer's 
chapter on the principles of mechanics, where it was asserted 
that all changes must have an external reason, thereby para-
phrasing Newton's Second Law of Dynamics, the law of 
inertia, which was articulated in a slightly different form in 
Kant's Metapqysische Anfangsgriinde.29 In his excerpts Novalis 
added a question mark to the sentence and noted on the margin: 
"Vid. Browns System-contra Fichte" (II, 383)-which means, 
first of all, that he associated a mechanical principle with 
Brown's theory. Although this did not run counter to the 
spirit of Eschenmayer's book, there the law of dynamics was not 
streched to cover medicine. 
Hardenberg's note and question mark becomes meaningful 
if we associate the law of inertia with the basic tenet of Brown's 
theory, namely that "life is a forced state", that "the tendency of 
animals, every moment, is to dissolution" and that "they are 
kept from it by foreign powers" which both support and exhaust 
life. In Fichte's philosophy, however, the Absolute Ego posits 
itself in a sovereign act and the Empirical Ego is morally free, 
so that only the coward and philosophically inferior dogmatists 
submit to external determinism: 
Der Streit zwischen dem Idealisten und Dogmatiker 
ist eigentlich der, ob der Selbstandigkeit des Ich die 
Selbstandigkeit des Dinges, oder umgekehrt, der 
Selbstandigkeit des Dinges die des Ich aufgeopfert 
werden solle.30 Wer in der Tat nur ein Produkt der 
Dinge ist, wird sich auch nie anders erblicken; und 
er wird recht haben, solange er lediglich von sich 
und seinesgleichen redet .... Wer aber [als Idealist] 
seiner Selbstandigkeit und Unabhangigkeit von 
allem, was auBer ihm ist, sich bewuBt wird, ... der 
bedarf der Dinge nicht zur Sti.itze seines Selbst, und 
kann sie nicht brauchen, weil sie jene Selbstandig-
keit aufheben, und in leeren Schein verwandeln. 31 
Thus this innocuous little marginal note leads us not only to the 
central problem of Novalis' thoughts on medicine, but to the 
root of romantic thinking in general. The question mark was 
directed not so much against Newton's law of mechanics as 
against its extension into the organic and human realm. It 
indicates that Navalis was skeptical about Eschenmayer's and 
Brown's procedure to explain higher forms of life in terms of the 
lower and unconscious events in nature. In Navalis' view 
organisms could not be explained by mechanics, unless inanimate 
matter was conceived as an organism (III, 740) and hence he 
consciously and anthropomorphically reversed Brown's proce-
dure and planned to introduce medical theories into mechanics 
(III, 179). Since, as we saw, Navalis projected an organic 
structure into Fichte's lifeless not-I, the marginal note implies 
also a criticism of Fichte. Yet whatever the differences were at 
this point or later between Hardenberg and Fichte, in the 
"debate between the Idealists and Dogmatists" Navalis always 
inclined towards the former, and consequently the confrontation 
of Brown and Fichte has to be read as principally directed 
against the philosophy underlying Brown's medical theory. 
The profound hostility against mechanistic theories which 
Navalis shared with the other romantics is evident throughout 
the notebooks. A few months after reading Eschenmayer's book 
he wrote: "Aller Anfang des Lebens muB antimechanisch-
gewaltsamer Durchbruch-Opposition gegen den Mechanism 
seyn" (II, 57 5); and later in the "Brouillon" he remarked 
specifically about Brown: "Das Individuelle, propter Genesin, und 
false he des Br[ owns chen] Systems ist seine Neigung zur Mecha-
nik" (III, 407). 
We may conclude that Navalis consistently opposed Brown's 
theory on the ground that its mechanical foundations were in-
compatible with life, and held up against it the sovereignty of 
the organism. Yet to Navalis, as to Eschenmayer and many 
others, the Elements represented the first attempt to treat 
medicine philosophically, and as such it merited a philosophical 
critique. In addition, the theory was attractive because it 
contained a rudimentary form of romantic dialectic, by con-
fronting externality with internality, subject with object, and 
stimulation with excitability. 
The second marginal note to the Eschenmayer excerpts in-
dicates that Novalis felt the need to modify Brown's dialectic by 
raising the active power of excitability (the subjective internal 
force) above stimulation (the objective external component). 
While Eschenmayer, directly relying on Kant, defined matter as 
mobility32 ("Beweglichkeit"), Novalis remarked in the margin, 
once more switching from the inorganic to the organic: "Vid. 
Brown-Erregbarkeit" (II, 3 8 5 ). This association between 
mobility and excitability, which recurs in Novalis' later notes 
(III, 5 59), says in effect: as inorganic matter is defined by its 
intrinsic mobility, so organisms are determined by their exci-
tability and not by the external stimulants. 
We find therefore in these first little notes a sophisticated and 
differentiated view of medicine, which does not permit any 
summary statements about Novalis' initial acceptance or 
rejection of Brown's theory. One has to hold this, for instance, 
against the theory of Th. Haering, which attempts to force the 
dynamics of Novalis' philosophy into an all too simple de-
velopmental scheme, and maintains that an initial acceptance of 
Brown's ideas was followed by a later critical rejection.33 
But since already these early remarks on Brown and medicine 
constitute a system of acceptances and rejections, this view is 
untenable; in fact, as Novalis' knowledge and understanding of 
medicine deepened, he adhered to the specific tenets of this 
differentiated view with considerable consistency. 
V. HEMSTERHUIS AND BAADER 
Approximately at the time when Novalis prepared the excerpts 
from Kant and Eschenmayer, he also made extensive excerpts 
from the works of the Dutch philosopher Franz Hemsterhuis 
and attempted to correlate these with his other readings. 
Although Hemsterhuis did not write on science, his psychology 
and his conception of history left a deep imprint on all aspects of 
Navalis' philosophy.s4 
While Hemsterhuis is little known today, Navalis' admiration 
for his sensitively written neo-Platonic dialogues and letters was 
shared in various degrees by a great many contemporaries, 
among them Herder, Goethe, and even Diderot.35 As F. Schle-
gel reports, Navalis was inspired by Hemsterhuis' notion of the 
"golden age" as early as 1791. This concept was discussed in 
Alexis ou de l' age d' or, an essay that attempted to prove that the 
golden age was both a fact of historical past and a possibility 
for the future. Could man ever become as pure as he was in the 
cradle of history? Hemsterhuis' answer was contained in the 
psychology expounded in Simon ou des facultes de l'ame. He 
recognized four faculties: I. "la velleite"; the basic material that 
has to be formed and educated somewhat analogously to 
Dante's "simple little soul"; 2. the imagination, which Hemster-
huis considered to be the receptacle of all impressions coming 
from outside-not a creative imagination; 3· the intellect, 
originally a vague intuition which became reason by excercising 
comparison, composition, and dissection; and finally 4· the 
"organe moral", which consisted of a passive part exposed to 
the passions, above all love and hate, and of an active part whose 
task was to judge and modify impressions, and shape the course 
of action. 36 In the earlier Surles desirs Hemsterhuis stated that 
the passions of the passive moral sense arose from the soul's 
constant desire to unite with external objects, and from the 
frustration that the senses as intermediaries inevitable cause. As 
Navalis noted in his excerpts, if the senses could be by-passed 
a perfect union would become possible: "Ohne Organe wurde 
die Seele im Moment von dem unendlichen Object durchdrungen 
-beyde wurden Eins-und der Wechselgenul3 vollkommen 
seyn" (II, ;61). 
More important than the question of physical sensation was 
Hemsterhuis' theory of the active moral sense and the need for 
its training. He was convinced that the intellect has become the 
despotic overseer of all faculties; the way to raise mankind 
was therefore through activating morality and harmoniously 
developing all faculties. Navalis' early theory of magic does 
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not yet contain a fully developed conception of how morality 
ought to interact with the physical world, yet there is clearly a 
connection between his Hemsterhuis excerpts and the later 
"Brouillon"; for it is stated in both that the relation between 
physiological and psychological phenomena may be utilized for 
asserting the spiritual forces and morally transforming nature. 
Franz Xaver von Baader (1765-1841) is remembered today 
primarily as a theologian, but he was also a scientist in his 
early days and he even discovered a method of making glass. 
Novalis knew only his early works on "Naturphilosophie": he 
owned his Beitrage zur Elementar-phisiologie (Hamburg, 1797), 
and Ueber das pythagoraische Quadrat in der Natur oder die vier 
Weltgegenden (Tubingen, 1798), and he also read the very early 
Vom Warmestoff. 37 Starting with scientific questions, Baader 
reached for "higher philosophy" and tried to amalgamate his 
classical, religious, and humanistic learning with the latest ideas 
in the sciences. For instance, his work on the Pythagorean 
square, inspired by Schelling's Weltseele, set out to show that the 
ubiquitous polar forces of Schelling's philosophy were iden-
tifiable with fire and water; adding to these a coordinating 
principle, namely earth, and a fourth one permeating the 
three, namely air, Baader believed he had shown that the 
universe was made up of fire, water, earth, and air. Navalis' 
remark about the essay seems to be just: " ... nichts wie derbe, 
gediegene Poesie, aber freilich in grobe Bergarten eingesprengt 
und schwer zu saubern und auszuhauen."3 S 
The Beitrage zur Elementar-phisiologie, a work which Novalis 
read during the fall of 1797, is almost equally perplexing and 
annoying because of its inflated dependent clauses and copious 
footnotes which all but obliterate the central thoughts, its 
highly personal vocabulary, and its conjectures, many of which 
must have made little sense even in view of the limited knowl-
edge then available. Yet, if one takes the trouble to "clear and 
to carve out", one meets the marks of a highly original mind. 
Baader concerned himself with the nature of interacting forces 
and attempted to oppose mechanistic explanations with a 
dynamic philosophy. Mechanistic explanations seemed to him 
excusable only in those cases where the interacting bodies were 
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completely lacking autonomy, i.e., internal spontaneous capacity 
to act. But within Baader's anthropomorphic view of nature the 
number of such bodies was low indeed-even the interaction of 
sea and wind to form waves he read as the creation and anni-
hilation of selves. 
Baader's own argument ran the following way: the concept 
of force is always a synthesis between the form of external 
intuition (space) and internal intuition (time). While forces are 
additive in the perception of space, in the inner form of percep-
tion they are multiplicative and exponential, because forces are 
dynamically interrelated through a principle called "Gliederung" 
which arranges for a division of labor. In Baader's under-
standing this "Gliederung" vouchsafed for the anthropo-
morphic construction of nature: "Da nun Gliederung nur a us 
einem Princip (systematisch) moglich ist, da ferner das hiezu 
erforderliche Durchgehen cines Vielerlei nicht im aussern 
Sinne. . . sondern nur im innern . . . stattfinden oder geschehen 
kann, so burgt uns ersteres fur die V ernunftigkeit der Natur als 
Bildnerin . . . sowie letzteres fur ein unserem inneren Sinnenstoff 
analoges Innere in jedem Korpergebilde."39 
Baader opposed both pure mechanism and the radical sepa-
ration of object and subject, for he believed that even among the 
lower orders of nature an inner principle of change existed. 
External stimulation was therefore only the releasing spark for 
self-generated action: "Ueberallleuchtet nun hiebei der Urtheils-
kraft der Satz vor, class die aussere (raumlich-beriihrende) 
Ursache bloss als Reiz, Funke oder Same zu betrachten sei, 
welcher der inneren Naturkraft (Einbildungskraft im weitesten 
Sinne) nur das Schema zu einer bestimmten Synthesis dar-
bietet ... welches jene (das bildende, weibliche, und hernach 
gebarende Vermogen) fasst, eigentlich empfiingt, in sich ent-
zundet und fortbildet."40 
Baader's theory of"Gliederung" and his belief in self-generated 
activity became important for Navalis when he attempted to 
formulate his answer to mechanistic philosophies.41 Like Baader, 
he came to believe that bodies obeyed a central principle similar 
to the entelechy of the Leibnizian monad: "Jeder Korper 
wird durch eine Monade zusammengehalten und bestimmt."12 
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The most important case of agreement between Hardenberg 
and Baader reveals a remarkable affinity: in fighting pure ratio-
nalism and Kant's separation of action and knowledge both 
Baader and Navalis believed that "Glauben und Liebe" have to 
form the basis of all knowledge. Pure knowledge as such does 
not exist, human wisdom is ultimately a participation in divine 
knowledge and its acquisition requires faith. The laws of nature 
are, in turn, the manifestation of divine love: "Liebe ist das 
allgemeine Band, das alle Wesen im Universum an und ineinan-
der bindet und verwebt. Man nenne es nun allgemeine Schwere, 
Attraction, Cohasion, Affinitat .... "43 Hence Navalis could 
remark with approval about Baader: "Seine Zauber bin den 
wieder,/ Was des Bl6dsinns Schwert geteilt" (IV, 241). 
III 
The Anthropology and Physiology 
of Magic 
r. Romantisirung 
Die Welt mu13 romantisirt werden. So findet man 
den urspr[unglichen] Sinn wieder. Romantisiren 
ist nichts, als eine qualit[ative] Potenzirung. Das 
niedre Selbst wird mit einem bessern Selbst in 
dieser Operation identificirt. So wie wir selbst eine 
solche qualit[ ative] Potenzenreihe sind. Diese 
Operation ist noch ganz unbekannt. Indem ich dem 
Gemeinen einen hohen Sinn, dem Gewohnlichen ein 
geheimniBvolles Ansehn, dem Bekannten die Wurde 
des Unbekannten, dem Endlichen einen unendlichen 
Schein gebe so romantisire ich es-Umgekehrt ist 
die Operation fur das Hohere, Unbekannte, Mysti-
sche, Unendliche-dies wird durch diese Verkni.ip-
fung logarythmisirt- Es bekommt einen geHiufigen 
Ausdruck. romantische Philosophie. Lingua romana. 
Wechselerhohung und Erniedrigung (II, 545). 
The demand "Die Welt mu13 romantisirt werden" is one of the 
best known statements of Harden berg's poetic and philosophical 
intent, but its meaning is seldom deciphered in terms of the 
notes with which it is woven into a pattern, the MSS from the 
first half of 1798, especially those which follow this quotation. 
These notes deal with the "Romantisirung" from all possible 
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angles, particularly from the point of view of physiology, 
psychology, anthropology, and poetry. My purpose is to 
demonstrate that, although fragmentary, these notes are unified 
through the ideas of "Romantisirung" and "Magie", both of 
which are developed in connection with Hardenberg's scien-
tific and medical studies.1 
"Romantisirung" aims at "Wechselerhohung und Erniedri-
gung": at raising the everyday into the realm of the mysterious 
and at a palpable representation of the supernatural. Shelley must 
have meant something similar to "Erhohung" when he wrote 
that poetry "lifts the veil from the hidden beauty of the world, 
and makes familiar objects be as if they were not familiar", 
while the "Erniedrigung" roughly corresponds to the Goethean 
conception of the symbol in literature. 
Although the "Romantisirung" will have to be more than 
merely an artistic act, it is prefigured in the artist's creativity, 
which is therefore exemplary for all human activity: "Dichtkunst 
ist wohl nur-willkuhrlicher, thatiger, produktiver Gebrauch 
unsrer Organe ... " (III, 5 63). The conviction that the future 
will necessarily realize the projected "Romantisirung" is rooted 
in Hardenberg's vision of history according to which the 
coming age will self-consciously reconstruct the Golden Age. 
"Romantisirung" is an attempt to reinvest in poetry that religious 
and magic power which provided the men of the Golden Age 
with a mythology and gave to their everyday life a transcendental 
incantation. If the future is to resemble the past in harmony and 
beauty, it will have to reconstruct the primeval unity of theology, 
ethics, and aesthetics: the act of poetry will have to regain its 
universal and metaphysical power, while purposeful everyday 
activity will have to acquire an artistic quality. Hardenberg's 
poetics is the unfolding of the first program, while his physiol-
ogy, anthropology, psychology, and medicine describes the 
second of the complementary parts of "Romantisirung". In the 
course of this chapter I shall first outline the theory and its 
epistemological implications, then further illuminate it under the 
complementary aspects of poetics and medicine. 
Navalis' approach to the sciences is historical and pro-
grammatic, inasmuch as he starts from the given conditions 
but is mainly concerned with the dormant future possibilities. 
How can human lives be heightened and refined? Accepting 
the traditional dualism of body and soul Navalis conceives of 
the natural world and the spiritual realm ("Geisterwelt") as 
two domains to which the human components are subordinated. 
The two realms are interrelated through a network of asso-
ciations which, at present, unfortunately enable the body to 
dominate the soul. However, within Navalis' vision of history 
this state of affairs is only temporary and many signs indicate 
that the spirit will assert itself to form a free association with the 
body: "Dennoch sind haufige Spuren eines umgekehrten Ver-
haltnisses anzutreffen, und man bemerckt bald, daB beyde 
Systeme eigentlich in einem Vollkommnen Wechselverhaltnisse 
stehn sollten, in welches jedes von seiner Welt afficirt, einen 
Einklang, keinen Einton bildeten. Kurz bey de Welten, so wie 
beyde Systeme sollen eine freye Harmonie, keine Disharmonie 
oder Monotonie bilden" (II, 546). 
The balance of components in this harmony is described by 
Navalis in various ways which do not always agree. In the 
group of notes under discussion the association between 
body and soul is usually governed by the latter. From the 
medical point of view this is only tantamount to that inversion 
of Brown's ideas which was already observable in the marginal 
notes to the Eschenmayer excerpts: if Brown proclaimed that 
external stimulation was far more important than the stimulation 
resulting from the activity of consciousness, in the state envisaged 
by Navalis the senses would primarily, but not exclusively, 
react to the changes of inwardness: "In der Peri ode der Magie 
client der Korper der Seele, oder der Geisterwelt" (II, 547). 
In asserting that the senses might be directed inward, Navalis 
belongs to the neo-Platonic tradition, and to the romantic 
generation that was in search both of extra-sensory experience 
and of modes in which the imagination might objectify itself 
in the external world.2 Navalis is unique among the romantics 
because of his thorough scientific learning and the corresponding 
concreteness and practicality of his proposals. The moving 
diary he kept after Sophie's death and the notebooks on science 
are both in search of a method to penetrate the extra-sensuous 
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realm. One finds in both empirical material collected from acute 
self-observation, a mixture of medieval asceticism and modern 
impassioned research, which precipitated in notes and maxims 
as the following: "Es giebt mancherley Arten vondervereinigten 
Sinnenwelt unabhangig zu werden. 1. durch Abstumpfung der 
Sinne. . . . 2. durch zweckdienliche Anwendung, MaBigung, 
und Abwechselung der Sinnenreitze. JHeilkunst.J 3· durch 
Maximen a. der Verachtung [Novalis originally wrote "Gleich-
giiltigkeit"] und b. der Feindlichkeit gegen alle Empfindungen . 
. . . 4· theilweise durch Aushebung gewisser Sinne oder gewisser 
Reitze, die durch Ubung, und Maxime einen bestandigen, 
iiberwiegenden EinfluB erhalten" (II, 549). 
Such a neutralization of the "external senses" -the develop-
ment of "neutral regions" in the body as Novalis described the 
process elsewhere-would permit concentration upon the 
"interior senses". The latter are of course not merely sensors 
of time, as in Kant's philosophy, but include in general all 
faculties which have as yet no "objective correlatives". As a 
result of such a concentration one might not only refine sensiti-
vity, but could also creatively employ the refined senses to form 
new parts for the body: "Wir wiirden nur V eriinderungen her-
vorbringen konnen-die Gedanken ahnlich waren, und wir 
wiirden ein Bestreben fiihlen, uns jene Sinne zu verschaffen, die 
wir jezt auBre Sinne nennen. Wer weis ob wir nicht nachgerade, 
durch mannichfache Bestrebungen Augen, Ohren etc. hervor-
bringen konnten, weil dann unser Korper so in unsrer Gewalt 
stande, so einen Theil unsrer innern Welt ausmachte, als jezt 
unsre Seele. "3 
Although passages of this kind are often regarded as poor 
science fiction, recent experiments and theories seem to confirm 
them in several respects. Thus, for instance, we know now 
that if for some reason the senses are deprived of stimuli, con-
sciousness will eventually attempt to replace them through 
hallucinations and visions. Even more surprising, these 
symptoms of sensory deprivation bear resemblance to the 
apparitions of certain kinds of mental derangement such as 
schizophrenia; in both, the command of the senses is switched 
from the external world to internal forces. 
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This switch may be brought about in an artificial way, 
through the application of certain drugs, such as mescaline or 
LSD.4 Navalis, who was familiar with the stimulating power of 
opium from Brown's theory, might have had his own experience 
with narcotics, as the praise of the "brown juice of poppy" in the 
second hymn to the night suggests. 5 
The skepticism and ambiguity concerning the excessive or 
exclusive use of the imagination, so outspokenly described in the 
early letter to Erasmus, is evident also in this context. The 
spiritualization of human sensibility remained for Novalis a 
delicate and somewhat questionable operation, and it is therefore 
a misrepresentation of his ideas to say that he merely envisaged 
a turning inward by "switching off" the external senses. Such 
popularizations usually arrive at the banal conclusions that 
Navalis was a late mystic or an early escapist, but they cannot 
account for the complexity of his life and work. What Novalis 
envisaged was, in Fichtean terminology, the simultaneous 
existence of an absolute, practical, and empirical self (II, 547), 
which means that the moral activity of the empirical self was to 
be potentialized so that it become identical with the original act 
of positing-without, however, giving up the specifically human 
and empirical aspect of life. 
Of the different versions of this abstract Fichtean formula 
only those will be mentioned here that use the language of 
science and medicine. Already among the excerpts from Hem-
sterhuis' Simon we find a passage in which the dangers of 
excessive sensibility are noted: "Der moralische Sinn jdie 
sensible Seite des Herzensf ist die schonste, aber auch gefiihr-
lichste Seite unsers Wesens. Seine zu groBe Lebhaftigkeit veran-
laBt leicht Tauschungen" (II, 3 76). In one of the important 
Bluthenstaub fragments this idea is developed further in terms 
of Navalis' own theory of the organs. Once more the 
dangers of an absolute spiritual domination are emphasized: 
"Eine allzugroBe Dienstfertigkeit der Organe wurde dem ir-
dischen Daseyn gefiihrlich seyn. Der Geist in seinem jetzigen 
Zustande wiirde eine zerstorende Anwendung davon machen. 
Eine gewisse Schwere des Organs hindert ihn an allzuwillkuhr-
licher Thatigkeit, und reizt ihn zu einer regelmiiBigen Mitwir-
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kung, wie sie sich fur die irdische Welt schickt. Es ist unvoll-
kommener Zustand desselben, dai3 ihn diese Mitwirkung so 
ausschliei3lich an diese Welt bindet. Daher ist sie ihrem Prinzip 
nach terminirt" (II, 451). Although the phrase "in seinem jetzi-
gen Zustande" seems to leave the question of the future open, 
Navalis' repeated references to earthly existence suggest that he 
deemed it necessary to retain a balance between spirit and matter 
even under future circumstances, for it is this bond that defines 
the nature of human existence. 
One may say, therefore, that the projected "higher" existence 
in Navalis' philosophy does not fall beyond human boundaries; 
within the "great chain of being" it would still be accommodated 
between Kleist's marionette and Rilke's angel, between mechan-
ical existence and pure consciousness: "Die hohere Phil[ oso-
phie] behandelt die Ehe von Natttr ttnd Geist" (III, 247). The 
point is crucial and needs further emphasis, for even such a 
meticulous and intelligent scholar as Professor Strohschneider-
Kohrs fell victim of traditional views, in asserting that Magic 
Idealism is tantamount to the transcendence of the empirical 
world: "Anderseits ist in Navalis' Vorstellung vom magischen 
Idealismus das Denkmotiv der absoluten Annihilation des 
Empirischen schon eingeschlossen: zu der Erzeugung von Welt 
gehi:irt auch die totale Ri.ickfiihrung des Empirischen in die 
Identitat des Geistes."6 In support of this thesis Professor 
Strohschneider-Kohrs adopted the phrase "indifferente Einheit 
von Welt und Ich" from Hugo Kuhn and asserted that Har-
denberg's philosophy rests on such a point of indifference: 
"[Navalis] fai3t den Indifferenzpunkt ... in mystisch bestimmter 
Abwandlung als den Urgrund und das Zeugungswunder von 
Sein, Welt und Ich ineins." 7 
If there were such a point of indifference, then Professor 
Strohschneider-Kohrs could claim with justification that Har-
denberg's philosophy is void of irony, for irony always depends 
on the interplay between distinct categories. Although it is 
somewhat difficult to grasp what exactly is meant by the 
"Zeugungswunder von Sein, Welt und Ich", one feels sure that 
the "Indifferenzpunkt" does not correspond to Navalis' 
conception of the "neutral zones" discussed above. Since the 
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latter are to be developed with the expressed intention of 
refining the contact between the self and the world, there can 
be no "absolute annihilation of the empirical world" in Harden-
berg's philosophy. His irony issues precisely from the dynamic 
and dialectic interplay between body and soul, self and world, 
present mechanism and future magic. Isolated extremes are 
always simplifications of complex situations: "A us Tragheit 
verlangt d[er] Mensch blojfen Mechanism oder blojfe Magie. Er 
will nicht thatig seyn-seine prod[uctive] Einb[ildungs ]Kr[aft] 
brauchen, (III, 408). 
II. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF MAGIC 
Nowhere do the dialectical elements of Novalis' thought appear 
more clearly than in his theory of knowledge. To the question 
of how we know about matters outside of our consciousness, 
Navalis replies that it is through intuition and analogy-two 
forms of cognition which implicitly assume that mind and self 
are distinct from the matter of the world. Neither claiming an 
identity between self and world, nor separating them as radically 
as Fichte in his Wissenschaftslehre, Novalis conceives of an alien-
ation and adoption process issuing in knowledge: "Ich kann 
etwas nur erfahren, in so fern ich es in mir aufnehme; es ist also 
eine Alienation meiner selbst und cine Zueignung oder Ver-
wandlung einer andern Substanz in die meinige zugleich: das 
neue Product ist von den beiden Factoren verschieden, es ist aus 
beiden gemischt."8 
This alienation and adoption process corresponds to the 
"Wechselerhohung und Erniedrigung" of the "Romantisirung", 
for alienation, the objectification of the self, means the spirit's 
descent into matter, while adoption means transformation (had 
Novalis known Hegel he might have said "Aufhebung") of 
sensuous matter through the "magic" power of the self. Since 
the processes dialectically complement each other as activity 
and passivity, diastole and systole, or "Tun" and "Leiden", 
neither their source nor their sum can be an "Indifferenzpunkt". 
What are the physiological factors and what function do the 
senses have in this learning process which is based on intuition 
and analogy? In a note entitled "Von der unsinnlichen, oder 
unmittelbaren ErkenntniB'' (II, 5 5o), Navalis gives his answer: 
the senses are media which transmit, but also distort the primary 
data they receive. In the terminology of physics, they are 
impure conductors. 9 As already indicated by some earlier notes, 
Navalis considered the possibility of making the senses into 
"insulators", by turning them inward so that they might 
produce a world, perhaps identical with the existing one, 
without sensory impressions. In such a system the senses would 
not be conductors, but insulators and mirrors, or, as Navalis put 
it, they would become "absolute senses": "Ein absoluter Sinn 
ware Mittel und Zweck zugleich" (II, 5 50). Such would perhaps 
be the structure and nature of an Absolute Ego. Navalis, 
however, suggests the retention of the conducting function 
of the senses (in other words, he would still insist on certain 
functions of the Empirical Ego); as a result the nature and 
function of the senses would become twofold: 
Ich bekame eine zugleich mittelbare und unmittel-
bare-repraesentative und nicht repraesentative, 
vollkomne und unvollkomne-eigne und nicht eig-
ne, kurz antithetisch synthetische Erkenntni13 und 
Erfahrung von dem Dinge. Das Glied, oder der 
Sinn wurde zugleich Glied und NichtGlied seyn, 
weil ich es durch meine Belebung auf gewisse Weise 
vom Ganzen abgesondert hatte. 
Nenn ich das ganze Ding Welt, so wurde ich ein 
integrantes Glied der Welt in mir, und das Ubrige 
au13er mir haben. Ich wurde mir in theoretischer 
Hinsicht, in Rucksicht dieses Sinns, als abhangig 
und unter dem Einflu13e der Welt erscheinen (II, 55 I). 
This theory, which recurs in Navalis' polemic against Schelling's 
Weltseele (III, 109), gives also the epistemological foundation 
to Magic Idealism: if the body is largely under the powers of the 
soul but nevertheless remains a part, a variation, of the empirical 
world, a knowledge of the macrocosm may be derived through 
analogies from the direct and intuitive knowledge of the 
microcosm, which is one's own body.10 Examining this re-
lationship from a different angle, another thesis in Hardenberg's 
philosophy becomes evident: since the body serves both as a 
source of information about the world at large and as a tool with 
which the self can modify this world, in the body action and 
cognition represent merely two aspects of the same operation: 
"Ich selbst weis mich, wie ich mich will und will mich, wie ich 
mich weis-weil ich meinen Willen wi/1-weil ich abs[olut] will. 
In mir ist also Wissen und Willen vollkommen vereinigt" 
(II, 552.). As formulated elsewhere: "Wir wissen etwas nur-
insofern wires ausdriicken-i.e. machen konnen."11 
Thus the complementarity of doing and knowing follows 
from the dialectic between the "Wechselerniedrigung und Er-
hohung", and the alienation and adoption. Together they 
represent a conscious opposition to the philosophies of Kant 
and Fichte, where object and subject are radically separated: 
"Sich nach den Dingen, oder die Dinge nach sich richten-ist 
Eins" (II, 5 89). 
The theory raises, however, an important problem: theore-
tically at least, one can conceive of a spiritual domination 
of the body, and one may even imagine that one day the senses 
will serve the soul and accept its commands-although tech-
nological advances have not brought this moment closer. 
But precisely because of the modifications that the body might 
have to endure in the course of this transformation, we have no 
safeguards that nature would retain that consistency which 
permits the macrocosm to be seen in terms of the microcosm. 
In other words: the spiritual modification of the body might 
lift it completely from the realm of nature, so that future 
observations on it would not necessarily tell anything about the 
structure of the universe. As a passage from Die Lehrlinge 
indicates, Navalis was aware of the problem, although he had no 
definite answer for it: "Es fragt sich, ob wir die Natur der 
Naturen durch diese spezielle Natur wahrhaft begreifen lernen 
konnen, und in wiefern unsre Gedanken und die Intensitat 
unsrer Aufmerksamkeit durch dieselbe bestimmt werden, oder 
sie bestimmen, und dadurch von der Natur losreiBen und viel-
leicht ihre zarte Nachgiebigkeit verderben" (I, 97). 
Magic Idealism does not represent, therefore, a logically 
binding theory of knowledge of the kind that Fichte's Wissen-
schajtslehre offers; it is a hybrid, a bridge between consistent but 
radical answers. It envisages a state where the mind might 
know its material substratum as intimately as it knows itself; 
thereby it displaces, without overcoming, the crucial boundary 
between consciousness and externality. Ultimately, Navalis 
deviates from the young Schelling and sides with Descartes and 
Leibniz because he resorts to a supreme being and a preordained 
harmony which secure the tie between mind and matter, and 
provide a foundation for knowledge. In describing this 
coordination Navalis mixes elements of the traditional Christian 
conception of God with Fichte's transcendental self, and the 
notion of the "Weltseele".12 
Hardenberg makes no attempt to resolve the contradictions 
between freedom and constraint, or individuality and universali-
ty. He describes a precarious and paradoxical balance which is 
intimately tied up with a vision of history, and he assumes that 
the development of the individual correlates with this movement 
on the universal scale, or, more exactly, that the self can "ani-
mate" the changes of the world on the basis of an a priori unity 
between self and world: "Die Welt hat eine urspri.ingliche 
Fahigkeit durch mich belebt zu werden-Sie ist i.iberhaupt a 
priori von mir belebt-Eins mit mir. Ich habe eine ursp[ri.ing-
liche] Tendenz und Fahigkeit die Welt zu beleben- Nun kann 
ich aber mit nichts im V erhaltniB treten-was sich nicht nach 
meinem Willen richtet, oder ihm gemaB ist-Mithin muB die 
Welt die ursp[ri.ingliche] Anlage haben sich nach mir zu richten 
-meinem Willen gemaB zu seyn" (II, 5 54). 
This a priori unity between self and world vaguely resembles 
Professor Strohschreider-Kohrs' "point of indifference". But 
in Navalis' conception it is a transcendental unity infinitely 
removed from history and the empirical world, and the only 
claim he makes as to its empirical reality is that, on the basis 
of a correspondence, consciousness may act upon the world 
without disturbing the inner structure of it: "Meine geistige 
Wircksamkeit-meine Realisation von Ideen-wird also keine 
Decomposition, und Umschaffung der Welt-wenigstens nicht, 
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insofern ich Mitglied dieser bestimmten Welt bin- seyn konnen, 
sondern es wird nur eine Variations Operation seyn konnen-Ich 
werde unbeschadet der Welt und ihrer Gesetze-mittelst der-
selben- sie fur mich ordnen, einrichten und bilden konnen" 
(II, 55 4). 
III. THE PHYSIOLOGY OF POETRY 
Curiously, among the main works of Kant Navalis ignored the 
Critique of judgment, that work which could have been most 
relevant to his poetic calling. Yet the omission is not accidental. 
Navalis had hardly more than a passing interest for such Kantian 
aesthetic questions as the nature of the beautiful and the beautiful 
in nature-like Hegel, but unlike Kant, he was only concerned 
with man-made beauty. To him, the essence of art lay in the 
mode of its creation-an aspect to which Kant's analytic method 
did not do full justice. As Croce remarks with somewhat undue 
severity, Kant "knows a reproductive imagination and an 
associative, but he knows nothing of a genuinely productive 
imagination, imagination in the proper sense."13 
In turn, it might be said of Navalis that he knows only of 
"a genuinely productive imagination"; in fact, "produktive 
Einbildungskraft" is a key word in his vocabulary. Wacken-
roder's description of the artistic process, as given in "Raffaels 
Erscheinung" of Herzensergiejungen eines kunstliebenden Kloster-
bruders, was closer to Navalis' views than Kant's treatment of the 
imagination. Quoting from a letter of Raphael, Wackenroder 
asserts that a painting is not the reproduction of what the artist 
had seen in the realm of appearances, but an attempt to shape 
matter according to an inner vision. Hence the source of art is 
not nature but the spiritual realm, which finds outlet through the 
individuality of the artist: "Da man so wenig sch()ne weibliche 
Bildungen sieht, so halte ich mich an ein gewisses Bild im 
Geiste, welches in meine Seele kommt."14 In this interpre-
tation, Raphael's Madonna is a copy of an ideal or a Platonic 
form, and the artist is reduced to a medium through which 
inspiration operates. While Wackenroder raises art from the 
degrading "imitation of an imitation" to an "imitation of the 
real", he leaves the artist as a passive tool in the hands of higher 
powers: the image "comes" into the soul of Raphael, it is 
properly speaking not his own making. The position parallels 
the famous complaint of Keats that the artist, qua artist, may 
have no personality of his own. 
Navalis shares with Wackenroder and Keats the view that 
art is a product of the imagination and not an imitation of 
nature-"ja keine Nachahmung" was his advice to his brother 
Karl (IV, 336). But as to the artist's role in the creative process, 
he holds a significantly different view. According to him, art, as 
to a lesser extent all human activity, is a personal and individual 
expression of the creative genius inherent in man. The artistic 
product carries therefore the imprint of the mind's pattern, the 
shape of the imagination. Although it may, and in the highest 
cases should, achieve universality, it does so indirectly and 
almost incidentally, through the postulated preordained harmony 
between the self and the world. 
The issue is a crucial one, and the position that Navalis 
takes has at least two important consequences: 1. since art is 
primarily a product of the self-and not the objectification of an 
impersonal inspiration-Navalis, unlike some other romantics, 
perceives no qualitative difference between the poetic act and 
other human activity; 2. he regards the involvement of the self 
as total, and devotes careful attention to physiological, as well as 
psychological, aspects which might play a role in creativity; the 
artist, to him, is "Werckzeug und Genie" (II, 52 5 ). 
These views might be illuminated through a few additional 
comparisons. In the Preface to the "Lyrical Ballads" Words-
worth asserted that "the human mind is capable of being 
excited without the application of gross and violent stimulants" 
and that the "Poet is chiefly distinguished from other men by a 
greater promptness to think and feel without immediate 
external excitement, and a greater power in expressing such 
thoughts and feelings ... "15 This comes close to Navalis' 
conception of writing, although there are still important 
differences. The "thoughts and feelings" of poetry are, according 
to Navalis, not only not "immediately" excited from outside, 
they are not even recollections in tranquillity-they are in the 
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literal sense brought forth from a source within the self: " ... 
der Kunstler hat den Keirn des selbstbildenden Lebens in 
seinen Organen belebt-die Reitzbarkeit derselbenfiir den Geist 
erhoht und ist mithin im Stande Ideen nach Belie ben- ohne 
auBre Sollicitation-durch sie hera us ZU stromen- Sie, als 
Werckzeuge, zu beliebigen Modificationen der wircklichen Welt 
zu gebrauchen ... "(II, 574). The difference lies not merely in the 
"Keirn des selbstbildendenLebens" which is to Navalis the hall-
mark of the artist, but even more in the general transforming 
power that he attributes to the artistic imagination: the organs 
of the artist-his hand, his eyes, his voice-are conceived as 
tools which may modify the external world in a sovereign 
way.I6 
Yet, the difference between Wordsworth and N ovalis is not as 
great as the comparison indicated. For Navalis is usually 
careful to place his analysis in a historical context and he describes 
the imagination not so much as a power existing but as a power 
to be. At present the genius of the artist does not modify the 
world at large, only the piece of stone to be sculptured, the 
language to be moulded into poetry, and, perhaps, in the sense 
of Rilke's "Du muBt dein Leben andern", the life of those who 
come in contact with the finished work. The artist is further 
advanced in the art of objectifying his spiritual impulses than 
others, but his activity does not separate him from the rest of 
mankind, for "Romantisirung" is the development of artistic 
and creative faculties in all men. As Navalis says in the fragment 
quoted above: "Fast jeder Mensch ist in geringen Grad schon 
Kunstler ... " (II, 5 74). 
Briefly considering Navalis' thoughts on the differences 
between the various arts may further illuminate his position. 
It has been noted that Navalis' poetry and prose show a subtle 
melody and rhythm, although they lack the visual clarity and 
plasticity of Goethe's style. This stylistic inclination towards 
musicality was probably reinforced by Navalis' opposition to 
imitation: the sounds of music show little resemblance to 
naturally occurring noises, while the plastic arts were tradition-
ally (before the advent of abstract art) some form of imitation. 
One might therefore expect a preference for music in Harden-
berg's aesthetics. Yet, to him, the creative process in art was 
not an internalization, but an objectification of inwardness: "Der 
Musiker hort eigentlich auch active-Er hort hera us. Freylich 
ist dieser umgekehrte Gebrauch der Sinne den Meisten ein 
GeheimniB, aber jeder Kiinstler wird es sich mehr oder minder 
deutlich bewuBt seyn" (II, 5 74). If every art attempts to impose 
the pattern of consciousness upon raw material, the forms of 
art are only distinguished by their tools, signs, and media 
("Werckzeug", "Chiffer", and "Stoff"). Since the signs of 
musical notation are arbitrary and independent of material 
conditions, the composer is not faced with the resilience of 
matter, this task is left to the performer. But brush, brushstroke, 
and canvas are all materials of nature, and their use requires a 
technique as well as an inner vision of shape. The painter's task 
is therefore not only more difficult than that of the composer, 
but also much more representative of the universal problem 
that the magic idealist will have to face in his imaginative 
transformation of the world. Navalis concludes: "So viel, 
diinkt mich, werde daraus gewiB, daB die Mahlerey bey weiten 
schwieriger, als die Musik, sey."l 7 
IV. THE DOCTOR AS A YOUNG ARTIST 
Navalis holds that artistic creativity is exemplary for all human 
activity in the envisaged future, and consequently he attempts to 
establish a relation between art and the creative element in vari-
ous professions, among them medicine. He calls poetry the 
laboratory where the future remedy of mankind is tested: 
"Poesie ist die groBe Kunst der Construction der transscenden-
talen Gesundheit. Der Poet ist also der transscendentale 
Arzt" (II, 53 5 ). Inverting this statement, Novalis demanded 
from physicians that they become artists in their profession, 
and from men in general that they become a virtuoso of their 
bodies. In medicine, as in all other realms, he saw universal 
principles at work, and in the fight of various schools of 
thought he recognized fundamental issues at stake. The humoral 
pathologists he linked with the materialists ("Stoffseher") who 
saw life in terms of interacting fluids. The neuro-pathologists, 
in turn, were "die atomistischen mechanischen Formseher" 
who interpreted organic life in terms of the motion and collison 
of solids. In the "Actionisten" who, like Fichte, rose above the 
restricting conditions of the natural world, he saw a possible 
synthesis (II, 646). He occasionally counted John Brown to 
these actionists or "schaffende Betrachter, Seheschopfer" because 
Brown held a "dogmatic" philosophy with the personal 
courage and the conviction of an Idealist: "Das Beste am 
Brownischen System ist die erstaunende Zuversicht, mit der 
Brown sein System, als allgemeingeltend, hinstellt" (II, 545). 
Hence, in spite of his philosophical reservations, Novalis 
accepted Brown's vocabulary; in the remaining part of this 
chapter I shall give a few examples of how he redefined this 
vocabulary to fit his own philosophy. For example, Navalis 
changed the original categories of internal and external stimu-
lants into direct and indirect: "Der Reitz von Au13en ist in-
directer, der Reitz von Innen directer Reitz" (II, 561). This 
harmless substitution did indeed fit better his own theory of 
sensation, since he held that the body performed a mediating 
role between consciousness and the external world, so that all 
external stimuli impinged upon the mind indirectly.18 Moreover, 
he believed that external stimuli played only a secondary role in 
defining consciousness, since the decisive impulses came from 
the operation of the mind itself: as if the self were to contain in 
an undefined and raw form all its future, and stimulation would 
only act as a trigger for the particular act. As Baader stated, 
stimulation was merely an "ignis mas", a "Samen", while the 
self had been defined in a primeval hylozoistic act. Navalis 
agreed with Baader that mechanical causation was mere appear-
ance effacing the original transcendental act of begetting. In 
tracing this original act of creation both were in search of an 
"Urmaterial", an unformed medium of dormant potentials, 
which they came to identify with a primitive fluid.19 The self-
begetting of this fecund medium became for them an emblem 
for all reproduction and consequently both of them raised the 
female principle above the purely triggering function of the 
male. To my knowledge it has not been noted so far that in 
Baader's Elementar-phisiologie, as later in Hardenberg's Die 
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Lehrlinge, this primitive fluid was associated with the veil of 
Isis. 20 
These physiological considerations had important conse-
quences in pathology. If external stimulation was only of 
secondary importance in defining the state of a body, the causes 
of a disease were not so much in the environment as in the 
constitution, while deficiencies in a constitution were ultimately 
related to the irregularities in a man's psychological make up-
as Navalis' speculation about hypochondria and madness 
already indicated. These are the considerations that later led 
Navalis to see a link between disease (a physiological aberration) 
and sin (a moral and psychological failure). 
Perhaps the most important improvement that Navalis 
proposed to make over the medical works he studied was the 
introduction of a theory of constitutions. The outline was as 
follows: 
1. Constitution mit mangelnder Reitzbarkeit. (in-
direct asth[enisch]) 
2. Constit[ ution] mit iiberfliissiger Reitzbarkeit. 
(direct asth[ enisch]) 
a. C[ onstitution] mit iiberfliissiger Incitation (direct 
sthenisch) 
b. C[ onstitution] mit mangelnder Incitation (indi-
rect sthenisch.) (II, 573). 
The note belongs to those which N ovalis found yet unsatis-
factory and crossed out, but he must have regarded the classi-
fication as important because the scheme is sketched out in a 
recently published little drawing (also crossed out), and the 
concept introduced by him, the term "indirectly sthenic", 
recurs in a "Brouillon" note relating to Roschlaub's Unter-
suchungen.21 
A superficial comparison between Hardenberg's sketch and 
the chart that usually accompanied the Elements (Appendices I-
III) would suggest that Navalis merely wanted to round off 
Brown's somewhat asymmetrical pattern by introducing a 
fourth type of disease. But by doing so he also redefined some 
basic principles: in the new classification diseases were either 
due to irregular amounts of excitability or unhealthy environ-
ments; the former became the internally caused asthenic 
diseases, the latter the externally conditioned forms of "Sthenie". 
Although the new category was a form of "Sthenie", Novalis' 
real concern were the asthenic diseases, which, in his scheme, 
were caused by internal physiological or psychological disorders. 
Brown's "dogma" that most diseases were asthenic22 achieved 
thereby a new meaning and Brown himself became the physician 
of the age because he recognized the "Zeitgeist" and identified 
the dominant asthenic disposition corresponding to it: "Die 
herrschende Konstitution ist die Zartliche-die Asthenische. 
Das Heilsystem ist das natiirliche Produkt der herrschenden 
Constitution ... " (II, 6o4). 
Novalis' remarks about the dominant constitution of the age 
are merely medically dressed expressions of that almost universal 
self-conscious modernism of the "Goethezeit" which found 
more eloquent expression in Holderlin's poetry, Schiller's 
Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung or later in Hegel's philo-
sophy. While the Greek temperament expressed itself in "noble 
simplicity and quiet grandeur", the modern constitution, as 
Novalis noted, was typified by easy excitability, delicacy, 
sensitivity, and slight femininity(II, 579, 6oz, and 6o4). To this 
observation he even brought a personal testimony: "Zuviel 
Abstraction erzeugt Asthenie-zu viel Reflexion Sthenie. Ich 
mu13 viel reflectiren und nicht viel abstrahiren. Ich bin schon 
reitzbar genug" (III, 289). Carrying this medical analysis even 
further, in the "Brouillon" he asked whether this asthenic 
disposition of the age was a constitutional deficiency (direct 
weakness) or due to the exhausting external conditions (indirect 
weakness): "Wichtige Frage, ob die Menschheit im Zustande 
der directen oder indirecten Schwache sey" (III, 4 I 9)? 
The usefulness of this terminology, as well as the restlessness 
of Hardenberg's mind, is shown by the undue haste with which 
these idioms became landmarks and general signposts on the 
philosophical map he was charting. Epic poetry became in-
directly asthenic, lyric poetry directly asthenic, while drama was 
both directly and indirectly sthenic: ''Die Dramatische [Poesie 
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ist) die vollstandig Gesunde, acht Gemischte."23 Somewhat 
earlier, however, a "Trauerspiel", as well as life, was described 
by a transition from sthenic to asthenic or vice versa. 24 In an 
other sketch Novalis quickly moved from contemplating 
a "medical view of the French Revolution" to the asthenic 
nature of the Chinese, and finally to a plan to write a history of 
mankind in terms of medicine. 25 
More interesting and important is a fragment that imme-
diately followed the classification of constitutions and did not 
explicitly use any medical term: "Plato macht die Liebe schon 
zum Kinde des Mangels, des Bediirfnisses- und des Oberflusses" 
(II, 573). The occasion for this remark was not the passage 
from Plato's Symposium (203 A-204 A), as suggested in the 
critical edition (II, 775), since Novalis' references to Plato 
were probably made on the basis of reading secondary works.26 
In this case Novalis' source was Schlegel's 69th "Lyceum" 
fragment which appeared in I 797: "Es gibt auch negativen 
Sinn, der viel besser ist als Null, aber viel seltner. Man kann 
etwas innig lie ben, eben weil mans nicht hat: das gibt wenigstens 
ein Vorgefiihl ohne Nachsatz. Selbst entschiedne Unfahigkeit, 
die man klar weil3, oder gar mit starker Antipathie ist bei 
reinem Mangel ganz unmoglich, und setzt wenigstens partiale 
Fahigkeit und Sympathie voraus. Gleich dem Platonischen 
Eros ist also wohl dieser negative Sinn der Sohn des Uberflusses 
und der Armut."27 Since Navalis' note captures most of 
Schlegel's last sentence, there can be no doubt about the back-
ground and we only have to ask what interested him in the 
statement, since he was not concerned with Schlegel's "negative 
sense". The words "Mangel" and "Uberfluss" suggest that the 
note may be related to thoughts on medicine, and this assump-
tion is confirmed by another note in the same MS where sthenic 
and asthenic loves are compared. What could have Navalis 
meant by these odd terms? 
In Hardenberg's theory, constitutions are described by a 
"deficiency" or "excess" in excitability or stimulation. Love 
in a constitution of low excitability will express itself through 
dispassionate tenderness and yearning, while a highly excitable 
constitution will burst into flames of passion. The distinction 
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allows for an interesting reading of the Hjmnen an die Nacht 
and some "Teplitzer" fragments which describe a "deficiency" 
or "excess" of light-the metaphor of love. 28 The night of the 
hymns represents a realm beyond sensuous experience where 
extrasensory perception is aided by the juice of poppy (opium) 
and the "golden flood of grapes" (I, 133). This realm is only 
"indirectly" dim, because the beloved, the "dear sun of the 
night" (I, 133) spreads an overabundance of light over the 
firmament. In a fragment written in Teplitz Novalis did indeed 
distinguish between directly and indirectly asthenic nights. 
The first was simply lacking in illumination, whereas the latter 
was characterized by an excess of light and likened to an 
organism with an "excess of self-stimulation". 
Precisely such an excess in internal stimulation will lead to 
that imaginative derangement of the senses in which the visions 
of the hymns are experienced: "Die Nacht ist zweyfach-
Indirecte und directe Asthenie- Jene entsteht durch Blendung 
- UbermaBiges Licht-diese aus Mangel an hinlanglichen 
Licht. So giebt es auch eine Unbesonnenheit aus Mangel an 
Selbstreitz-und eine Unbesonnenheit aus UbermaaB an 
Selbstreitz-dort ein zu grobes-hier ein zu zartes Organ .... 
Die Nacht und Unbesonnenheit aus Mangel ist die Haufigste. 




Ideas for an Encyclopedia 
,Was ist die Natur?-ein encyclopaedischer 
systematischer Index oder Plan unsers Geis-
tes. Warum wollen wir uns mit dem bloBen 
VerzeichniB unsrer Schatze begnugen -laBt 
sie uns selbst besehn-und sie mannichfaltig 
bearbeiten und benutzen" (II, 5 83). 
I. THE "BROUILLON" AND THE OTHER NOTEBOOKS 
The last sketches of the "Vorarbeiten zu verschiedenen Frag-
mentsammlungen" date from September 1798, when Novalis 
had already started to jot down miscellaneous notes under 
the title "Das allgemeine Brouillon": "Was mir nebenher 
einfallt, wird in das allg[emeine] Brouillon mit hineingeschrieben" 
(III, 28o ). He continued to write into this notebook till March 
1799, shortly before his return from Freiberg to Weissenfels. 
The "Brouillon" was, of course, not the only notebook Novalis 
kept during his stay at Freiberg: the so-called "Freiberger 
naturwissenschaftliche Studien", printed for the first time in 
their entirety in vol. III of the new critical edition, contain 
a large number of detailed notes on specific scientific works 
of the time.1 Since the "Brouillon" often reuses themes and 
ideas from these and older notes, one might be tempted to 
merge it with other notebooks, and perhaps even follow 
E. Wasmuth who collected all of Hardenberg's "fragmentary 
writing" and subdivided it according to subject matters. 
But such an arrangement would be misleading, not merely 
because it is often difficult to determine to what subject a many 
faceted Novalis-note belongs. The "Brouillon" neither contains 
elirect excerpts and notes as other notebooks from Freiberg 
do, nor is it made up of polished fragments as Bliithenstaub 
or Glauben und Liebe. Both its form and its content will best be 
dealt with if we attempt to reconstruct the outline and the aim of 
this collection, which occupies a distinct place in Hardenberg's 
development. 
As already the title(= general outline, scheme) indicates, the 
"Brouillon" meant to bring together a wide spectrum of knowl-
edge to show the interrelations and the underlying higher unity. 
In the "Kant-Studien" of 1797 Navalis already defined philos-
ophizing as a scientific and poetic treatment of the sciences 
(II, 390), and half a year later the notion reappeared in that letter 
to A. W. Schlegel which accompanied the first version of the 
Bliithenstaub fragments. In this letter N ovalis expressed the 
hope of escaping from the "Strudel der Empiric" through his 
old inclination towards the absolute, and asserted that in the 
future he would only engage in poetry: " ... die Wissenschaften 
mi.issen alle poetisiert werden-von dieser realen, wissenschaft-
lichen Poesie hoffe ich recht viel mit Ihnen zu reden. Bin 
Hauptgedanke dazu ist die Idee der Religion in meinen Frag-
menten" (IV, 229). Both a fragment written in Teplitz (II, 6o1) 
and a letter to F. Schlegel (IV, 233) contemplated a "symbolic 
treatment" of the natural sciences. In the "Brouillon" itself 
N ovalis noted programmatically: "Romant[ische] poet[ische] 
Ansicht d[er] W[issenschaften]" (III, 377). 
Although these remarks do not necessarily refer directly 
to the "Brouillon", there can be no doubt that this was conceived 
as a symbolic, poetic, and religious treatment of the sciences. 
What exactly was the meaning that Navalis attached to his 
project? His first notions lead us back to the notes he wrote 
preceding the conception of the encyclopedia, notably to the 
"romanticizing of the world" and to some of the early notes on 
medicine, where an imaginative reconstruction of the world 
was advocated: ''Das Beste am Brownischen System ist die 
erstaunende Zuversicht, mit der Brown sein System, als all-
gemeingeltend, hinstellt-Es muB und soll so seyn- die Er-
fahrung und Natur mag sagen, was sie will. Darinn liegt denn 
doch das Wesentliche jedes Systems, seine wircklich geltende 
Kraft" (II, 545). In the notebooks written in conjunction with 
the "Brouillon" this idea was repeated in much more general 
terms: ''Der Begriff Materie, Phlogiston, Oxigene, Gas, Kraft, 
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etc. gehoren in eine logische Plqysik-die nichts von concreten 
Stoffen weis-sondern mit kiihner Hand eigensinnig in das 
Weltchaos hineingreift-und eigne Ordnungen macht. Plotins 
Plqysik" (III, 179). This symbolic conception of science, which 
Navalis attributes to Plotinus, points to prevalent twentieth-
century theories because it recognizes that, contrary to the 
popular conception, the terminology of science is not a re-
presentation of materials and material objects, but rather a 
mental and imaginative aid that helps us in ordering the "Welt-
chaos". Today Navalis could refer to the notions of wave, 
electron, or orbit to show that physical concepts do not corre-
spond to a uniquely defined material reality beyond con-
sciousness. He saw the task of science in developing a system 
of concepts or regulative norms that could be applied to nature: 
"Wir werden erst Physiker werden, wenn wir imaginative- Stoffe 
und Kr[afte] zum regulat[iven] Maa!3stab der Naturstoffe 
und Kr[afte] machen" (III, 448). N ovalis called the process of 
generating a system of "imaginative materials and energies" 
"active empiricism" (thatiger Empiricismus), and meant by it 
an essentially creative endeavor; physics, as well as poetry, 
experimented with "images and concepts in the imagination 
(III, 443) until these lost their arbitrariness and became pure 
representations of a divine idea. Hence the process may also 
be called "experimenting in God" (III, 443)-Novalis found 
this expression while reading Tiedemann-and the resultant 
body of science may be described as "theological physics". 
Considering the "Brouillon" as an attempt at a symbolic, 
poetic, and religious treatment of physics, with the philosophy 
of Plotinus and the medical theosophies of the sixteenth century 
(Paracelsus and his followers) as precursors, it comes as a 
surprise that Navalis regarded Goethe as the greatest physicist 
of his age: "Gothe soll der Liturg dieser Physik werden-er 
versteht vollkommen den Dienst im Tempel" (III, 469). This 
remark from the "Brouillon" has antecedents in an earlier letter 
and in the essay-fragment on Goethe, probably written in the 
first days of September 1798. Conceived in the mixed spirit of 
respect and criticism which characterizes most of Hardenberg's 
writing on Goethe, the essay praised Goethe's scientific tal-
ents :"Auch durfte man im gewissen Sinn mit Recht behaupten, 
daB Gothe der erste Physiker seiner Zeit sey ... " (II, 64o). 
Professor Samuel is probably correct in observing that here, as 
in the more explicit letter, Navalis praises Goethe's science with 
a contrast to Schelling in mind (II, 519). But the praise is 
shrewdly qualified ("durfte", "im gewissen Sinn", "mit Recht") 
and seems to be based on methodology rather than basic issues. 
For Navalis emphasizes Goethe's ability to deal penetratingly 
with an insignificant subject until the presentation became 
highly polished and "comfortable" -praise in which the under-
tone of irony cannot be ignored. 2 It was, nevertheless, this 
penetration and care which compared favorably with the 
"immaturity" of Schelling's Weltseele (IV, 238). 
Navalis seems to have attributed to Goethe a "Naturanschau-
ung" which was his own rather than Goethe's. He believed that 
the great physicist looks at nature as the artist does at antiq-
uity: he constructs a model of nature as the modern artist 
forms an ideal image of Greece: " ... man irrt sehr, wenn man 
glaubt, daB es Antiken giebt. Erst jezt fangt die Antike an zu 
entstehen. Sie wird unter den Augen und der Seele des Kunst-
lers. Die Reste des Alterthums sind nur die specifischen Reitze 
zur Bildung der Antike. Nicht mit Handen wird die Antike 
gemacht. Der Geist bringt sie durch das Auge hervor-und der 
gehaune Stein ist nur der Korper, der erst durch sie Bedeutung 
erhalt, und zur Erscheinung derselben wird" (II, 64o ). Accord-
ingly, Navalis praised in Goethe the ability to abstract with 
unusual accuracy, "without ever failing to construct simulta-
neously the object" (II, 64r). This is indeed Navalis' physics, 
(the essay actually applies the term "activer Empirismus" to the 
method), and not Goethe's view of nature, for in Goethe's 
scientific studies, as well as in his poetry, one finds a reverence 
for the natural construction of objects which often led him to 
contempt for abstractions and for higher religious significations. 
Instead of an ideal reconstruction of nature, Goethe aimed at 
empathy, a blending into the organic unity of the universe. 
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II. EXTERNAL UNITY-A.G. WERNER 
The work that went into the making of the "Brouillon" con-
cerned form and method as much as it did subject matter. When 
Navalis had come to suspect that the "symbolic treatment of the 
sciences" was too ambitious a plan for complete and satisfactory 
execution he decided to focus his work on methodology, giving 
only examples from the particular fields of knowledge (III, 3 56). 
He did indeed devote increasing attention to the very nature of 
his undertaking, and as a result the "Brouillon" has become to 
a large extent a critique of its own nature and intentions (III, 
3 57); a number of notes bear the title "Enzyklopaedistik" and 
others refer back specifically to the project itself. As part of 
this self-examination Navalis consulted, or planned to study, a 
wide range of encyclopedic works, among them the great French 
encyclopedia of Diderot and d' Alembert, from which he made 
excerpts, G. G. Fulleborn's new Encyclopedia phi!o!ogica, Rous-
seau's Dictionnaire de musique, J. K. G. Jacobson's Techno!o-
gisches Worterbuch, and W. T. Krug's encyclopedia of the 
sciences. 3 His preoccupation with the form of the project is 
evident also in a note of the "Brouillon": "Meine Haupt-
beschaftigungen sollen jezt I. Die Encyclopaedistik. 2. ein 
Roman. 3. der Brief an Schlegel seyn. Im leztern werde ich ein 
Bruchstuck a us I. so roman tisch, als moglich, vortragen. (SoU es 
eine Recherche (oder Essai), eine Sammlung Fragmente, ein 
Lichtenbergischer Commentar, ein Bericht, ein Gutachten, 
eine Geschichte, eine Abhandlung, eine Recension, eine Rede, 
ein Mono!og oder Bruchstiick eines Dialogs etc. werden?)" (III, 
277 f.). Since we do find in the "Brouillon" fragment-like notes, 
essays, commentaries, and review notes, we may surmise 
that this lengthy list of possible formats was not merely a sign 
of Hardenberg's indecision, but a planned feature of his en-
cyclopedia4 bearing resemblance to Schlegel's "progressive 
Universalpoesie". The latter aimed at the reunification of 
literary genres and the fusion of philosophy with literature by 
envisaging the saturation of the arts with "all kinds of learned 
material". 5 
Navalis was well aware that the variety in form was seriously 
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endangering the internal and external unity of his project and he 
was in search of unifying schemes. Most useful was what he 
learned from A. G. Werner (1749-r8r7), his friend and teacher 
at Freiberg. Werner, although still regarded as the greatest 
figure in the history of the academy, is remembered among 
laymen chiefly because of his erroneous Neptunian theory, 
which asserted, like Thales in Faust II, that the continents of the 
earth emerged from the sea in an evolutionary process. But 
Werner's solid and enduring achievement was the founding of 
oryctognosy (mineralogy) which he chiefly accomplished with 
his book Von den aujferlichen Kennzeichen der Fojfilien. 6 As may 
be expected, such a systematic book was of particular value to 
Navalis, who needed a system of classification for the con-
struction of his "Brouillon". The idea of the project itself might 
have come to him in the lectures of Werner who taught a 
course on "Enzyklopadie der Bergwerkskunde" during Navalis' 
stay in Freiberg (cf. III, 738). 
Indeed, the "Brouillon" abounds in little memos which meant 
to remind Navalis of the need to study Werner's system of 
classification. 7 Surprisingly, however, most of these notes are 
highly polemic, advocating the revision of the oryctognostic 
classification (III, 3 58), the criticism of Werner's Introduction 
to the work (III, 3 58), or even the joint revision of Werner's 
system and the "Brouillon" itself (III, 3 59). To understand the 
meaning of these remarks, one has to turn to Navalis' extensive 
notes on Werner's book, which were recently published for 
the first time (III, 135-r6r). 
As the title of Werner's book indicates, he was concerned with 
the external characteristics of minerals. It was, however, 
Werner's conviction that no matter how carefully and system-
atically one would construct and order these external features, 
they could not serve as a basis of a true classification of minerals, 
for such a classification had to rest on their internal, chemical 
composition. Werner himself was very skeptical of the possibil-
ity of establishing a necessary relationship between external 
features and internal composition, because he felt that the 
observable characteristics were only arbitrarily and haphazardly 
expressing something about internal makeup (III, 856 f.). He 
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nevertheless wrote this book on external characteristics because 
he preferred to have his minerals well described and ill classified 
than vice versa. 
Novalis objected to several specific points in Werner's 
system. Quite correctly, for instance, he was unwilling to 
accept Werner's rigid separation of the animal and plant 
kingdoms from that of minerals, or the somewhat rigid 
distinctions concerning the study of minerals. But he was most 
interested in the relation between external signs and internal 
structure (or symptoms and chemistry) for he sensed that it was 
here that a critique of a higher science must start. Werner was 
dogmatic, inasmuch as he believed that any meaningful associa-
tion between internal and external features may only be estab-
lished a posteriori, i.e., when complete information about both 
realms was already available (III, 1 39). An idealist (Novalis 
calls him a person of magic knowledge, a prophet), on the other 
hand, would apply a synthetic method whereby changes in form 
would give him the key to internal transformations. Novalis 
remarked quite correctly that it is anthropomorphic to believe 
that internal changes do not show up in scientifically observable 
external changes; such a belief attributes a free will to minerals 
and denies the possibility of science. 
The basic weakness of Werner's system of classification was its 
empirical method, which Novalis considered subjective and 
arbitrary. His opinion is only seemingly paradoxical; for he 
thought that Werner's scheme was similar to the botanical 
system of Linne, where the empirically found facts were arranged 
into an orderly array of empirically established categories. Such 
a nominalistic system could not show why and how the classifi-
cation was an internal and logical necessity. Lacking the 
"principle of necessity" and the "principle of completeness", 
Werner's system remained a "useful" but "prosaic oryctognosy". 8 
Instead of merely wanting to replace Werner's "dogmatism" 
by an "idealistic" method, Novalis was looking for a dialectic 
that would synthesize the two. As in his interpretation of 
Goethe's physics, the observed object was to be simultaneously 
an a priori idea in the mind of the observer(III, 357 f.), and the 
"compelling concept of a fossil" (III, 388) was to be constructed 
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through a both theoretical and practical method of investigation 
(III, 144 f.). A method of empiricism and abstraction could 
uncover that binding relationship between chemical composition 
and external appearance which Werner denied (III, 141), for 
individuality and universality were always dialectically present 
in appearance and internal structure (III, 140). 
III. INTERNAL UNITY- KANT, FICHTE, AND LAMBERT 
A unifying form for the "Brouillon" was, of course, never 
found, and the shifts in Hardenberg's plans-first from the 
encyclopedic project to the inhomogeneous Die Lehrlinge zu 
Sais, and then from Die Lehrlinge to Heinrich von Ofterdingen-
suggest that he became gradually convinced that only poetry 
could provide that external form for which he was looking. 
In any case, the unifying element of the "Brouillon" is not the 
external but the internal arrangement of its subject matter, 
for the project is grounded in the conviction that knowledge, 
however immense, is both unique and universal, and that 
neither nature nor the human mind is split by irreducible 
contradictions. According to Novalis, there is an inner core of 
truth somewhat analogous to general mathematical statements, 9 
which reduces the bewildering variety found in the empirical 
world: 
Doppelte Universalitat jeder wahrhaften W[issen-
schaft]-Eine entsteht, wenn ich alle andern W[is-
senschaften] zur Ausbildung der Besondern benutze. 
-Die Andre, wenn ich sie zur Universalwissenschaft 
mache und sie selbst unter sich ordne-alle andre Wis-
senschaften, als ihre Modificationen betrachte. Den 
Ersten V ersuch der leztern Art hat Fichte mit der 
Phil[ osophie] unternommen. Er soli in allen W[is-
senschaften] unternommen werden (III, z69). 
The passage suggests that Novalis took from Fichte that 
transcendental foundation in which he found Werner's system 
deficient, and attempted to apply Fichte's mathematical and 
logical but abstract rigor to the empirical sciences. 
To these two processes, namely the deduction of a specific 
science from the general framework of all sciences, and the 
universalizing of a single field, Navalis often applied the mathe-
matical terms of "logarithmisiren" and "potenziren", and he 
even defined romanticizing as a "qualitative Potenzirung" 
(II, 545). Such terms as "Logologie" (Logik X Logik = Lo-
gik2). "Philosophic der Philosophic", "Kridk der Kritik", or 
"Poesie der Poesie" show that Navalis had actually attempted to 
establish Fichtean "potentialized" categories which would 
symbolically incorporate in their name the self-conscious 
and reflective way in which the world was reconstructed by 
Fichte's empirical self. For it was the method of Fichte's 
Wissenschaftslehre to start from the arbitrarily selected statement 
a = a, and to arrive through the use of logic and "intellectual 
intuition" to the ideally posited first principle of philosophy 
which states that "the ego simply posits in an original way its 
own being". The trouble with Fichte's procedure was that 
the individual consciousness "potentialized" itself to the truth 
of the absolute self without touching the specific truth of the 
sciences that cover the empirical world: "Der W[issenschajts ]-
Lehrer behandelt blos W[issenschaft] im Ganzen-Hat blos 
mit W[issenschaften ], als solchen zu thun. f Die W[issen-
schafts ]Lehre ist eine wahrhafte, unabhangige, selbststandige 
Encyklopadik.-W[issenschaft] d[ er] W[issenschaften]. f W[is-
senschafts ]L[ehre] ist System des wissenschaftlichen Geistes-die 
P.rychologie, wenn ich so sagen darf-der \Vissenschaften im 
Ganzen" (III, 249). The issue mentioned here was already 
discussed by Eschenmayer, and this note in the "Brouillon" 
does indeed pick up themes from the Eschenmayer-notes. 
Like Fichte's U7issenschaftslehre, the "Brouillon" meant to 
reflect a transcendental unity, but instead of analyzing the 
structure of consciousness it turned to the empirical world and 
attempted to show that the homogeneous pattern of knowledge 
turns the consideration of any subject, be it medicine, physics, 
geology, psychology, or music, into a paradigm of universal 
truth: "Aile W[issenschaft] ist Eine" (III, 3 56). If Fichte had 
sketched the "Psychologic der Wissenschaften", the universal 
application of his method was still wanting; the "Fichtisiren", 
as Novalis called his own procedure earlier (II, 5 24), aimed pre-
cisely at that: it wished to treat the various concepts in the 
sciences as Fichte treated the concept of the self: "Behandl[ung] 
jedes Begr[iffs]-nach der Fichtischen Ichformel" (III, 40 5 ). In a 
similar way, Novalis performed experiments with Kant's 
question whether a priori synthetic judgments are possible. 
When he gave ten different physical and metaphysical inter-
pretations to Kant's fundamental question (III, 388), he wished 
to demonstrate that all forms of knowledge are related to a 
unified philosophical chain into which they enter organically 
through a method of "potentialization" (III, 346), and he tried 
to prove against Kant himself that there are no divisions between 
the sensuous, the moral, and the metaphysical realms. Seen 
from this angle, the "Brouillon" may be read as a series of 
thought-experiments in which Kant's and Fichte's ideas are 
tested upon the empirical world: "Es HeBe sich eine auBerst 
instructive Reihe von specifischen Darstellungen des Fichtischen 
und Kantischen Systems denken z.B. eine poetische, eine 
chemische, eine mathematische, eine Musikalische etc .... Ich 
habe eine Menge Bruchstiicke dazu" (III, 336). 
The third volume of the second critical edition contains a new 
section entitled "Studien zu Tiedemanns 'Geist der spekulativen 
Philosophic' und Lamberts 'Neuem Organon"' (III, I29-134). 
As mentioned before, the rather cryptic notes on Tiedemann's 
work in this section led Professor Mahl to significant discoveries 
about the background material of the "Brouillon". The excerpts 
from Lambert's Neues Organon10 contain less explosive informa-
tion and only a few, rather insignificant, personal notes from 
Navalis; nevertheless they raise some interesting questions. 
Lambert was a follower of Wolff and Locke and had an 
almost boundless confidence in the power of reason: in the 
Neues Organon he set out to discuss the ways in which truth may 
be separated from error, and he proposed that ultimately all 
human knowledge may acquire the certainty of logic and 
mathematics. As Navalis quoted him in the excerpts: "Man 
sollte daher allerdings jede Aufgabe in den Wissenschaften auf 
bios logische Aufgaben reduziren konncn" (III, I 3 I). The unfolding 
of this principle resulted in a book which one critic called the 
"most comprehensive theoretical formulation of a 'mathesis 
universalis' in the history of philosophy."11 Such claims are 
no doubt excessive, yet they make Hardenberg's interest in the 
work clear; indeed, in spite of scarce direct references to 
Lambert's work, Hardenberg's encyclopedic project was surely 
stimulated and influenced by Lambert's ideas. In the larger 
sense the Neues Organon shows once more that the main current 
of eighteenth-century German philosophy of science and 
epistemology -from Leibniz through the generation of Lambert 
and culminating in Kant-had anticipated and prepared an 
important aspect of romantic thought: rationalism and ro-
manticism shared the belief that all knowledge was of the same 
pattern and shaped by the same principles. 
IV. THE BIBLE PROJECT 
When Friedrich Schlegel wrote to Navalis on October 20, 
I798 that the goal of his literary projects was to write a new 
bible and to follow the footsteps of Mohamed and Luther (IV, 
2 3 9 ), N ovalis responded with enthusiasm. Schlegel's plan 
seemed like a decisive sign of success for their "Sym-organization" 
because Navalis too had "potentialized" himself from the study 
of science and its vessel, the book, to the bible-the prototype 
of all books (IV, 240). Yet, as Schlegel recognized, their plans 
were quite different;12 Schlegel's friendship with Schleiermacher 
led to a project that was literally, and not merely symbolically, 
religious: "Nun habe ich aber eine Bibel im Sinne, die nicht in 
gewissem Sinne, nicht gleichsam, sondern ganz buchstablich und 
in jedem Geist und Sinne Bibel ware, das erste Kunstwerk 
dieser Art, da die bisherigen nur Produkte der Natur sind . 
. . . Mein biblisches Projekt aber ist kein literarisches, sondern-
ein biblisches, ein durchaus religioses." (IV, 247). 
This is not the place to analyze Schlegel's hazy notion about 
the religion he was to proclaim and the prophet he was going to 
become through his bible-project. In relation to Novalis' ideas 
on the bible it is important to note only that although Schlegel's 
book was to be strictly religious, the project was not unrelated to 
his essay, Uber das Studium der griechischen Poesie: Schlegel was 
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planning a self-conscious, artistically constructed book which 
could become for modern man what the "spontaneously" 
written bible was for ages past, thus rendering a concrete answer 
to his own call for a new mythology. The call was not unknown 
to Navalis, and he himself had felt the need for renewing the 
foundations of faith. As he indicated in a letter to Just (IV, 25 6), 
he was emancipated from the traditional "theology of historical-
critical reason" and could not take the bible as a "pledge of God 
and immortality" (IV, 257). Instead of documents, his faith 
rested on the proofs that his imagination constantly supplied, 
and he regarded the bible as an "Urbuch", a symbol and 
prototype of all books. Consequently, his bible could not be 
religious in the narrow sense, but had to unite religion with 
morality, poetry, and the knowledge of the empirical world, 
as the bible mirrored the primeval unity between the poet and 
the priest. In Navalis' conception, the age needed not a modern 
bible, but a theory that would universalize the spirit of the 
"Urbuch": "Die Theorie der Bibel, entwickelt, gibt die Theorie 
der Schriftstellerei oder der Wortbildnerei iiberhaupt-die 
zugleich die symbolische, indirekte Konstruktionslehre des 
schaffenden Geistes abgibt" (IV, 240 ). 
In what way was the "Brouillon" project affected by Harden-
berg's ideas on the bible? In contrast to the arbitrary external 
unity offered by Werner's classification, and the internal but 
abstract unity of Fichte's method, the bible rendered both an 
internal and external unity through the poetic treatment of its 
subject. It imposed unity not through a mathematical scheme or 
an abstract philosophical argument but through the concrete 
representation of lives and events. Although the "Brouillon" 
remained an inadequate realization of a vague idea, Navalis' 
later turn to poetic representations shows how he eventually 
conceived of this "theory of the bible", from which he hoped to 
generate "grandiose truths and ideas", to prepare the way 
towards a "true process of reunion" (IV, 240 f.). In the "Brouillon" 
itself he wanted to apply the idea of the bible to the sciences, so 
that his work could be called a "scientific bible" and a "real and 
ideal model", in short: a "Keirn aller Bucher" (III, 363). In this 
sense Navalis could characterize his project as a "description of 
the bible", a "Bibel Kunst und Naturlehre", and his aim was to 
raise his book to the art of the bible (III, 365). Indeed, the 
creative construction of a Book was a task for all those who 
strove for perfection: "Eine Bibel schreiben zu wollen-ist ein 
Hang zur Tollheit, wie ihn jeder tiichtige Mensch haben mufi, urn 
vollstandig zu seyn" (III, 49I). 
V. HEMSTERHUIS VS. SCHELLING 
Die Wissenschaften sind nur aus Mangel an Genie 
und Scharfsinn getrennt-die Verhaltnisse zwischen 
ihnen sind dem Verstand und Stumpfsinn zu ver-
wickelt und entfernt von einander. 
Die groBesten Wahrheiten unsrer Tage verdanken 
wir solchen Combinationen der Lange getrennten 
Glieder der Totalwissenschaft (II, 368). 
This meditative excursion amidst the Hemsterhuis-excerpts 
foreshadows the "Brouillon" and suggests that the philosophy of 
Hemsterhuis was another formative element in the making 
of the encyclopedia. The second sentence of this passage and 
other quotations fromLettre sur l'homme, Simon, and Alexis were 
indeed inserted word for word into the "Brouillon" (III, 275). 
Hemsterhuis believed that the postulated unity of knowledge 
would only be established, if reason, the faculty of the 
sciences, becomes subordinated to the moral sense that resides in 
the heart and develops through social intercourse.l3 Novalis 
became acquainted with this concept of the moral sense in the 
fall of I797, but neither his notebooks from the earlier part of 
I 798 nor his ideas on magic, as outlined in the preceding chapter, 
show that it impressed him; his notebooks from that time reflect 
rather his scientific studies in Freiberg, his interest in medicine, 
and a residual attachment to certain ideas of Fichte. However, 
by the end of summer I 798 moral, scientific, and philosophical 
concerns began to illuminate each other: in a letter to F. Schlegel 
from July 20 Novalis suggested that one might treat physics 
symbolically and he divulged that he had come upon the idea of a 
"moral astronomy" in Hemsterhuis' sense and discovered the 
"religion of the visible cosmos" (IV, 2 3 z ). The letter states that 
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Christian religion and everyday life were among the "central 
monads" of Hardenberg's meditations at the time, and so 
"moral astronomy" may be associated both with religion and 
with the rituals of everyday circumstance. Indeed, among the 
fragments written during August in Teplitz there are several 
passages where religious and moral concepts are fused with 
common life-a life that Navalis calls "Priesterdienst" (II, 6o8): 
communal eating, for instance, is described as a symbolic act of 
union (II, 6zo ), and the tangible world in general is conceived as 
an "Universaltropus", an image of the spirit (II, 6oo ). 
What exactly is meant by "moral astronomy"? In a note 
from late summer 1798, Navalis stated once more that the 
imagination was independent of mechanical laws and capable of 
replacing the external senses (II, 65o). In this particular passage 
he arrived at the assertion by contemplating the association that 
Hemsterhuis postulated between the visible and invisible worlds: 
"Alles Sichtbare haftet am Unsichtbaren-Das Hi:irbare am 
Unhi:irbaren-Das Fuhlbare am Unfuhlbaren. Vielleicht das 
Denkbare am Undenckbaren-. Das Fernrohr ist ein kiinstliches, 
unsichtbares Organ. fGefaB.j" (II, 65o). Now the last sentence 
strikes one as odd. Why should the telescope be an "artificial, 
invisible organ"? Our clue is given by a passage in Hemsterhuis' 
Lettre sur l' hom me where the demoralizing effects of the dis-
integrating geocentric astronomy are described. Hemsterhuis 
contrasts the weakening of faith and loosening of morals 
consequent to the invention of the telescope (i.e., the improve-
ment of the external senses) with the constructive intention of 
the Pythagorean sect to improve their internal sense of morality: 
"Ils tenterent une modification de la societe, dont la base seroit, 
non la perfection de 1' organe de la vue, ni de celui de 1' ou1e, ni de 
celui du tact, mais celle de l'organe moral."14 Although Navalis 
made no excerpts of this passage, he noted the Pythagorean 
refinement of the moral sense and asked if there were telescopes 
for it (II, 367). The question is in accordance with the description 
of the telescope as an "artificial, invisible organ", for in both the 
reference is not to the physical instrument which gives power 
to the eye, but to that "invisible organ" which may enhance the 
effectiveness of the moral sense: through self-observation and 
training such an instrument could "telescope" the action of the 
internal sense. Hence moral astronomy consists of the "reasons 
of the heart" aided by the technical power of the mind, while the 
"moral" telescope is an instrument to fortify the unstable heart 
and to achieve moral wisdom.15 
Expressions such as "moralische Heilkunst" (III, 2 76) indicate 
that the "Brouillon" intended to establish also a reverse relation-
ship between morality and science, by giving a moral meaning 
to empirical knowledge. Following Hemsterhuis, the "Univer-
salwissenschaft" or "Wissenschaft im graBen" of the "Brouillon" 
would have been a science saturated with the moral law: "Die 
magischen W[issenschaften] entspringen, nach Hemsterhuis, 
durch die Anwendung des moralischen Sinns auf die iibrigen 
Sinne-i.e. durch die Moralisirung des Weltalls, und der iibri-
gen Wissenschaften" (III, 275). That magic should be in the 
service of a moral idea is the specifically new thesis of the 
"Brouillon" with respect to earlier notes where magic merely 
designated the possibility of achieving internal control of the 
externally oriented sense. As if discovering a new dimension 
beyond the earlier concept of magic, Navalis could say now 
that the final purpose in the art of magic was to develop the 
sense of moral responsibility (III, 2 5o). 
This shift in Hardenberg's thinking carried him further away 
from Kant. If earlier notes already reflected his endeavor to 
eliminate Kant's distinction between knowing and believing or 
knowing and moral action, the idea of the "moral sciences" in the 
"Brouillon" sharpened the polemic and defined Navalis' 
position more clearly. The central argument against Kant was 
that although God and nature, or morality and nature, were 
indeed distinct under the existing circumstances, the inevitable 
movement of history was to bring about a moralization of 
nature, a moral subjugation of natural forces: "Gott und Natur 
muB man hiernach trennen-Gott hat gar nichts mit der Natur 
zu schaffen-Er ist das Ziel der Natur-dasjenige, mit dem sie 
einst harmoniren soll. Die Natur soll moralisch werden und so 
erscheint allerdings der Kantische Moralgott und die Moralitaet 
in einem ganz andern Lichte. Der moralische Gott ist etwas weit 
Hoheres, als der magische Gott" (III, 250). Both in the "Brouil-
Ion" (III, 248) and in the plans for Die Lehrlinge (I, I I I) man 
appears as the "Messiah of nature" because he is destined to 
liberate the universe from the yoke of mechanical determinism 
by following the poet-prophet. 
The shift from a "magical God" to a "moral God" marks also 
Novalis' decisive departure from Schelling's early "Natur-
philosophie". One ought to be discriminating, however, in 
evaluating their relationship. Although Novalis might have had 
later personal reasons for disliking Schelling, especially on 
account of Karoline Schlegel's relationship with Schelling, the 
initial differences were only philosophical and not very clearly 
defined. Of their first meeting on December I, 1797 Novalis 
reported to the Schlegel brothers that it was a success and they 
agreed to begin a correspondence.16 The impression that 
Schelling made on Novalis was perhaps more due to the 
quality of his mind than to agreement about aims and methods, 
because Novalis' later remarks on Schelling's works were 
mostly negative. But one should read these in their context: 
the oft-quoted critical remarks on Schelling appear almost 
exclusively in his correspondence with the Schlegels,l' partic-
ularly with Friedrich, who was unfavorably disposed towards 
Schelling. Since Friedrich's attitude towards Schelling betrayed 
an excess of jealousy from the very beginning-Schelling was 
three years younger and significantly more successful- and 
since his reports about Schelling's new works were always 
accompanied by some disparaging remarks,18 Novalis made 
some rather striking adjustments to the opinions of his addressee 
by avoiding a polemic and harmonizing with his tone-
as he always did in his correspondence.19 This may also reveal 
why Novalis wrote to Friedrich that he "boldly explained" to 
Schelling "our" (i.e., Novalis' and Friedrich's) displeasure at the 
ldeen. 
Nevertheless there were real differences and serious issues at 
stake. In retrospect these were not, as Schelling and Steffens 
believed, due to Hardenberg's allegedly "fragmentary and 
restless" nature,20 since Schelling's own escapades in the fields 
of medicine, chemistry, and physics are often more undisciplined 
than certain speculations of Novalis. It seems more important 
that the young Schelling consistently refused to subordinate his 
concept of nature to any supernatural idea or being. His 
Weltseele, which appeared in the spring of 1798, carried in its 
title a concept which was not beyond nature, merely the unseen 
coordinating principle inherent in it. In short, Schelling's 
"Weltseele" was a Spinozistic concept. 
The early notes ofNovalis do not explicitly reject this worship 
of nature, and the notion of magic is merely an attempt to define 
the power that consciousness may acquire over matter; but 
after the study of Hemsterhuis' enthusiastic and metaphysical 
treatment of nature Schelling's philosophy must have appeared 
to Navalis as somewhat prosaic. Like Schelling, Hemsterhuis 
considered the attractive and repulsive forces as fundaments of 
nature, but he saw a personal God and a "preordained harmony" 
holding and coordinating them. 
The most interesting comment within Navalis' extensive 
study of the Weltseele makes it clear that Navalis was unwilling 
to concede to Schelling a radical dualism between mind and 
matter, even on the empirical level (III, I 14). He agreed with 
Hemsterhuis in matters of ultimate priorities: "Mit dem bloBen 
Stoff den Anfang in der Philos[ ophie] der Wissenschaften zu 
machen ist eben so einseitig und antinomisch und unkritisch, 
als mit der blojlen Bewegung anzufangen. Mit dem Menschen 
anzufangen ist schon kritischer ... mit Gott anzufangen-ein 
Maximum der Kritik" (III, 3 4 3); "Die Wissenschaft Hingt nicht 
mit einem Antinom-Binom-sondern mit einem Inftnitinom 
an" (III, 432). That this last remark was directed specifically 
against Schelling, we know from a letter by Steffens in which he 
complained to Schelling that Navalis posited an "Urinfinitis-
mus" instead of an "Urduplizitat" at the heart of nature, and 
thereby "misunderstood" the basic principle of "Naturphilo-
sophie" (IV, 463). 
Thus Hardenberg's increasing differences with Schelling may 
partly be traced to his renewed interest in Hemsterhuis' philo-
sophy: when he announced his plans for a "moral astronomy" 
and a symbolic physics, he added that he hoped to surpass 
Schelling in these fields; similarly, his second thoughts about 
Schelling's "Weltseele" were related to the moral redefinition 
of nature. If nature and morality were as yet separate and the 
"W eltseele", according to Schelling, was the intrinsic principle 
of the physical world, then it had to be separated from the 
moral concept of God: "Will ich nun Gott oder die Weltseele 
in den Himmel setzen? Besser war es wohl, wenn ich den 
Himmel zum moralischen Universo erklarte-und die Weltseele 
im Universum liefie" (III, 250). As Professor Mahl noticed, 
another solution offered itself, once Novalis learned about Plo-
tinus' philosophy. Here the upper "Weltseele" was defined as 
the immediate emanation of the divine hypostasis and was 
separated from the lower "Weltseele", the spirit of the sensuous 
world. The use of the concept "Weltseele" in the later notes of 
the "Brouillon" should be associated therefore with the nco-
Platonic tradition rather than with Schelling's work of that 
title.21 
In passing it might be mentioned that while the "Brouillon" 
marked Hardenberg's alienation from Schelling, it showed his 
affinity with Schiller, particularly his Uber die listhetische Erzie-
hung des Menschen (1795) which Novalis must have read-
although his notebooks show no direct references to it. Like 
Novalis, Schiller accepted the dualism in man as a necessary 
part of the human condition and described a distant goal which 
had common features with the physiology and psychology of 
Magic Idealism: "[des Menschen] Kultur wird also darin 
bestehen: erstlich: dem empfangenden Vermogen die viel-
faltigsten Beriihrungen mit der Welt zu verschaffen und auf 
seiten des Gefiihls die Passivitat aufs hochste zu treiben: 
zweitens: dem bestimmenden Vermogen die hochste Unabhan-
gigkeit von dem empfangenden zu erwerben und auf seiten der 
Vernunft die Aktivitat aufs hochste zu treiben."22 The decisive 
point of agreement, however, was that both Schiller and Novalis 
foresaw a moral development in which man would transform 
himself and nature, 23 and that they saw art as the mediating 
force in this transformation. As Schiller stated, the realm of art 
lies both in the natural world of change and the motionless 
sphere of moral freedom and it is in this joint aesthetic realm 
that man's primeval "Spieltrieb" may be effective: "Der sinn-
liche Trieb will, daf3 Veranderung sei, daB die Zeit einen Inhalt 
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habe: der Formtrieb will, daB die Zeit aufgehoben, daB keine 
Veranderung sei. Derjenige Trieb also, in welchem beide ver-
bunden wirken . . . der Spieltrieb also wi.irde dahin gerichtet 
sein, die Zeit in der Zeit aufzuheben." 
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Sensibility and Medicine 
I. THE VOCABULARY OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
"Romanticism was above all a renewal of human sensibility" 
writes Pierre Trahard in his monumental work on eighteenth-
century French sensibility, and one is inclined to accept his 
definition, not because it is precise, but because his notion is as 
complex as romanticism itself.l For the concept of sensibility 
thatM. Trahard traces through the torturous ways of eighteenth-
century France and opposes to the classic ideal seems as a one-
dimensional projection of an idea that moved over the frontiers 
and the artificial compartments of human thought. One only 
has to consider the precise and experimentally measurable 
phenomenon that Albrecht Haller investigated just about mid-
century, or the literary and social associations of the term in 
England (here it had simultaneously retained its narrowly 
defined physiological meaning) to be convinced of this.2 Thus 
on his "sentimental journey" Laurence Sterne addressed himself 
to sensibility as the "source unexhausted of all that's precious 
in our joys, or costly in our sorrows", referring to the God-
given gift of charity and good-heartedness, while Dr. Johnson 
could write in a very different sense: "I was on Saturday at 
Mrs. Montague's, who expressed great sensibility of your loss." 
Finally, reading Byron's description of the "motley court" of 
romance "Where Affectation holds her seat,/ And sickly Sensibil-
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ity", one is inclined to say that romanticism was more a crisis of 
this notion than a renewal of it. 3 
With these considerations we have come surprisingly close to 
the ambiguous meaning that Navalis attaches to the term, be-
cause in his mind the various shades of "sensibility" were fused 
together to form a complex encyclopedic concept. The first 
strand came to his attention in the writings of Hemsterhuis, 
who had regarded sensibility as the passive component of the 
moral organ, the heart, and defined six stages between perception 
and action, subordinating the first two receptive ones to the 
heart. As Navalis summarized it, sensibility was the hearts's 
capacity to like and dislike: "1. I Das Herz I welches H[emster-
huis] hier fur Gefi.1hl von Lust und Unlust-fiir Sensibilitaet 
nimmt- I begehre oder verabscheue" (II, 371). In Simon 
Hemsterhuis went considerably further. He identified the 
active and passive components of the moral sense with the 
faculty of judgment and the imagination respectively, and 
advocated a proper balance between the two: "Ein Mensch mit 
sehr viel Sensibilitaet des moralischen Organs, aber ohne 
Activitaet desselben-ist der Tugend und des Lasters gleich 
fahig" (II, 3 7 5); "Der moralische Sinn I die sensible Seite des 
Herzens I ist die schonste, aber auch gefahrlichste Seite unsers 
Wesens" (II, 376). Even more important, Hemsterhuis be-
lieved that an imbalance in the two ·components could be re-
dressed through constant training and education. 
The argument about the dangers of excessive sensibility 
and the teaching about the training of it must have struck a 
chord in Navalis, since, as his letters to Erasmus show, these 
were problems he confronted in his youth. Yet, curiously, once 
he finished making excerpts from the works of Hemsterhuis he 
dropped the subject for a while: the early notebooks from 
Freiberg (which often relied on material from the previous 
year) do not touch on the concept of sensibility, as they are not, 
in general, concerned with the moral transformation of nature. 
In the "Brouillon" and the accompanying notebooks the term 
emerges again in a changed context and with different shades 
of meaning: "Gehort etwa die Sensibilitaet schon der Seele an? 
(Reitzbarkeit und Sensibilitaet haben einen sehr bemercklichen 
EinfluB auf die Organisation" (III, 249); "Reitzbarkeit und 
Sensibilitaet stehn in ahnlichen V erhaltnissen, als Seele und 
Korper ... " (III, 31 6). 
The coupling of sensibility and irritability in both remarks 
suggests that the concepts are taken here in their physiological 
sense, and that we have to turn to medical literature to under-
stand their meaning. "Irritability" and "sensibility" were as 
fashionable then as "id" and "ego" in the recent past, and Novalis 
must have read about them in at least five or six different 
publications,4 but the meaning and significance that he attached 
to them leave little doubt that the immediate occasion was 
offered by the works of Schelling. Indeed, the terms appeared 
first in Novalis' notes on Schelling's We!tseele. Following 
Kielmeyer, Schelling defined sensibility as the highest organic 
force, and irritability as the lower expression of the same 
general power, so that irritability and sensibility were in an 
inverse mathematical relationship (III, I 14). Although inversely 
proportional to each other, both sensibility and irritability 
were regarded by Schelling as "negative conditions of life", 5 
not because they were merely receptive faculties, but because he 
recognized only one positive principle, the "Weltseele", which 
guided and coordinated the interaction of the dialectically op-
posed negative principles: "Die negative Bedingung des Lebens-
processes ist ein Antagonismus negativer Principien, der durch 
den continuirlichen EinfluB des positiven Princips ( der ersten 
Ursache des Lebens) unterhalten wird" (Sch, I, 575). 
A more detailed interpretation necessitates acquaintance 
with Schelling's notion of "capacity". Following Girtanner, 
Schelling believed that irritability, the lower of the two reciprocal 
factors, was physiologically measurable through the oxygen 
capacity of the nerves in the organ: large or numerous nerves 
were supposed to increase the capacity for oxygen, thereby 
making the organ more irritable and less uniform in its function, 
and vice versa. 6 On the basis of this theory it was argued, for 
instance, that the heart should have few nerves because the 
organism could not endure its irregular operation; in turn, the 
physiologically observable sign for great sensibility became the 
scarcity of nerves: 
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So hat also die Natur, indem sie die Bewegung der 
Willkiir ganz zu iiberantworten schien, sie durch 
Erhohung der Sensibilitat der Willkiir wieder ent-
zogen; denn die Bewegungen der empfindlichsten 
Thiere sind auch am wenigsten willkiirlich, und um-
gekehrt, die groBte Willkiir der Bewegungen ist in 
den tragen Geschopfen. So nimmt mit steigender 
Sensibilitat des Nervensystems das Willkiirliche 
(Abgemessene) der Bewegungen durch die ganze 
Reihe der Organisationen, und sogar in Individuen 
derselben Gattung (nach Verschiedenheit des Ge-
schlechts, Klimas, Temperaments u.s.w.) regel-
maBig ab (Sch, I, 63 I). 
This odd claim, that high sensibility should be marked by 
few nerves, becomes more comprehensible upon considering 
that to Schelling sensibility was not so much a sensitivity to 
stimulation as a sign of mental development, and that the mental 
level of a race was, according to a thesis of Sommering (Sch, I, 
63o), inversely proportional to the abundance of nerves. Stated 
in a different way, Schelling believed that with the development 
of sensibility the animal organism would gradually lose that 
arbitrariness in operation which is the inevitable consequence of 
abundant nerves, and thereby blend more harmoniously with 
the laws of reason. Novalis' characteristic reaction to this theory 
was: "Vereinigung der hochsten Sens[ibilitaet] und hochsten 
Irritabilitaet" (III, I 14), which meant that he was in search of a 
state in which extreme subjectivity would harmonize with the 
laws of reason. 
The following two remarks may serve as a starting point 
in analyzing Navalis' concept of capacity: "Zersezt besteht die 
Erregbarkeit aus Sensibilitaet und Reitzbarkeit-oder Beweg-
lichkeit und Capacitaet" (III, 3 2 3); "Allzu groBe geistige 
Beweglichkeit und Sensibilitaet deutet auf Mangel an 
Capacitaet ... " (III, 55 9). In both of these remarks Brown's 
"excitability" is resolved into "irritability" and "sensibility", and 
also into two other contending tendencies, namely "mobility" 
and "capacity" -in analogy to the concepts of mobility and 
inertia in mechanics ("Beweglichkeit" was the basic property of 
matter for Kant and Eschenmayer). The two different ways of 
resolving excitability yield an association between irritability 
and capacity or sensibility and mobility. According to the 
second note, excessive sensibility and mobility are characteristics 
of an unstable constitution; the same theory is upheld in 
another note: "Die Tragheit steht mit der Sensibilitaet in um-
gekehrten [sic] V erhaltniB-vielleicht also in Geradem mit der 
Irritabi!itaet-und ist nichts anders, als diese" (III, 179)? Yet 
another note shows that Navalis followed Schelling in recog-
nizing a "scale of life" which was arranged according to the 
organism's oxygen capacity: "Die Capacit[aet] [der?] Mat[ erie] 
(Oxigene. organischer Stoff) ist unterschieden-daher es eine 
Leiter des Lebens giebt .... "(II, 5 56). These various statements 
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The gist of the comparison is that Navalis accepted Schelling's 
terms of sensibility and capacity but inverted the meaning 
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attached to them. While Schelling associated capacity with 
irritability and instability, Novalis regarded it as a measure of 
constitutional stability, 7 emphasizing once more the inherent 
constitutional factors in health and disease and adding a new 
parameter to Brown's physiology. Like a pendulum with a short 
suspension, or a highly elastic body that quickly bounces back 
to its original shape, a constitution with high capacity would 
be highly sturdy and quick to return to its steady state of health. 
In other words, capacity was meant to measure a body's 
capability to suffer and to regenerate. 8 
This interpretation of "capacity" permits a few more concrete 
observations relating to the already mentioned differences 
between Schelling and Novalis. In Weltseele sensibility was 
the highest expression of organic life so that through it the 
organism was liberated from the yoke of local and mechanical 
conditions and placed under the direct guidance of the "spirit 
of nature". 9 But since this guiding and coordinating principle 
was merely the spirit of nature itself, Schelling erected a closed 
system where the highest development, sensibility, remained a 
wholly natural phenomenon. No God or other supernatural 
being hovered above Schelling's natural world. 
Novalis, in turn, saw in sensibility a faculty feeling its way 
towards regions beyond the natural order. In contrast to 
Lamettrie who concluded from Haller's experiments that there 
was no soul, Novalis held with Hemsterhuis that sensibility was 
a high moral and spiritual expression of man, not yet fully 
developed and not wholly within nature.l0 In this sense he 
could ask if sensibility was part of the soul (III, 249), or he could 
make an analogy between irritability and the body on one hand, 
and sensibility and the soul on the other (III, 3 16). As the 
following passage illustrates, the education of sensibility was the 
key to the advocated moral education: 
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Synthesis von Seele und Korper-und Reitzbarkeit 
und Sensibilitaet. Sie gehn naturlich jezt schon in 
einander durch Indifferenzsfaren uber-unendliche 
Erweiterung dieser Indifferenzsfaren-Realisirung, 
Ausfullung der Null ist das schwierige Problem 
d[ es] Ki.instlers der Unsterblichkeit. Die Indiffe-
renzsfare ist das Maas d[er] Constitution. Will-
ki.ihrliche Glieder sind Sinne im strengern Sinn. 
Vermehrung der Sinne und Ausbildung der Sinne 
gehort mit zu der Hauptaufgabe d[ er] V erbesserung 
des Menschengeschlechts, der Graderhohung der 
Menschheit. 
Wir sahen vorhin, daB Bildung und V ermehrung 
der Seele das wichtigste und erste Unternehmen ist. 
AuBere Reitze haben wir schon in unsrer Hand-und 
mit ihnen die Reitzbarkeit-es kommt nur vorzi.iglich 
aufVermehrung und Bildung der Sensibilitaet und 
zwar auf die Weise an, daB die Reitzbarkeit und der 
auBre Reitz nicht dabey leiden, nicht dabey ver-
nachlassigt werden- denn sonst webt man ein sehr 
zerreiJ3bares Gewebe, und ein Gewebe der Penelope 
... (III, 3 I 8). 
It may be claimed that the "multiplication and education of the 
senses" is still identical with the program of magic to develop 
freely usable organs, and that the described synthesis of body 
and soul is in accordance with the earlier aim to endow the soul 
with a dominating power without severing its ties with the 
physical world. But here the training of the senses has a moral 
aim: the new layer of meaning over the original theory of 
magic is evident even in the new vocabulary which includes 
"irritability" and "sensibility" but not "magic". Similarly, the 
"Indifferenzsfaren" which the "artist of immortality" ought to 
develop, have now become signs of constitutional stability and 
denoted with "capacity". The spheres of neutrality indicate the 
strength of the constitution, because they enable the body to use 
external impulses freely. High capacity (stability) may be 
maintained in spite of a high level of irritability if the formation 
of zones of "numbness" is balanced by refining some organs 
to extreme sensibility; the one-sided cultivation of sensibility 
would lead to an unstable constitution ("ein Gewebe der Pene-
lope"), while the exclusive expansion of neutral regions would 
lead to a regression to an animal state. 
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Hence Navalis saw sensibility as a historical and teleological 
force that was destined to liberate man from Schelling's natural 
world; through its right cultivation man could develop-but 
also destroy-his potentials, and raise himself from his fallen 
state to a second millenium. It is typical of Hardenberg's 
bifocal vision that he attached to this utopia very immediate 
and practical tasks in terms of a rather prosaic notion. His 
prescription was not, as one might expect, a cultivation of 
delicate feelings and taste, but a rather austere and disciplined 
training program to develop "Aufmercksamkeit". The term 
occurs for the first time among the Hemsterhuis excerpts, where 
Navalis remarks that the education of the moral sense, as 
discussed above, could be achieved through the continued use 
of selected stimuli. As reason is sharpened through constant 
use of the mind and a concentration on its activity, so the moral 
sense-Navalis calls it "rational imagination" here-could be 
trained until it could make arbitrary use of the slightest and 
remotest stimulus and set the sense into a morally consistent 
activity (II, 3 77). 
The notion continued to be on Hardenberg's mind. Among 
the fragments of 1798 he remarked that only a few have learned 
to give attention to everything that surrounds them, and noted 
for himself that according to C. Bonnet, attention was the 
mother of genius (II, 541).U Still in the same group of notes 
there is a longer discussion of "Aufmercksamkeit" and "Abstrac-
tionsfiihigkeit" (II, 5 77 f.) in terms of the theory of magic. In 
posing himself the question of how an organism can cope with 
an array of simultaneously operating stimuli which impose upon 
it an ironclad rule of mechanism, Navalis found the answer in 
the development of "Aufmercksamkeit", a power which shifts, 
weighs, and channels external sensuous stimulation. On the 
most elementary level this may mean, for instance, a partial or 
complete ignoring and overcoming of pain, by directing the 
attention to some pleasing sound or sight; in general, the most 
beneficial impressions would receive attention. After an ex-
tended period of training a more sophisticated level would be 
reached, where it would become possible to distribute local 
pleasurable or painful stimulations over whole regions of the 
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body, or to concentrate widely and thinly spread impressions in 
one area.12 
Following the plan to present a "higher" view of specialized 
knowledge, Navalis gave even greater prominence to the term 
"Grad", which was to measure the degree of progress towards 
the "Graderhohung der Menschheit" (III, 3 18). As a typically 
encyclopedic word, "Grad" was applied to a surprising range 
of phenomena to point out the hierarchic structure and ultimate 
unity of knowledge. Hence the expressions "Grade der Zeit" 
(III, 340), "Grade d[er] Kritik" (III, 343), "Grade der Wissen-
schaftlichkeit" (III, 347), "Grade des Willens" (III, 354), 
"Grade des Denkens" (III, 349) etc.; language appears as 
"Gedankenmeter" (III, 349), and philosophy as the highest 
degree of "Wissenschaftlichkeit" (III, 347). Life itself was 
"Gradbewegung" (III, 3 5 5 ), and thus the "Graderhohung der 
Menschheit" represented a heightening of "Lebensfunktion" 
(III, 324) or the degree of existence (III, 343); in a wider sense 
the aim of the "Brouillon" was to raise the level of all nature: 
"Graderhohung der Materie" (III, 179). 
A few sketchy notes in the "Brouillon" show that Navalis 
intended to refine his thoughts on the qualitative improvement 
of matter, by following Eschenmayer and describing qualitative 
differences in terms of degrees in interacting forces. Every 
organism was a synthesis of "Grad und Quantitaet-Energie und 
Figur'' (III, 341), whereby "Figur" was determined by "Grad", 
and this, in turn, was maintained by a universal life force, 
"Kraft", which Navalis associated with the "Weltseele": "Der 
Grad entsteht d[ urch] innen modificirte Kraft. Ein Stoff kann 
nicht mit Kraft i.ibersattigt seyn. Je mehr Kraft er besitzt-
ruhende Kraft ist Vermogen-also je vermogender er ist, desto 
hoher ist sein Grad. Alle Kraft gehort zur Welt Kraft. Die 
Kraft verhalt sich zur Seele, wie die Seele zum Geist. Alle 
Beruhrung ist ein AnlaB zur Erregung der Einenden, systemati-
sirenden Kr[aft]-i.e., der Weltseele-oder der Seele iiberhaupt" 
(III, 341). In this passage, as in much of the "Brouillon", the 
vocabulary, and the identification of the "Weltseele" with a 
"unifying and systematizing force", shows that this is taken in 
the sense of Plotinus rather than Schelling. "Kraft" itself is the 
emanating force which actually established the "chain of 
being" and ordered nature into a hierarchy, while "Stoff" is 
unformed matter upon which "Kraft" imprints the desired 
shape- "Figur". Novalis discusses here those imaginative 
"Stoffe und Krafte" which the true physicist would have to 
use if he were to penetrate the secrets of nature. If we identify 
the "W eltseele" ("Seele i.iberhaupt") with "Geist", then the 
concept of "Seele" is used here in accordance with other notes 
where the soul is defined as localized spirit: ". . . die Seele ist 
nichts, als gebundener, gehemmter, consonirter Geist."13 
II. AN ESSAY ON MEDICINE 
In the fall of 1798, only a few month after the first two volumes 
of Roschlaub's Untersuchungen iiber Pathogenie appeared, Novalis 
wrote critical comments on Roschlaub's ideas.14 The Unter-
suchungen was not in his library, but his comments leave no 
doubt that he carefully read and considered it. That he highly 
respected Roschlaub's competence is shown by some notes he 
made during his final illness where he expressed the wish to 
turn to the doctor in Bamberg for consultation: "Ich werde, 
wenn ich erst mit Weigel gesprochen habe, umstandlich an 
Riischlaub schreiben, Opium und Mandelwasser anschaffen . 
. . . Wird es schlimmer, so verreis ich nach Leipzig, Bamberg 
oder Jena" (IV, 410). Death was, however, imminent and 
neither the letter nor the journey were accomplished; contrary 
to Dr. Leibbrand's assumption there was then no personal 
contact between Novalis and Roschlaub.l 5 
Hardenberg made no excerpts or longer commentaries on the 
Untersuchungen, but his reaction to it may be reconstructed; 
as P. Kluckhohn noticed already, a remark in the "Brouillon" 
indicates that Novalis intended to write a review of the work in 
the Journal of Roschlaub's greatest foe, Ch. W. Hufeland. The 
outline of this review contains the following points: "1. Be-
merck[ ungen] i.ib[ er] die Fundamentalsatze. z. Bemerck[ ungen J 
i.ib[er] d[ie] einzelnen zerstreuten Anwendungen. 3· Bemerk-
k[ungen] i.ib[er] die Anw[endung] d[es] Brownischen Systems 
i.iberhaupt. 4· Ober die Theorie der Potenzen. 5. Ober die 
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Heilmethoden. 6. Was muB noch fur die Medizin geschehn" 
(III, 3 77). Using this outline and correlating certain passages of 
the "Brouillon" with passages from Roschlaub's book, we may 
not only reconstruct the planned essay, but also obtain Navalis' 
general analysis of the German "Brownian movement": as the 
outline itself indicates, he did not differentiate between the 
various shades of the theory. 
Notes 593-96 of the "Brouillon" contain a remark which is 
usually taken as a proof of Hardenberg's gradual alienation 
from Brown: "Nachgerade hiiufen sich immer mehr Griinde, 
die mich die Brownische Erregungstheorie nicht mehr in dem 
giinstigen Lichte erblicken lassen, als ehedem" (III, 369, no. 
593). Two points need to be clarified: r. Navalis' own statement 
not withstanding, his early notes already show a hostility 
towards the mechanical bases of the theory of excitability, and the 
passage above means not a reversal but merely a shift in his 
critical opinion. 2. Although Navalis mentions the name of 
Brown, he actually argues with Roschlaub and the specific 
points of his criticism can only be understood in the context 
of Roschlaub's book.l 6 Of the numerous cases where the 
reference is to Roschlaub's book(or some other German source) 
and not to Brown's Elements as it was assumed till now, I shall 
give here two examples only. In note no. r 148 Navalis asserted 
that irritability and sensibility were symptoms and not causes 
of diseases and continued: "Brown scheint also das Haupt-
verdienst zu haben-das wesentlichste, karakteristische Symp-
tom der Kr[ anckheit] bemerckt und sie darnach in Beziehung auf 
Arzenrykunde, (also schon angewandte Pathologic) geordnet zu 
haben" (III, 477). Navalis was probably unaware of the fact 
that irritability and sensibility were not used in the Elements. 
The second example concerns the polar terms "direct-indirect" 
and "external-internal", which were completely independent of 
each other in Brown's theory: the former ones were predicated 
to diseases, the latter to modes of stimulation. Here too, 
Navalis followed Roschlaub, in adopting his "Theorie der 
Potenzen" and making indirect and external all but synonymous. 
In general, no term in Navalis' medical vocabulary is unequiv-
ocally and directly related to the Elements of Medicine, and a 
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reading of his notes is best facilitated by an acquaintance with 
the exchange of medical and philosophical ideas in Germany. 
If we add that 1) as far as we know Novalis made no notes or 
excerpts from the Elements of Medicine, and z) the work was not 
found in Hardenberg's library, we may assume with reasonable 
certainty that he read neither the original nor a translation of it, 
and that his knowledge of it, as his knowledge of Plotinus and 
Plato, came through secondary sources. Under these conditions 
Roschlaub's work merits special attention. 
The purpose of Roschlaub's book was: " ... die von John 
Brown vorgetragenen Lehrsatze in Betreff der Pathogenic naher 
zu beleuchten, auseinander zu setzen, weiter zu verfolgen und zu 
ihrer Begriindung etwas beyzutragen .... " 17 As a consequence, 
Roschlaub tacitly defended the main philosophical contention of 
the Elements of Medicine and repeatedly asserted that the laws of 
mechanics were equally valid in the realm of living nature, 
that life was nothing but the ability to react to or accept impulses 
from the external world, and that without an external ignition 
the flame of life could not be kindled.18 Since life was elicited 
from outside, the idea of a life force ("Lebenskraft"), be it 
Blumenbach's "Bildungstrieb" or Kielmeyer's multiplicity of 
forces, could not serve as an approach to the mystery of life. 
Instead of these forces-which Roschlaub defined as internal 
guidance to action19-the passive-receptive excitability was the 
principle of life, and, accordingly, the neuro-pathologists were 
right in assuming that the receptivity of the nervous system 
regulated the composition of fluids and through these the whole 
of the organism; in their attention to fluids the humoral pathol-
ogists were dealing with secondary phenomena, not with the 
cause itself. 
Yet, for all the vehemence with which Roschlaub defended 
Brown and attacked his opponents, his medical philosophy was 
not orthodox. Although he accepted the primacy of external 
causation, he granted some importance to the body's ability to 
react, and regarded life as a dialectic interaction of the two 
components. Unlike Brown, he separated irritability from 
sensibility, by defining irritability as the muscles' capability 
to contract upon stimulation, and sensibility as the same 
property for the nerves. Decomposing excitability in another 
fashion, he conceived of a purely negative receptivity of which 
both sensibility and irritability were components, and a more 
active contractility ("Zusammenziehungsvermogen") through 
which the organism was able to answer the challenges of the 
world: "Untersuchen wir nach den Gesetzen unseres Vor-
stellungsvermogens diesen Begriff [Erregbarkeit ], so finden wir 
ihn als einen aus zweyen verschiedenen zusammengesetzten 
Begriff: wir stellen uns namlich a. die Fahigkeit (Empfanglich-
keit, receptivitas) der organischen Masse vor, durch Eindriicke 
von aufien affizirt zu werden. b. Das Vermogen, durch 
Selbstwirksamkeit bestimmte Handlungen hervorzubringen."20 
It appears then that Roschlaub's principles were a blend of 
eighteenth-century mechanistic philosophy and idealistic "Natur-
philosophie"-mechanistic perhaps by tradition and idealistic by 
inclination. As may be expected, the mechanistic views irritated 
Navalis and challenged him to a rebuttal. The basic issue may 
be formulated in terms of forces. How do they arise and what 
maintains them in action? The mechanists were interested only 
in the first of these questions and they answered it with the 
scheme of action and reaction. Brown and Roschlaub applied the 
formula to organisms, although the latter inconsistently defined 
force as "Handlung aus sich". Navalis ignored the mechanistic 
premises and accepted Roschlaub's definition. In the resultant 
theory force and matter could interact and even transform into 
each other; organic forces did not merely move matter mechani-
cally, they formed, developed, and adopted it as an active catalyst 
of their own growth. Organic development itself tended 
simultaneously towards a qualitatively higher life and a perfect 
reflection of the macrocosm: "Org[ anische] Kr[ aft] ist Kraft, die 
sich selbst im Ideal eines Universums beabsichtigt" (III, 327); 
"Org[ anische] Kraft ist also Kraft die das Vermogen zu bilden, 
sich zu assimiliren sucht-um sich selbst mittelst dieses corres-
pondirenden Gegenstandes, gleichsam d[ urch] Bildung ihres 
N[icht]I[chs], (Gradu, quantitate et Relatione), zu erhohn, zu 
vermehren .... " 21 
The main point of Navalis' criticism was that ultimately all 
motion and mechanical interaction will have to be understood 
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in terms of this teleological development of organic forces. 
Hence his criticism of the theory of excitability and mechanism 
culminates in a note which promises nothing less than a "de-
throning of the basic laws of Mechanics and of the Theory of 
Excitability" both of which are characterized with the phrase 
known from Kant and Eschenmayer: "Keine Bewegung ohne 
Sollicitation." Novalis' own theses against this are: "Alle 
Bewegung und Erregung entsteht nur d[urch] Bewegung und 
Erregung. Reitz und Beweglichkeit sind nur Verhaltnisse von 
Bewegungen. Alles was erscheint z.B. Bew[egung] und 
Erreg[ung], war schon vorher da. Aller sog[enannter] Reitz 
start die Bewegung und Erregung vielmehr-polarisirt sie-und 
nun wird sie, als gestorte Bewegung und Erregung sichtbar" 
(III, 388). Although Novalis did not follow Fichte in strictly 
separating matter from consciousness, these principles of his did 
exalt self-contained action, and thus he could remark with some 
justification that the new theory of excitability was compatible 
with the Wissenschajtslehre (III, 3 8 3). 
The third heading of the review, "Bemerckungen iiber die 
Anwendung des Brownischen Systems iiberhaupt", suggests 
that this section would have dealt with the a priori aspects of 
Brown's medical theory and its relation to practice. Relevant to 
the topic are nos. 728, 777, 45 I, 5 I I and 502 of the "Brouillon". 
Following Roschlaub and Schelling who noted that excitability 
was an a priori concept of pure reason,22 Novalis described 
Brown's method of cure as a priori, because it was a construction 
of pure logic rather than conclusion based on experience. As he 
remarked bitingly in the "Brouillon", pure empiricism was a 
hit-and-miss method which led the physician to illuminating 
insights once the cemetery was filled with subjects of unsuccess-
ful experiments. To this, Brown's method was definitely 
preferable. Once again, however, Novalis' ideal was a dialectical 
"reconciliation of opposites", a synthesis in which, as he remark-
ed of Goethe, the a priori constructs of consciousness would 
spontaneously meet the characteristics that the case history pre-
sented: "Der genialische Arzt wird von sich und dem Gegen-
stande zugleich, aber ohne gegenseitige Beschrankung-viel-
mebr mit gegenseitiger Vervollkommnung, bestimmt" (III, 3 3 I). 
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Brown's theory of medicine was both mathematical and 
poetical. Poetic, because it contained the "internal poetic-the 
so-called philosophical materials" (III, 3 5 I) which were en-
during and impervious to change, and mathematical (more 
precisely: algebraic) because it purported to give the abstract 
rules into which data of the specific case would have to be fed 
if practical diagnoses and results were to be expected (III, 3 71 and 
377). Indeed, Brown's theory had some mathematical features: 
I. it used a collection of dual concepts such as sthenic and 
asthenic, direct and indirect, stimulation and excitability; 2. it 
claimed that only the quantity of stimulation mattered, due to 
which 3. all diseases fitted along a scale. 
In short, the theory of excitability was an abstract science of 
life, and the method of the cure it recommended was only set 
by general guidelines.23 In this respect the "idealist" philosophy 
of Fichte and the "dogmatic" physiology of Brown were on 
common grounds: if they were in polar opposition in what they 
said, they nevertheless agreed in the mode of approach to their 
subject matter, in the way they erected their ideal and abstract 
schemes to deal with reality. 24 Just as Fichte's Ego was "a 
Robinson-a scientific fiction-for an easier representation and 
development of the 'Wissenschaftslehre"' (III, 405), such 
concepts as "excitability", "sthenic", and "asthenic" were fictive 
aids to measure the state of health of an organism. Navalis well 
knew of course that Brown's theory was unsatisfactory both as 
an a priori system and as an aid in medical practice. But he 
believed that the shortcomings at either end were related to each 
other, so that the deficiencies in the opium treatment and the 
general pharmaceutical and therapeutical principles of Brown 
were due to their insufficient philosophical grounding. 
The relationship between external and internal stimulation 
was a decisive feature in all theories of excitability. The issue 
would presumable have been discussed in Navalis' review 
under the heading "Theorie der Potenzen", although it is 
somewhat doubtful that he was aware of the differences that 
separated Roschlaub from Brown in this respect. These 
differences were actually quite significant, for Brown assumed 
that there were independent and primary internal stimuli, 
arising from "muscular contraction, sense, and the energy of the 
brain in thinking, and exciting passion and emotion",25 while 
Roschlaub believed that internal stimuli were always induced by 
external ones. To be sure, the latter included not only physical 
impulses, but also thinking, the "operations of the soul", and the 
affections of the heart.26 This point in Roschlaub's theory 
has been a concern of Navalis: "In dem Sinn, wie Roschlaub, die 
innern incitirenden Potenzen nimmt, miissen alle au13re Potenzen, 
wozu dann auch die Seele und der Geist gehort-mitte!st der 
inneren incit[irenden] Pot[enzen] wircksam seyn" (III, 3 5 z). 
Indeed, as the identification of external with indirect, and internal 
with direct (II, 56 r) shows, N ovalis was in agreement on this 
point with Roschlaub: external impulses become effective 
only indirectly, once they are transformed into internal stimula-
tion. The theory appealed to Navalis, because it made no 
essential distinction between physiological and psychological 
impulses, and regarded the body, the sum of the internal 
stimulations, as the joint crystallization of the physical and 
the spiritual world. 
The section entitled "Uber die Heilmethoden" would have 
concerned the war between the various schools of medical 
philosophy, as notes immediately following the plan of the 
review indicate. The warring camps were, of course, the 
humoral pathologists and the neuro-pathologists, or, defined in 
terms of bedside practice, those who still believed in the 
relieving lancet and debilitating treatments, and those who 
followed Brown in believing in cures of fortification. Since 
Novalis saw the hallmark of the age in the asthenic constitution, 
he was siding more with the Brownians, although his position 
was equivocal and his judgements depended on the particular 
feature of the theory he had in mind at the moment. Thus, for 
instance, he observed that Brown embraced mechanistic views 
as an exaggerated gesture of revolt against the establishment, 
but he defined the neuro-pathologists elsewhere as "Idealisten, 
suhjektive philosophische Mediziner", due to the importance 
they attributed to the nervous system, and to their methodologi-
cal similarity to Fichte. The humoral pathologists, in turn, were 
"dogmatists" ("objektive philosophische Mediziner") inasmuch 
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as they paid too much attention to material interactions. Yet 
they too had their point in basing their physiological analysis 
on fluids, the primeval form of life. 
It is understandable therefore that the "Brouillon" should be 
dotted with calls for uniting the two schools, each of which had 
strengths and weaknesses :27 "Chemiker und Symptomatiker und 
ihre nothwendige Vereinigung. Vollk[ ommne] Chemie und 
vollkommne Symptomatik erganzen sich gegenseitig. 
Allg[emeine] Satze der Humoralpath[ ologie] wie d[ie] allg[ e-
meinen] Satze der andern Pathol[ogie]" (III, 377); "Mech[ani-
sche]-chem[ische]- und zusammenges[etzte] oder synth[e-
tische] Heilkunde" (III, 475). The unification was to be 
achieved by imposing the algebraic skeleton of Brown's medicine 
upon the specific data supplied by experience; in other words, 
"special historical pathology" was to be developed by observing 
individual organisms in terms of Brown's method (III, 351). 
Such a procedure would have reduced the rigidity inherent in the 
"dogmas", given a more exact account of the numeros factors 
in the environment and in the body itself, 28 and given recognition 
to the dialectical interchangeability of opposites. Navalis 
affirmed the last point in several concrete cases; for instance by 
stating that bloodletting might both be weakening and strength-
ening (III,377), or that, in general, a body might be strength-
ened by weakening or vice versa (III, 37I). Such self-coined 
terms as "Humoralsthenie" and "Humoralasthenie" (III, 3 I I), 
point towards the synthesis that Navalis anticipated. 
Presumably, the theme of the reconciliation of opposing 
schools would have led to the closing section of the essay, 
where Navalis would have expounded his own theory of 
medicine in terms of his general prognosis. The title "Was 
muB noch fiir die Medizin geschehn" indicates that medicine 
would have been considered here from a historical perspective, 
not according to the existing psychological and physiological 
conditions, but the development of dormant potentials which 
medicine was to help actively. From this point of view all 
existing theories, including Brown's, were lacking a sense of 
history. Medicine had to be reformed (III, 37I) and made 
cognizant of the possibility that a rigorous training process could 
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completely change the characteristics of the human body. Thus, 
for instance, a scientifically guided gradual increase in stimulation 
would not produce a sthenic disease, 29 but raise the body 
qualitatively in accordance with Hardenberg's "Graderhohung 
der Menschheit". The following enthusiastic and visionary 
words, or words to the very same effect, would have surely 
formed the closing section of Hardenberg's essay: 
112 
Wenn wir hier nach den Aussichten fragen, die die 
Menschheit jezt auf Befreyung ihrer korperlichen 
Ubel hat-so wird man uns, zur Antwort, den Zu-
stand der Heilkunde zeigen. Ihre Ausbildung und Ver-
breitung bestimmt das Gegengewicht der Last der 
korperlichen Ubel, die uns drucken. 
J e mehr die Heilkunde Elementarwissenschaft 
jedes Menschen werden-je groBere Fortschritte die 
gesammte Physick machen und die Heilkunde sie 
benutzen wird-Je inniger die gesammten Wissen-
schaften zur BefOrderung ihres gemeinschaftlichen 
Interesse, des Wols der Menschheit, zusammentreten 
und die Philosophie zur Vorsitzerinn und Leiterinn 
ihrer Beschlusse nehmen werden-desto leichter wird 
jener Druck, desto freyer die Brust des Menschen-
geschlechts werden. 
Jezt suche jeder Einzelne zur Beschleunigenden 
Annaherung dieser ghicklichen Zeit das Ubel an der 
Wurzel anzugreifen-er studire Medicin und beob-
achte und forsche-und erwarte mehr grundlichen 
Nutzen von der Aufklarung seines Kopfs, als von 
allen Tropfen und Extracten (III, 4 74 f.). 
VI 
The Case of Die Lehrlinge zu Sais 
, ... in deinem Geiste haben sich Poesie und 
Philosophie innig durchdrungen" (Schlegel: 
,An Novalis") 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF DIE LEHRLINGE 
Although the subject matter of Hardenberg's notes and 
fragments prepares for the poetic works of his last years, one 
detects between the former and the latter a definite discrepancy 
which is manifest not only in mode of expression but also in 
point of view and creative intention. Since man's relationship 
to nature is reflected in the Hymnen an die Nacht, Geistliche 
Lieder, or Heinrich von Ofterdingen so differently that it would 
require both a different approach and a different context of 
study, and since Hardenberg's poetic temperament is the 
subject of my work only insofar as it relates to his philosophical 
and scientific thought, I can discuss here only that fictional 
work which is a transition, a curious blend, between his note-
books and the purer distillations of his poetic talent. More than 
any other work of Navalis, Die Lehrlinge zu Sais raises the 
question of the relationship between Hardenberg's philosophical 
and poetic achievements. 
Indeed, this fragmentary novel was the bone of contention 
between two of Navalis' most perceptive early critics, Rudolf 
Haym and Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey, who believed that 
Navalis' natural philosophy was only a stage in the development 
of his poetic view of nature, held that a synthesis was indeed 
achieved in the novel through a feeling of unity and harmony 
with nature: " ... und so offnet sich auch nur dem Gefiihl des 
Menschen das Wesen der Natur."1 Haym, however, examined 
the work from a philosophical and scientific point of view and 
came to the conclusion that it was plagued by immaturity of 
thought: "Die Beziehung der Natur auf das Gemiith ist freilich, 
... das Thema der ganzen Dichtung. Das jedoch ist gerade das 
Charakteristische, daB die Art und Weise dieser Beziehung 
schlechterdings unentschieden bleibt."2 Since the issue between 
Haym and Dilthey remained suspended, one wonders why only 
few attempts have been made to comment upon the novel in 
the light of the improved and enlarged knowledge about 
Novalis. 3 The work deserves particular attention, not so much 
because of its literary merits-although it has highly poetic 
passages-but because it reveals something of the "two souls" 
in Hardenberg which were never reconciled. Although their 
clash was superseded in Heinrich von Ofterdingen or Hymnen an 
die Nacht, the "poetic synthesis" of these works does not 
include the empirical world and the realm of the sciences in the 
way in which the "Brouillon" and Die Lehrlinge had originally 
set out. My purpose here is to show that by being halfway 
between the notebooks and Heinrich von Ofterdingen, or, roughly 
speaking, between science and poetry, Die Lehrlinge possesses no 
center and no organic unity. 
II. PLANS 
Most works of Navalis are fragmentary. But the sketchiness of 
Die Lehrlinge is not due to lack of time, as might have been the 
case for Heinrich von Ofterdingen. In a letter dated February 23, 
r8oo, Navalis thanked Tieck for acquainting him with Jakob 
Bohme and added: "Urn so besser ist es, daB die 'Lehrlinge' 
ruhn-die jetzt auf eine ganz andere Art erscheinen sollen-Es 
soll ein echt-sinnbildlicher Naturroman werden. Erst muB 
'Heinrich' fertig sein ... "(IV, 33 I). Since the MS with marginal 
annotations is unfortunately lost, we cannot know for certain 
whether Navalis added anything to the novel after the date of 
this letter. However, since Heinrich von Ofterdingen also re-
mained unfinished in spite of its priority, it seems very likely 
that we have now the version of February I Soo which does not 
correspond to the artistic intentions indicated in the letter. 
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What kind of changes would Novalis have made? While it 
is impossible to pinpoint this with any accuracy, the passage in 
the letter gives us some hints. The changes which were to make 
the novel into an "echt-sinnbildlicher Naturroman" were 
related somehow to the influence of Jakob Bohme. Now we 
know on the basis of recent datings4 that probably all of the 
text was written in Freiberg, much of it probably at the same 
time as the "Brouillon" project. The original intention to give a 
symbolic treatment to nature is common to both, and only the 
form and the arrangement were to be different: the poetic and 
fictional form of Die Lehrlinge is already pointing towards the 
reawakening of Hardenberg's poetic forces. Evidently the 
planned and never executed changes would have carried the 
novel still further away from the "Brouillon" and from its 
original intentions. As the hyphenated expression "echt-
sinnbildlich" suggests, Novalis was dissatisfied with his former 
attempts to treat nature symbolically and wished to find the true 
mode. Since the new direction is linked with the name of 
Jakob Bohme, we may assume that the final version would have 
surpassed the notebooks with its poetic and religious inter-
pretation of nature. The unfinished sections suggest that on 
leaving Freiberg Novalis found it increasingly difficult-or 
boring-to deal with the problem of science in short prose 
remarks and finally decided that the subject needed a poetic 
form and a religious framework. Some of Novalis' earlier 
ideas, notably the Bible-project, had already anticipated such a 
form, but on the whole the notebooks written between I 797 and 
1799 were directly related to his study of science. In Die Lehr-
linge the manifestations of the empirical world-as indicated at 
the beginning with the wings, the eggshells, and the filings 
around the poles of the magnet-slowly receded and left behind 
a language which was neither concise enough to become a 
"Chiffernschrift", a forest of symbols, nor inspired with sufficient 
consistency to reach the hymnic tone of Hardenberg's later 
poetic works. One senses everywhere a friction between the 
will to formulate a philosophy of nature and the desire to give 
it a poetic expression: in the uneven style, the dialectic of the 
arguments, and the subtle shifts in narrative voice. 
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Two surviving outlines show that the progress of the novel 
also entailed a shift in perspective. The first, entitled "Die 
Naturlehre", probably preceded the writing of the second 
chapter by about a month; it contains the following outline: 
Doppelte Wege-vom Einzelnen-vom Ganzen-
Von innen-von auBen. Naturgenie. Mathematik. 
Giithe. Schelling. Ritter. Die pneumatische Chemie. Das 
Mittelalter. Naturromane. Vortrag der P~sik. Werner. 
Experimentiren. 
Ob der Naturlehre eine wahre Einheit zum Grunde 
liegt (II, 669). 
Clearly, this material for the second chapter was from Harden-
berg's scientific notebooks, presented in a dialectic (von innen-
von aul3en) that followed the pattern of his "Magic Idealism". 
References to J. W. Ritter's frog-leg experiments5 and Schel-
ling's "Naturphilosophie"6 did indeed find their way into the 
chapter, but such bits of science are accidental in the text. 
A second note, written much later but still before the mentioned 
letter to Tieck, suggests a very different content: 
Verwandlung des Tempels zu Sais 
Erscheinung der Isis. Tod des Lehrers. Traume im 
Tempel. Werckstatt des Archaeus. Ankunft der 
griechischen Gotter. Einweihung in die Geheimnis-
se. Bilds[aule] des Memnons. Reise zu den Pyrami-
den. Das Kind und sein ] ohannes. Der Messias der 
Natur. Neues Testament-unci neue Natur-als neues 
Jerusalem" (III, 5 90). 
It seems that the "Verwandlung" would have indeed changed 
the atmosphere, not by resolving the conflict between clashing 
views, but by transcending them. While the first outline 
concentrates on interpretations of nature, i.e., on ideas, the 
second delineates a poetic plot which leads to the mysteries of 
the godhead and leaves nature behind. Physics, chemistry, 
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and mathematics are overshadowed by the mythical constructs 
of temples and pyramids; Goethe, Schelling, and Ritter give 
place to prophets and goddesses. 7 
III. "HYAZINTH UND ROSENBLUTCHEN" 
In the absence of unifying themes we have to focus on the 
components, in the hope that they reflect the general intentions. 
The second chapter includes the little tale of Hyazinth and 
Rosenblutchen, one of Hardenberg's most successful poetic 
creations; since he regarded the genre of "Marchen" as the 
canon of literature (III, 449), we may try to establish the design 
of the novel from the blueprint provided by the fairy-tale. 
The first sketch for this tale appears in a well-known aphorism 
written in r 798, which states that to know the greatest mystery is 
to know oneself, and that, in turn, the "know thyself" is ultimate 
wisdom: "Einem gelang es-er hob den Schleyer der Gottin 
zu Sais-Aber was sah er? er sah-Wunder des Wunders-
Sich Selbst" (II, 5 84). This sketch is clearly in accordance with 
the often stated thesis of the notebooks that the knowledge of 
the microcosmic self is man's only way to explore the macrocosm. 
Such a preoccupation with the self is, however, narcissistic; in 
the actual fairy-tale the exploration of the self is intimately 
related to the love of another, and the veil of the goddess hides 
the image of the beloved. 
Hyazinth, a healthy, handsome young boy, is estranged 
from his family and his "Schatzchen", Rosenblutchen, for 
he walks around lonely and dejected, talking to birds, animals, 
trees, and rocks without ever making himself understood. 
His strange disease originated with the visit of an old man, who 
returned the hospitality by telling Hyazinth about wonderful 
distant lands and customs. He left Hyazinth with an undeci-
pherable book and in the hold of a spell that manifests itself 
in a mental derangement. One day, however, Hyazinth tells his 
parents that he met in the forest a strange old woman who 
advised him on how to recover. She burned the book and 
instructed the boy to leave his home with parental blessing; and 
so Hyazinth embarks upon an agitated journey through foreign 
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lands in search of the Virgin Goddess. As his erratic and yet 
purposeful wandering progresses, both external nature and his 
own mind slowly mellow into a friendly mode, so that the 
disrupted communication between the youth and the universe is 
reestablished. When Hyazinth finds attunement with nature 
he also encounters the long-sought home of the goddess in 
sleep ("for only sleep was allowed to lead him into the realm of 
the holiest"), lifts the veil, and embraces his Rosenbliitchen ... 
This little tale which has freshness and linguistic simplicity 
mirrors Hardenberg's philosophy without straining the fabric of 
the story itself. Thus Novalis' conception of history is reflected 
in the stages of Hyazinth's "Bildungsroman"; the initial state of 
naive love and harmony is followed by a fall and a period of 
unrest which lasts till the labours of love, lost and refound, 
establish a higher version of harmony. Rosenbliitchen, the 
ultimate guiding force in Hyazinth's life, is the mediator 
("V ermittlerin") of the divine sphere that Sophie represented in 
Novalis' own life. Significantly, the final revelation comes in a 
dream which is beyond sensuous experience. 
But what are we to make of the old man and his book? The 
question is of some importance, for it has been frequently stated 
that they represent an unholy desire for empiricism and rational 
knowledge from which only love can deliver Hyazinth. 8 But 
upon taking a closer look at the old man one finds that his long 
beard, his deep-seated eyes with frightening bushy eyebrows, 
and the strange signs that adorn his majestic robe all exude an 
aura of mystery. His wisdom is communicable because his vivid 
travel accounts immediately catch the attention of the little boy, 
and his method is empirical for climbing with Hyazinth into the 
deep mining shafts he literally leads the boy into the mysterious 
bowels of the earth. His age, his wisdom, and his willingness 
to initiate his "apprentice", make him an attractive figure. If 
the jealous Rosenbliitchen calls him "Hexenmeister", we have 
to remember that for Navalis the magician is the conjurer of 
wonderful effects, a forerunner of the future. 
The name "Hexenmeister" inadvertently calls to mind 
Goethe's old sage from "Zauberlehrling". Since Novalis owned 
a copy of the Musenalmanach zu qg8, where the poem appeared 
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for the first time, it could well be that he had Goethe's figure in 
mind when sketching his own "Hexenmeister". In any case, a 
comparison between Hyazinth, the apprentice of the tale, and 
sorcerer's apprentice in Goethe's poem is illuminating. Like the 
sorcerer's apprentice, Hyazinth attempts to emulate his mentor 
once the latter is gone, by taking the book, which is only the ossifi-
cation of his art, and seeking the magic formula that would open 
nature for him. If Goethe's apprentice possesses a dangerous 
half-knowledge that can evoke magic powers but cannot master 
them, Hyazinth's naive attempt to imitate the old man is arrested 
at an even lower level, because his formulas, culled from a book 
that "nobody could read", were mere gibberish: " ... und dann 
sprach er immer fort mit Tieren und Vogeln, mit Baumen und 
Felsen, natiirlich kein verniinftiges Wort, lauter narrisches Zeug 
zum Totlachen". s 
Hyazinth has now acquired the taste for knowledge which 
carries him beyond that primitive and unadulterated world 
which he had enjoyed as a child. But he is still too inexpe-
rienced to find the right way, for, like Goethe's apprentice, he 
believes that it is enough to follow the bookish formula without 
grasping its real meaning. If his derangement signals failure, the 
corruption is not the old man's making; by taking to the script 
and forgetting that the old man showed him how to descend into 
underworld shafts, Hyazinth misunderstands the message and 
embraces the abstraction without empirical experience. 
While H yazinth is less successful in evoking the magic formula 
than the sorcerer's apprentice, his journey in the second part of 
the story takes him beyond the horizon of Goethe's simpleton, 
into a world where he can find for himself concrete wisdom. 
Only after the burning of the book does the real message of 
the deep shafts become revealed: like Goethe's Faust, Hyazinth 
has to find for himself the seat of the "Mutter der Dinge". 
If this reading is correct, then the fairy-tale is not a refutation 
of empirical knowledge, but of pseudo-knowledge where 
acquaintance with the letter does not yield insight. The dis-
tinction is not between intuition and empiricism, but between 
independence and imitation; since half-knowledge has no 
rational foundation it might even be claimed that precisely 
irrationalism, undigested intuition, is shown to be in error. 
Although the story defines the limits of empirical and rational 
knowledge, the total vision does not amount to mysticism, but 
rather to something paralleling Dante's realism. Although 
Dante is guided through Inferno and Purgatorio by Virgil, who 
represents his rational thirst for knowledge, he is ultimately led 
by Beatrice's love, just as Hyazinth is both saved and guided by 
his love for Rosenbliitchen. Just as Virgil withdraws to let 
Beatrice guide Dante through Paradiso, so the reunion with 
Rosenbliitchen is consummated in a realm beyond the reach of 
rational powers-dream. The story of Hyazinth and Rosen-
bliitchen represents a delicate but sound balance between the 
contending views evident already in Navalis' notebooks: 
empiricism and loving empathy, nature and consciousness are 
brought together through the unifying power of narration and 
language. 
IV. "DER LEHRLING" 
Themes and structures from the fairy-tale do appear in the rest 
of the novel, but no similar balance is achieved. In fact, if 
studied carefully, the common elements only accentuate the 
disunity of the novel. Those interpreters who do perceive a 
unity in it usually disregard the obvious parallel between the old 
man and H yazinth on the one hand and teacher and apprentice 
on the other, and frequently reduce the teacher to a mere foil, 
a straw man. But the first chapter, although it is entitled "Der 
Lehrling", is mainly about the teacher and his philosophy, and 
the dialectic of confrontation between teacher and apprentice is 
based on both sides upon Hardenberg's notebooks. The follow-
ing passage, for instance, clearly shows that the empirical 
method of the teacher is reminiscent both of the fairy-tale's 
old man and of Hardenberg's scientific method of analogizing: 
"Wie er groBer ward, strich er umher, besah sich andre Lander, 
andre Meere, neue Liifte, fremde Sterne, unbekannte Pflanzen, 
Tiere, Mens chen, stieg in Hohlen .... Nun fand er iiberall Bekanntes 
wieder .... Er merkte bald auf die Verbindungen in allem, auf 
Begegnungen, Zusammentreffungen. Nun sah er bald nichts 
mehr allein" [italics mine] (I, So). 
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Like the old man in the tale, the teacher cannot prescribe 
courses of action and the apprentice has to discover his own 
way. He is dissatisfied with the mere exploration of analogies 
in the external world, for he feels that everything leads back into 
the self and that the scattered objects in nature only suggest a 
road towards the deity whose image he carries within himself: 
"Mich freuen die wunderlichen Haufen und Figuren in den 
Sioilen, allein mir ist, als waren sie nur Bilder, Bullen, Zierden, 
versammelt urn ein gottlich Wunderbild, und dieses liegt mir 
immer in Gedanken .... Es ist, als sollten sie den W eg mir zeigen, 
wo in tiefem Schlaf die Jungfrau steht, nach der mein Geist sich 
sehnt" (I, 8 r ). 
Among the structural similarities the tripartite arrangement is 
most obvious. As Striedter had already noted, the first chapter 
starts with an impersonally narrated section, continues with a 
long description of the teacher, and ends with a first person 
confession-all of which is a reflection of the tale. Similarly, it 
may be suggested that the circularity of the tale-Hyazinth 
leaves his home to find his Rosenblutchen in the distance-was 
also the plan for the novel: [ der Lehrer will], "daB wir den eignen 
Weg verfolgen, weil jeder neue Weg durch neue Lander geht, 
und jeder endlich zu diesen Wohnungen, zu dieser heiligen 
Heimat wieder fuhret" (I, 82). Here, then, the teacher's message 
is clearly enunciated and the apprentice is spared Hyazinth's 
initial error. But if the teacher bears a resemblance to the old 
man and the latter represents the high wisdom of the tale, we 
have to direct greater attention to the words of the former and 
will have to abandon the usual notion that only the apprentice 
represents Novalis' own views. Teacher and apprentice are 
ironic inversions of each other existing side by side unsynthe-
sized. 
V. "DIE NATUR" 
In the second chapter the narrative structure loosens further and, 
as will be shown, at certain points ironic play becomes the subject 
matter or the form of the narration. Far from exhibiting the 
unity which Striedter claimed for the first chapter (and by 
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transfer for the second), this part shows fragmentation in form 
and content which is not improved by the insertion of the tale. 
The section preceding the tale falls into two greater units, 
each of which contains several subdivisions. The first part 
(1, 82.-87) is about the manifold ways in which man can establish 
a unity with nature, whereas in the second part (1, 87-91) man 
and nature are confronted and man's goal is defined as the over-
coming of his opponent. 
An unidentified narrator opens the first of these two parts 
with an essay that contrasts the unity of the Golden Age with 
the fragmentation of modern man. Poets and scientists are 
supposed to speak one language, but the latter communicate 
only with sick nature. When the issue is raised whether man is 
capable of improving his contact with nature, the monologue 
broadens into a discussion, and special attention is given to the 
views of some "sinnigere Seelen", who see in existing nature 
only great but neglected potentials (1, 86). Somewhat sur-
prisingly, a nobler nature is to be built by taming and engineering 
as at the end of Faust II were streams are regulated, canals are 
dug, swamps are dried up, and gardens are cultivated. However, 
in describing these activities the prosaic narrative past tense 
subtly changes to the present and finally to a visionary future: 
12.2 
[Allmahlich fing das Herz der Natur wieder an] 
menschlich sich zu regen, ihre Phantasien wurden 
heitrer, sie ward wieder umganglich, und antwortete 
dem freundlichen Frager gern, und so scheint allmah-
lich die alte goldne Zeit zuriickzukommen, in der sie 
den Menschen Freundin, Trosterin Priesterin und 
Wundertaterin war, als sie unter ihnen wohnte und 
ein himmlischer Umgang die Menschen zu Unsterb-
lichen machte. Dann werden die Gestirne die Erde 
wieder besuchen. . . . dann legt die Sonne ihren 
strengen Zepter nieder .... Dann finden sich die alten 
verwaisten Familien, und jeder Tag sieht neue Be-
gruBungen, neue Umarmungen; dann kommen die 
ehemaligen Bewohner der Erde zu ihr zuriick, in 
jedem Hugel regt sich neu erglimmende Asche, 
iiberall lodern Flammcn des Lebens empor, alte 
Wohnstatten werden neu erbaut, alte Zeiten erneuert, 
und die Geschichte wird zum Traum einer unend-
lichen, unabsehlichen Gegenwart (I, 86 f.). 
What has happened here? Clearly, the final part of the passage 
is neither a recapitulation of what those "sinnigere Seelen" 
wished to do, nor an exaltation of engineering; the poet speaks 
here in a tenseless language of a space- and timeless vision 
which is beyond both the technological details of engineering 
and the sensuous experience of nature. Rhythm and wor-
ding are highly reminiscent of the central vision in Hymnen 
an die Nacht: "Zur Staubwolke wurde der Hugel ... Jahrtausende 
zogen abwarts in die Ferne, wie Ungewitter" (I, 135). We are 
confronted here with a breaking point, not unique but typical 
for Novalis, at which a complex empirical reality yields to a 
poetic vision; instead of resolution we have a dissolution of 
conflicts. If the tone and setting in the hymns prepare us for a 
visionary climax, in the passage from Die Lehrlinge one is in-
tellectually disturbed by the abrupt change and the inappropriate 
positioning, so that the final words remain unconvincing. 
It could be argued that such discontinuities are part of 
Novalis' notion of "Romantisiren" were it not for a subsequent 
ironic inversion which seems to be accompanied a by change of 
narrator: "Wer dieses Stammes und dieses Glaubens ist ... 
geht in den Werkstatten der Kiinstler umher ... " Perhaps the 
tone is not meant to be disparaging here, but the detachment 
from the exalted narrator and the "sinnigere Seelen" is evident. 
Indeed, in the following section the visionary scene is all but 
repudiated when poetry is characterized by discipline, exercise, 
and attention, and an observing-collecting figure reappears: 
" ... so sieht man einen kiinftigen Weltweisen in jenem, der allen 
natiirlichen Dingen ohne Rast nachspiirt, nachfragt, auf alles 
achtet, jedes Merkwiirdige zusammentriigt und froh ist, wenn 
er einer neuen Erscheinung, einer neuen Kraft und Kenntnis 
Meister und Besitzer geworden ist".10 The first part ends then 
with a return to empiricism. 
The second part of the first section is on the necessity of 
overcoming nature; a protest is made against the pettiness of 
pedantic searching, questioning, and collecting, this time not 
in the name of poetry and inspiration but on behalf of 
reason. The argument has several shades. According to "some", 
nature is a horrendous mill of death, because every stimulation 
works towards the liquidation of human reason, which is the 
greatest enemy of nature. Some "more courageous" ones find 
man's battle against nature promising, because the heroes of 
science are willing martyrs for the benefit of mankind. Others 
again would completely withdraw from the battle and follow 
the inward leading path to a purer world. Next a "serious man" 
elucidates Fichte's11 doctrine that nature is a mere impression of 
our self, because the meaning of the world is constituted in 
reason and the key to nature is man's own moral sense. No 
wonder that the confused apprentice is only saved from this 
barrage of conflicting opinions-most of which may be traced to 
Hardenberg's own notebooks- by the intervention of a jolly 
fellow who tells him the tale of Hyazinth and Rosenbliitchen. 
VI. THE TRAVELERS 
According to current interpretations, the function of the tale in 
the chapter is to resolve the chaos preceding it and to prepare 
the way for the final section which supposedly gives the romantic 
view of nature in terms of the resolution in the tale. Since the 
form of this section is dialectic, it has been suggested that it is 
comparable to a musical composition which proceeds from 
variation to variation.12 But in any good set of musical variations 
there is a common denominator, an initial proposition whose 
total meaning and inner richness is unfolded in the progression, 
so that the total composition forms an organic unity. The views 
presented in the final section of Die Lehrlinge neither form a 
dialogue nor do they constitute a systematic progression; 
thesis follows thesis without gradual enlightenment and deep-
ening of sense. 
True, the last section starts with a picture of harmony and 
peace lingering from the fairy-tale: the apprentices embrace each 
other and leave. But the "spirit of the place", consisting of the 
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abandoned objects in the temple, is in itself divided, and, 
divided, it laments the even greater chasm that separates it 
from man: "0! daB der Mensch ... die innre Musik der Natur 
verstande und einen Sinn fur auBere Harmonie hatte .... Er kann 
nichts liegen lassen, tyrannisch trennt er uns und greift in 
lauter Dissonanzen herum" (I, 95). The voices conclude that 
mankind shall reunite with nature when emotions become once 
more the expression of humanity: "Das Denken ist nur ein 
Traum des Fuhlens"-which to many interpreters is both the 
distillation of Die Lehrlinge and the essence of Hardenberg's 
thought. Yet this is only the view of the "spirit of the place" and 
the human answer in the novel is more complex. Travelers 
appear in search of a lost "Ursprache", and the rest of the 
chapter-save the last two paragraphs which are again devoted 
to the teacher-is taken up with their conversation. Four of 
them, three unnamed ones and a "beautiful youth", 13 participate 
in two rounds of speeches where the sequence and the views are 
meticulously maintained. 
The first traveler claims that if man would devote his un-
divided attention to the sensations he receives, he could master 
them and use them according to his pleasure. If only part of his 
sensuous impressions would be utilized in such an arbitrary way, 
he could establish a reciprocal relationship with the sum of his 
sensations (that is: nature) and he would master the world while 
learning about it. True, the body's imaginative modification 
might separate it from the rest of nature, and the information 
received might become unreliable; but if as a result of careful 
self-observation one could decipher the process whereby 
sensations become thoughts, the unraveling of nature's "forest 
of symbols" would become easier, and man would eventually be 
capable of creating "Naturgedanken" and "Naturkomposi-
tionen" without external impressions. The first traveler's speech 
in the second round only confirms that this theory is identical 
with Novalis' "Magic Idealism" as formulated in the notebooks 
of 1798, for it asserts that in the highest form of life, reached 
through discipline and practice, knowledge and creation ("Her-
vorbringen und Wissen") should be in reciprocal relation: 
"... durch den Zusammenhang seiner Gedankenwelt in sich, 
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und ihre Harmonie mit dem Universum, bildet sich von selbst 
ein Gedankensystem zur getreuen Abbildung und Forme! des 
Universums" (I, 101).!4 
The short interjection by the second traveler represents a 
note of skepticism which largely cancels the effect of the first 
man's speech. According to the second man, nature is an 
incomprehensible agreement between infinitely different things, 
hence it cannot be pieced together into a coherent picture from 
external signs only. As in the case of the first traveler, one may 
find entries in Hardenberg's notebooks that correspond to this 
position (e.g., III, 662, no. 5 98). 
The third traveler goes further than the first two in asserting 
the creative power of the mind: " ... je willkiirlicher das Netz 
gewebt ist, das der kiihne Fischer auswirft, desto gliicklicher 
ist der Fang" -which is the generalization of a remark Navalis 
made earlier about the medical theory of John Brown: "Je 
gro13er der Magus, des to willkiihrlicher sein V erfahren, sein 
Spruch, sein Mittel" (II, 546). Although this traveler does not 
deny the possibility of acquiring knowledge through philos-
ophy, he believes that love will bring about the new golden 
age, not obedience to social duties. To reach his goal man will 
not only need to "improvise on nature as on a great instrument" 
-which seems to be the position of the first traveler-but he 
will also need an intuitive understanding of history, because 
"all things divine have a history" (I, 99). 
The beautiful youth, who is fourth in the conversation, quite 
appropriately plays his tune on the lyre of Orpheus: only poets 
feel what nature could mean to man. Far from exaggerating, 
the poets themselves know not what powers they possess in 
taming and shaping the stones, trees, and beasts (I, 100 ). 
Accordingly, the beautiful youth disdains science. In contrast 
to the opening passage of the chapter where poets and scientists 
were said to speak the same language, the youth believes that 
scientists are lifeless beings. Such insensitive people as the 
chemists ("Scheidekiinstler" -the choice of word is charac-
teristic) should not be empowered to deal with the holiest and 
most enchanting phenomena of nature (I, 105). Rough minds 
that cannot comprehend the marvels enclosed in their test tubes 
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shamelessly exploit phenomena which ought to be secrets of 
nature's lovers and of a higher mankind. Only poets should 
deal with fluids (I, 105). As if to counterbalance the last speech, 
the discussion of the travelers abruptly closes with the re-
appearance of the teacher. Instead of resolving their conflict he 
opens up new topics. 
What kind of conclusions can one reach? Clearly, the variety 
of Hardenberg's notebooks appears also in Die Lehrlinge; the 
teacher, the apprentice, and the travelers expound views which 
are essentially Novalis' own, but the work is lacking in imagi-
native synthesis. In trying to establish some kind of order we 
may, perhaps, arrange the speeches of the four travelers in a 
dialectically ascending order, which would proceed from an 
initial emphasis on discipline and observation of detail to a 
final eloquent and rhythmical praise of mystic dissolution: 
" ... so versinkt die gliickliche Liebe gern in die endlose Tiefe" (I, 
105). The arch between these extremes roughly corresponds to 
the span between Novalis' scientific training and his final poetic 
works. We may surmise that his newly-won love for Bohme 
would have shifted the emphasis of Die Lehrlinge from the 
earlier medico-scientific thoughts towards the figure of Orpheus 
among the travelers. But we have to agree with Haym that the 
surviving fragment is lacking in unity and we may regard the 
first sentence of the novel as an unintentional motto for its own 
diversity: "Mannigfache Wege gehen die Menschen". 
127 
VII 
The Last Years 
I. RELIGION AND POE'I'RY 
Novalis' departure from Freiberg on \Vhitsuntide 1799 meant 
important changes in his way of life, the direction of his studies, 
and the course of his professional career. Engaged to Julie von 
Charpentier, daughter of a professor at Freiberg, he hoped to 
find domestic bliss in marriage and a financial basis for it in the 
administration and supervision of the salt mines in Saxony. 
He entered service as an assessor at the end of the year, and soon 
afterwards, in April I 8oo, decided to apply for a vacant "Amts-
hauptmann" position. Although he managed to send off his 
test solution of a legal dispute in September, the appointment 
in December came too late: he spent the remaining months 
before his death on March 25, I8oi, ailing and incapacitated. 
Compared to the large mass of notes Novalis took in Freiberg, 
the notebook volume of the last years was understandably 
slender due to his professional duties, his renewed interest in 
poetry, and his later illness. He retained a philosophical interest 
in science and poetry, but no longer attempted to construct 
theoretical syntheses, and turned in both realms from the 
accumulation of knowledge to practical application, from 
"knowing" to "doing".1 Since he was conscientious in carrying 
out the technical-scientific duties of his job and intensely poetic 
in his artistic vocation, the polarities of his temperament and 
character became more evident in the last two years of his 
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life, and the relationship between his art and life took on a more 
enigmatic aspect.2 
The plans for llymnen an die Nacht go back to an earlier date, 
but only around the turn of 1799/18oo were the prolonged 
theoretical studies interrupted by a burst of creative energy 
that yielded the final version of the cycle and Heinrich von Ofter-
dingen.3 The most prominent reason for this sudden onrush 
of creativity was Navalis' new-found friendship with Tieck, the 
only other poetically creative figure in the Romantic circle. The 
friendship, formed at their first encounter on July 17, 1799, 
"opened a new book" (IV, 294) in Navalis' life, and meant not 
merely a return to creative activity, but also a turn with respect 
to his old views and projects. Recalling his former philosophical 
and scientific studies he wrote to Tieck: "Unter Spekulanten war 
ich ganz Spekulation geworden" (IV, 3 30 ). Correspondingly, 
the first fruit of his reawakened poetic powers, Heinrich 
von Ofterdingen, was to be radically different in design from 
Die Lehrlinge. In conscious opposition to Goethe's Wilhelm 
Meister, where poetic aspirations were finally accommo-
dated within everyday life, Navalis aimed at an "apotheosis of 
poetry" (IV, 330) and attempted to ascend from the material 
world to the concrete and yet abstract forms of the poetic 
imagination. As Navalis wrote to Schlegel, poetry was to have 
been born in the second part of the work (IV, 343), where the 
novel would have become metamorphosed into a "Marchen" 
(IV, 3 3 3 ). Since the "blue flower" became a symbol for the novel 
and for poetic romanticism in general, these intentions of 
Navalis were indeed understood by subsequent generations, 
who saw in the work not an encyclopedic effort comparable to 
the "Brouillon", but an attempt at pure poetry. 
Changes in Hardenberg's philosophical and religious outlook 
may also be associated with Jakob Bohme.4 Apart from the 
changes contemplated for Die Lehrlinge, Navalis also intended 
to write about Bohme as a poet and a philosopher of nature.15 
It seems that Navalis was not so much attracted by Bohme's 
quietism as by his poetic nature, his talent, and his particular way 
of life: Bohme's creative powers represented to him a "forceful 
spring" that "breaks forth, carries, forms and mixes" (IV, 331). 
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Paralleling the pattern of Novalis' last years, Bohme-philos-
opher, theologian, and poet-had written most of his works 
while tending his job as a simple cobbler. 
While Hardenberg's religious convictions deepened and 
matured in his last years, their expression in poetry, the Geist-
liche Lieder became strikingly clear and simple. Perhaps both 
the deepening and the poetic clarity were related to a fine but 
perceptible shift from an analytical to an intuitional and com-
munal affirmation of faith. As the quoted letter to ] ust reveals, 
his faith always issued from strongly held inner convictions 
rather than from literal interpretations of religious documents. 
The force of his personal creed, as well as a certain dislike for 
his father's emotional Herrnhuterism, delayed his surrender to 
the community; 6 but it seems that simultaneously to his marital 
and professional plans to blend more fully with the fabric of 
society he also reconsidered his religious communal attachment. 
As his brother Karl reports, 7 he immersed himself in the works 
of Zinzendorf, the founder of the Herrnhuter brotherhood, 8 and 
when his physical condition worsened, he gained relief and 
spiritual tranquility from this reaffirmation of his faith: " .... 
Wenn mich nicht korperliche Unruhe verwirrt, welches doch 
nicht haufig geschieht, so ist mein Gemiit hell und still. Religion 
ist der groBe Orient in uns, der selten getriibt wird. Ohne sie 
ware ich ungliicklich. So vereinigt sich alles in einen graBen, 
friedlichen Gedanken, in einen stillen, ewigen Glauben ... " 
(IV, 349 f.). 
II. READINGS AND PROFESSIONAL WORK 
As the poetic imagination and the religious convictions of 
Novalis became both more concrete and more metaphysical in 
the last years of his life, so his interest in science separated into 
speculative and practical concerns. But neither his work nor his 
thought became as dreamy and unsystematic as Olshausen 
described them: 9 the care and attention that Novalis showed in 
his professional activity testifies that he was both able and 
willing to deal with routine technical matters. 
According to several recently discovered letters and docu-
ments Hardenberg was highly regarded for his professional 
competence.10 In spite of his short stay in Freiberg, he had the 
honor to be selected by Werner to participate in a geological 
survey of Saxony, which aimed at the exploration of new 
resources and the investigation of certain theoretical problems. 
Novalis and his assistant, Friedrich Haupt, surveyed the region 
Gera-Borna-Zeitz-Leipzig in June 18oo; the district report, 
completed and submitted by Haupt after Hardenberg's death, 
was placed among the best in Werner's final report on the 
entire project.11 Further information on the scope of Harden-
berg's interest in technical matters may be gained by looking 
at the list of books he read 12 or the letters and papers he 
wrote in his last years. Reading the reports and papers which 
were published for the first time in the new edition, 13 one is 
struck by their professionalism: they penetrate into concrete 
practical problems and seldom stray into philosophical and 
religious issues. For this reason they had little bearing on 
Hardenberg's philosophy or his views on poetry. 
One observes the reverse tendency in Hardenberg's later 
notes on medicine, physiology, and chemistry. His readings 
contained many standard textbooks, journals, and reliable 
treatises in these fields, but, contrary to the earlier notebooks 
where one finds commentaries on and even excerpts from these, 
among the notes from his final years such references are scarce 
indeed.14 This was not exclusively due to the renewed interest in 
poetry and religion and to the generally lean output of notes. 
Observations on science became more independent and abstract 
(i.e., not traceable to any particular reading), and those which 
were occasioned by scientific works departed from speculative 
and loosely written books of little scientific value.15 Novalis' 
own remarks on these works became so speculative and un-
related that it is difficult to put them into a coherent system. 
While the earlier notebooks, particularly the "Brouillon", give 
frequent demonstration of Novalis' conviction that all aspects 
of life are organically interrelated and that, consequently, the 
consideration of any subject will lead to fundamental issues, in 
the final years the threads of thought from the particular to the 
universal, from the scientific to the poetic, and from the theo-
retical to the practical are less visible. 
III. J· W. RITTER AND GALVANISM 
The slow evolution in the understanding of electrical phenomena 
culminated in the eighteenth century in Galvani's experiments 
with frog legs, published in 1791. He placed two metals in 
contact with the muscles and nerves of the frog leg and made 
them twitch; but his interpretation of the phenomenon was 
erroneous, for he concluded that the acting current was an 
"animal electricity" residing in the tissues of the frog which was 
different from the electricity observed in other physical pheno-
mena. The rival interpretation was made five years later by 
another Italian, Alessandro Volta, who correctly asserted that 
the current through the frog leg was due to the electrical 
potential difference between the two pieces of metal that formed 
a battery across the muscles and nerves of the frog. According 
to Volta, electricity and galvanism were the same phenomenon. 
The tug-of-war between the rival theories in the last years of 
the century seemed to have wider philosophical implications and 
aroused great interest in Germany, particularly among adherents 
of the "Naturphilosophie" movement, who favored Galvani. 
Even before the publication of Volta's argument, C. H. Pfaff, 
the translator and editor of the Elements of Medicine, published a 
book on animal electricity and excitability,16 in which he stated 
that Galvani's discovery proved the existence of a unique 
organic force of which all other forces in the organism were mere 
modifications. It seemed that galvanism brought the results of 
Haller, Blumenbach, and Brown to a common denominator. 
In I 797 Alexander von Humboldt published a voluminous 
book about his experiments with muscles and nerves, 17 up-
holding the correctness of Galvani's conclusions and deducing 
from them the autonomy of the animal organism.l8 As Schelling 
remarked in the U/eltseele, the "dignity" of Galvani's great 
discovery, jeopardized by Volta, was rescued (Sch, I, 623): 
once more the mechanistic and deterministic philosophies re-
ceived a blow. 
Humboldt gave in his book considerable space to a budding 
genius, Johann Wilhelm Ritter, who added his own remarks on 
the subject. In the fall of 1798 Ritter published his own book 
that made him famous: Beweis, dass ein bestandiger Galvanismus den 
Lebensprozess in dem Thierreich begleite.19 This reveals his two 
oddly incongruous talents, the inexhaustible patience in experi-
menting, and the genius to read visions into nature. Without 
taking sides in the Humboldt-Volta controversy, although en-
visioning an eventual synthesis between electric and galvanic 
phenomena resting on Volta's experiments, Ritter made a minute 
analysis of galvanic circuits and searched for the variables that 
determined their behavior. He found that the number of these 
factors was very large, but to his surprise he observed that all of 
them were affecting also organic life; hence he made his leap of 
faith and concluded that all organic life was constituted of a large 
collection of different galvanic circuits ( cf. III, 9 52). Conforming 
to Brown's doctrine he surmised that the stimuli of the external 
world changed the behavior of galvanic circuits and that 
consequently the manipulation of life perhaps depended only 
on the proper knowledge of galvanism: "Der berauschende 
Weingeist modificirt die Action Galvanischer Ketten nicht un-
betrachtlich, er abet ist es auch, der im thierischen Korper so 
thatig reizt.... Wie wenn sich alle Korper in Rucksicht ihres 
V erhaltens zum Galvanism us in Reihen ordneten, die parallel 
vielleicht liefen mit denen, in die sie eine vernunftige Materia 
medica theilt? ... Sollte es so dem Arzte einst noch moglich 
seyn am Studiertisch durch einige V ersuche an der reizbaren 
Muskel- und Nervenfaser das Mittel aufzusuchen, was seinen 
Kranken retten soil ?"20 In the visionary ending of the book, 
which contrasts with the sober but execrably written main 
part of the argument, Ritter lumped together the sun, atoms, 
plants, animals, metals, stones, and other paraphernalia of the 
universe into a great "all-Tier"-Nature. 
Navalis was exposed to the dispute on galvanism from so 
many sides that it is difficult to determine just where he first 
learned about it. Since the name galvanism appears already in 
the notebooks from r 798,21 it seems now certain that the first 
impulse was not provided by Ritter. Navalis' wide acquaintance 
with Humboldt's works22 and a vague reference in the "Brouil-
lon" (III, 264) to "Bewegung der gereizten Muskelfaser" suggest 
that he had read Humboldt's treatise. In addition, Navalis 
owned a copy of Pfaff's book and he read articles both by and 
on Volta(III, 95). 
But Hardenberg's excitement and enthusiasm concerning 
galvanism originated from his reading of Ritter's book probably 
not too long after its appearance. References to Ritter and his 
ideas appear in the "Brouillon" and the accompanying notebooks 
towards the end of 1798, and they run through the rest of his 
works. Although he was curious about the man, as he was 
about his work,23 he probably got to know him only towards 
the end of November, 1799, when their lasting friendship was 
founded. 24 
Unfortunately it is extremely difficult to say something 
meaningful and consistent about Navalis' theory of galvanism 
or his friendship with Ritter, beyond these meager facts. 
Although we do not lack material, this does not congeal into 
a significant utterance. In the "Freiberger naturwissenschaft-
liche Studien" one finds a chart which develops one of Ritter's 
ideas (III, 8 3) and seems to establish a triadic pattern 
between galvanism, electricity, and chemistry. The idea recurs 
in the "Brouillon" (III, 597). In the same collection, a passage 
written against Brown's medicine contains a reference to Ritter, 
seemingly suggesting that his theory of galvanism could combat 
Brown's mechanistic physiology. This, however, is highly 
tenuous. The rest consists of very flimsy speculation in which 
it is asked whether galvanism was the agent in decomposition 
(III, 3 54), a producer of light (III, 4 7 I), or a phenomenon more 
universal even than Ritter believed it to be (III, 621). 
It will have to be admitted that both from a scientific and 
philosophical point of view Novalis' notes on galvanism are 
the weakest among his notebooks, and this harsh judgment 
will only be slightly assuaged by adding that in those years very 
few people saw this issue clearly. Since the problem was solvable 
only through experiments and Navalis was no practicing physi-
cist or chemist, he had to decide on the basis of his highly 
contradictory reading. 25 Not being able to add anything to the 
advancement of knowledge, he took the material as a starting 
point for speculation. One may remark in defense that every age 
has its fascination with those phenomena that promise to lead 
into the unknown and provide answers for fundamental 
questions. 
But the notes on galvanism do reveal something about 
Novalis himself, even if they do not have an objective value. 
The disparaging remark in Die Lehrlinge that scientists only 
investigate "dead twitching remainders" (I, 84) suggests that 
Novalis was hardly impressed by the frog leg experiments 
themselves. Rather, in galvanism he saw a new hope of 
exploring that no-man's-land which lies between the material 
of the body and consciousness. He thought that if galvanism 
heightened the degree of existence of matter it might perhaps 
be regarded as the "higher consciousness of nature" (III, 6o3), 
or as "inner light" (III, 6o4). If the body was (as in a 
certain sense it is) a vast aggregate of galvanic circuits in which 
the mysterious stuff of life (electricity?) circulates, the phenome-
non itself could be called the "inner light". He asked whether 
these closed circuits that ring the body could be the elemental 
forms in which nature attempted to double upon itself and 
achieve a consciousness of its own being. Understood in their 
widest sense, these circuits or chains organically linked the 
members of a body and seemed to build up an organic universe, 
an "all-Tier" ( cf. III, 5 74), suggesting the existence of a physical 
"chain" of being. Finally, in Ritter's method of reading nature 
Novalis found what he thought was lacking in Werner's purely 
empirical method: Ritter, like the disciple in Die Lehrlinge, was 
reading the visible letters of nature, to decipher from them the 
secret of the "Weltseele" and the structure of inwardness: 
"Alle auBre Processe sollen als Symbole und lezte Wirkungen 
innerer Processe begreiflich werden" (III, 655). 
IV. SENSIBILITY AND DISEASE 
In the last years ofNovalis' life his conception of disease expand-
ed into a metaphysical and moral dilemma that brought the 
paradoxes of his philosophy into focus. Let us follow aspects 
of this transformation in concrete terms. 
Once more it might be useful to start with a work by Schelling, 
his Erster Entwurj eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, which 
appeared in 1799· Although Schelling and Navalis were going 
in very different directions by this time, there is little reason 
to believe Th. Haering that Navalis did not read this work. 26 
In fact, a critical remark in the last notebooks indicates that 
Navalis was concerned with Schelling's philosophy of nature, to 
which, for the first time, the title of this work referred to as 
"Naturphilosophie": "In der Schellingschen Nat[ur] Phil[oso-
phie] wird ein beschrankter Be griff der Natur und der Phil[ a so-
phie] vorausgesezt. Was die Schell[ingsche] Nat[ ur] Phil[ a so-
phie] eigentlich sey" (III, 666)? 
While the Erster Entwurj retained the principle of duality 
and much of Schelling's earlier vocabulary, the structure of 
nature in this work was both simpler and more specific than in 
the TJ/"eltseele. The dualism of receptivity and activity, present 
in every organism, was denoted as "excitability", and this again 
was decomposed in a different manner into three components 
of unequal value: on the highest level was sensibility, the 
essence of life, below it irritability, the force directly responsible 
for activity and movement, and, finally, on the lowest level, there 
was the productive and reproductive force-Schelling's version 
of the "Bildungstrieb".27 While irritability and sensibility were 
inversely proportional in the middle range of the evolutionary 
scale, beyond certain inversion points this relation ceased to be 
valid-a curious case of dialectics in Schelling's philosophy. 
A surely unintended parody of this theory may be read in a 
passage immediately preceding Navalis' note on "Natur-
philosophie", where he speculated that since plants are lower 
forms of organic life, their consumption should increase the 
body's reproductive force and should bring into balance a human 
body dominated by sensibility. The result is what may be called 
an "inverted" vegetarianism: "Alle Pflanzen verstarken im 
thierischen Korper den organischen Bildungstrieb und die 
Reproduktionskraft; vielleicht dai3 sie daher in den Erscheinun-
gen der herrschenden Sensibilitaet ein mittleres Produkt, ver-
starkte Irritabilitaet befordern" (III, 665). Similarly, the prin-
ciples of Schelling's theory suggested to Navalis that the con-
sumption of minerals fortifies the "Bildungstrieb" and the 
chemical metabolism of the body, so that the level of sensibility 
may be reduced drastically, perhaps even beyond the inversion 
point and below the level of irritability (III, 665 f.). 
We need not be concerned with the scientific accuracy of these 
half-humorous remarks, because their significance lies in what 
they tell us about Navalis' intentions: here too he is preoccupied 
with the reduction of excessive sensibility. As the early letters 
to Erasmus indicate, his incessant worry about this matter had a 
personal reason which only gained in importance during his 
final illness. 28 But this personal concern achieved a universal 
significance to him, once his paradoxical conception of sensibility 
became instrumental in shaping his theory of history: in his last 
years Navalis saw more and more clearly that sensibility was a 
dangerous yet ineluctable disease of man, destined to carry him 
towards the chiliastic vision. 
What is the moral meaning and historical function of sensibil-
ity if the destiny of man is to become moral (III, 66z)? Navalis' 
answer is a paradox: "Mit der Sensibilitaet und ihren Organen, 
den Nerven tritt Kranckheit in die Natur. Es ist damit Freyheit, 
Willkfthr in die Natur gebracht und damit Siinde, Verstoi3 gegen 
den Willen der Natur, die Ursache alles Ubels" (III, 657). Hence, 
as the "principium individuationis" sensibility represents that 
willful and sinful transgression of man's natural limitations which 
brings about his Fall but also opens his future, as in a more 
general sense all diseases are individualizations and deviations 
from natural and moral norms: "Alle Krankheiten gleichen der 
Sftnde, darein; daB sie Transcendenzen sind. Unsere Krankh[ei-
ten] sind alle Phaenomene erhohter Sens[ibilitat ], die in 
hohere Krafte ftbergehn will. Wie der J\1ensch Gott werden 
wollte, sftndigte er. Kr[ankheiten] der Pflanzen sind Animali-
sationen. . . . Krankh[ eiten] der Steine-V egetationen" (III, 
66zf.). Whether Man's Faustian sin of overreaching can fi-
nally be converted into a morally good end, or whether this 
refinement of his consciousness will have to be subordinated to a 
strict morality-this Navalis leaves unanswered. 29 What 
distinguishes his last thoughts on this topic from the earlier ones 
is a more determined effort to explore all the dark and question-
able aspects of disease. And since he came to associate the 
physical deviation with the moral aberration of sin-a notion 
which was otherwise remarkably alien to Navalis-his under-
standing of Christianity suddenly became deeper and more 
dramatic. His faith in man's power and capability now matured 
through the recognition that although man is limited, precisely 
his physical and moral frailties are his means of understanding 
the ways of divine mercy: "Je hiilfloser, desto empfiinglicher 
fiir Moral und Religion."30 Hence, his intention to explore all 
the dark regions of soul and body is paradoxically both within 
the framework of traditional Christian conceptions and pro-
phetically anticipating the unorthodox struggles of Baudelaire, 
Rimbaud, Nietzsche, Gide, and many others, who, in diverse 
ways, investigated the "great sickness" in search of a new 
transcendental health (cf. III, 667). Holding simultaneously the 
Christian conception of mercy, the infinite perfectibility of man, 
and the necessity of exploring sin and disease, Navalis stands as 
a complex and unique figure at the threshold of modern literature. 
V. EPILOGUE ON "ROMANTIC MEDICINE" 
With Hardenberg's death in r8or, the German Romantic 
Movement lost its most valuable member, and the cohesion 
of the group slowly started to give way. But the odd 
history of "Romantic Medicine", initiated in Germany by 
some of the ideas of John Brown, was just in the making, and 
a whole generation of romantic doctors worked to integrate 
the disparate fields of philosophy, religion, art, and science in 
the sense of "Symphilosophieren." The lively interaction 
between scientists, poets, and philosophers was not quite as 
unfruitful as historians of medicine and science tend to portray 
it. One may think, for instance, of Christian Oersted's discovery 
that the magnetic needle gets deflected near a conductor of 
electric current-to which he was led largely through his romantic 
belief that electricity and magnetism were aspects of a single 
higher phenomenon-or the encyclopedic knowledge and 
achievement of Alexander von Humboldt. There were practicing 
physicians among the writers: Gotthilf Schubert, the author of 
Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenschajt, Carl Gustav 
Carus, the versatile friend of Goethe, Justinus Kerner, whom 
we have encountered already as a patient of Weikard, F. G. 
Wetzel, the alleged author of the Nachtwachen des Bonaventura, 
and a host of minor figures. In turn, the "romantic doctors", 
many of them admirably portrayed in Ricarda Huch's Die 
Romantik,31 were so deeply involved in the intellectual life of 
Germany that medical theories became significant in the 
"Weltanschauung" of the time. Although the complex cross-
fertilization of religious, moral, artistic, political, and scientific 
questions probably yielded more fallacious than meaningful 
speculations, the period cannot be judged in terms of such 
simple tags as "irrationalism", "romanticism", or "reaction-
arism". 
As R. Huch and later W. Milch (in a somewhat different 
formulation) had noted, 32 one may define several broad currents 
in "Romantic Medicine", and should separate the adherents of 
the "Naturphilosophie" movement from those who were 
nourished by "Sturm und Drang" and had no debt to the Kantian 
revolution in philosophy. The latter group comprised mainly 
followers of John Brown and Anton Mesmer. But while the 
last waves of the "Brownian movement" subsided towards the 
end of the first decade of the new century, Mesmerism enjoyed 
increasing popularity after its founder's death in I 8 I 5. Although 
Mesmer himself belonged to no particular philosophical move-
ment, his intentions conformed to the general tendency of roman-
tic science and even to some aspects of N ovalis' philosophy, inas-
much as he hoped to identify and tap for the art of curing 
universal forces which went unrecognized until then. Far from 
being a mystic, he believed that the universe was pervaded by a 
fluid which established a reciprocal relationship between bodies 
under the laws of mechanics. Since he saw many analogies be-
tween the phenomenon of magnetism and the effect of this 
fluid, he called it "animal magnetism", and conducted a large 
number of experiments to determine the ways in which it 
affected the relationship between bodies. He did indeed get 
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some startling results by unknowingly employing hypnotic 
treatment, but not being able to find the laws of the phenomenon 
he fell in disrepute among scientists. Nevertheless, his views and 
techniques slowly gained popularity, especially once they met 
with irrational currents, such as the belief in somnambulism. 33 
His works were published in r8q34 and his biography was 
written four decades later by Justinus Kerner, himself a Mes-
merist.35 Although the Mesmerist movement and Novalis' 
medical notes hold a few common ideas, the kinship is distant 
and one would do well to keep them apart: Novalis made only 
vague references to "animal magnetism", and he could scarcely 
have known much about it since Mesmerism was still little 
known then. Neither is there any evidence that later Mesmerists 
were acquainted with Novalis' medical theories. 
Of Pas savant, one of the most important romantic physicians, 
R. Huch remarked: "Sein Leben lang schwankte Passavant 
zwischen zwei Berufen, dem des Arztes, den er ausi.ibte, und 
dem des Theologen, zu dem er neigte .... "36 What she says is true 
also of many others. According to Ringseis, all sciences, 
including medicine, have their principles in the books of 
revelation, which describe man and nature as fallen, incomplete, 
and dependent: "Vollkommenste Gesundheit mit der Moglich-
keit der Tri.ibung war einst im Paradiese; befestigt und ohne 
mogliche Tri.ibung wird sie ki.inftig sein nach der Wieder-
auferstehung; gegenwartig aber ist vollkommene Gesundheit in 
keinem sichtbaren Theile des universellen Organismus."37 In 
view of this sharp distinction between the innocent and healthy 
on the one hand, and the fallen and sick on the other, Ringseis 
insisted that the physiological laws of the healthy body 
were not applicable to pathological cases. Similar thoughts 
were entertained by Karl Windischmann, who shared with 
Ringseis an intense catholicism: diseases are independent 
organisms which change their constitutions with the passage 
of history, so that an intelligent cure would have to pre-
suppose a knowledge of the "Zeitgeist". To Windischmann, the 
sensibility of modern constitutions was a sign that man had 
lost his former solidity of faith and had not yet achieved the 
assurance of a future synthesis. Since moral and bodily decay 
were inseparable in the fallen state, the external expression of 
moral weakness, disease, could only be cured by tending the 
soul. Windischmann was a friend of Friedrich Schlegel, and it 
may be that he knew something about Novalis' notion on sin 
and disease, but, once again, no evidence is available, and it 
seems more likely that \Vindischmann, a translator of Plotinus, 
had developed his ideas from the neo-Platonic tradition. As to 
Ringseis, he only tells us in his Erinnerungen that as a young man 
he was attracted to Novalis, and it seems plausible that his 
affection belonged more to the poet than to the philosopher and 
the scientist.38 
A different sensibility links the religious convictions and the 
scientifically held ideas of the "Naturphilosophie" movement. 
Although most of the leading figures, including D. Kieser, H. 
Steffens, Fr. Hufeland, G. Schubert, I. P. V. Troxler, G. R. 
Treviranus, C. G. Carus, L. Oken, and J. Reil, were deeply 
religious, their natural philosophy was dominated by the concepts 
and the ideas of the young Schelling. Organism, dualism, 
polarity, sensibility, irritability, life force, and "Bildungstrieb" 
constituted the conceptual building blocks from which the various 
theories of "Naturphilosophie" were constructed, all of them 
having in common at least one principle, namely the postulate 
that the processes of the body be intimately linked with the 
oscillations of the soul. Kieser, for instance, believed that the 
increasing refinement of the human organism, that is the devel-
opment of individuality and personality, dangerously increased 
the physical and the psychological tension between the self and 
the world, so that refinement would necessarily be accompanied 
by susceptibility to diseases. 
Although these ideas are at several points in contact with 
Hardenberg's philosophy and psychology, there is no reason to 
assume that he was in any way responsible for the emergence 
of this movement. The correspondences may be traced back to 
Schelling, the founder of "Naturphilosophie", who was in the 
center of medical discussions for a long time after Hardenberg's 
death through his articles, his medical magazine, and his per-
sonal contacts. 
Given only such vague correspondences it is surprising that 
historians of medicine, who lay claim to a scientific temper they 
find lacking in romanticism itself, have built a rapidly swelling 
legend about Navalis' role in the shaping of "Romantic Medi-
cine". This view was first expounded by E. Hirschfeld in an 
otherwise judicious and intelligent article. 39 Hirschfeld took an 
oddly double-pronged attitude with respect to Navalis: while he 
severely criticized his medical philosophy from the scientific 
point of view, 40 he raised him to an "Ideenfi.ihrer" of "Romantic 
Medicine", and admired him for his psychological insights.41 
Bluth's dissertation, written largely in defense of Navalis, 
attempted to play down the first aspect of Hirschfeld's view by 
asserting that the "fragments" showed the unity of a system-
atizing mind which developed and transformed the current 
theories of stimulation in a highly independent way; unfortu-
nately, Bluth laid equally great emphasis on supporting Hirsch-
feld in the contention that Navalis was a leader and moving force 
behind "Romantic Medicine", a view which he upheld partially 
with erroneous information, partially with arguments based on 
unsupported analogies. 42 With Bluth the legend of Navalis' 
influence became firmly established. P. Diepgen, who was the 
supervisor of Bluth's thesis, accepted all of his results and gave 
them wide publicity, first in a speech on "Navalis und die 
romantische Medizin", and later by incorporating the material 
in his history of medicine.43 The more sympathetic evaluation 
of Hardenberg's medical views in W. Leibbrand's Die spekula-
tive Medizin der Romantik, shows a similar uncritical indebtedness 
to Bluth's work,44 especially where this was in support of 
Novalis' allegedly decisive influence on "Romantic Medicine".45 
All of these evaluations from the point of view of medical 
history suffer from two major weaknesses: on the one hand their 
assessment of Novalis' comprehension of science is based on 
incomplete and often misleadingly arranged editions of his 
works, and on the other hand they make the mistake of claiming 
that Novalis' scientific notes, largely unpublished till the twen-
tieth century, had a palpable influence on "Romantic Medicine". 
In reality, the two-volume Schlegel-Tieck editions,46 the sole 
published works of Novalis during medical romanticism, con-
tained few of his scientific notes. As a representative example, 
the I 8 I 5 edition contained Jleinrich von Ofterdingen in the 
first volume and the rest of his poetry in the first third of the 
second volume. Only sixty pages of the remaining two thirds 
were devoted to "fragments" on "Philosophie und Physik". 
These were arranged in a rather haphazard fashion, thereby often 
giving rise to artificial obscurity. In the memoirs and auto-
biographies of the succeeding romantic generation there is 
equally little evidence to support Bluth's and Diepgen's claim. 
Apart from the above-mentioned reminiscences of Ringseis, 
Carl Gustav Carus makes a brief reference to Navalis, although 
only to his Heinrich von Ofterdingen,47 while Gotthilf Schubert 
does not mention Navalis in his autobiography.48 Of those who 
knew Navalis personally, H. Steffens was a disciple of Schelling, 
while Ritter died very early and his works gradually lost 
importance and popularity. 49 
One is left then with next to no palpable evidence concerning 
Navalis' effect on "Romantic Medicine". The transmission of his 
medical ideas could have of course followed subtler channels, 
inaccessible to positivistic investigations. If one wishes to find 
the root of the romantic movement in medicine, it seems much 
more reasonable, however, to turn to the great speculators of 
medicine, such as Mesmer, Brown, or Erasmus Darwin, to the 
dominating intellectual figures, such as Herder, Goethe, and 
Schelling, or to the holders of chairs of medicine at Jena, Leip-
zig, Halle, and Gottingen. 
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1 A remark by Bourget, as quoted by Irving Babbitt in Rousseau and Romanticism, 
5th Meridian Books ed. (New York, 196o), p. 9· 
2 Thomas Mann, Gesammelte Werke (Frankfurt a.M., 196o), XI, 85 r. 
3 Navalis, the pen name adopted by Friedrich von Hardenberg, was used by his 
family as early as the thirteenth century, and was supposed to be stressed on the 
first syllable. To insist, as Heinz Ritter [Der unbekannte Nova/is (Gottingen, 
1967), p. 10] does, that the pen name be used only in connection with Harden-
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4 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke, X/1 (Berlin, 1835), 205; H. Heine, ,Die romantische 
Schule", bk. II, pt. IV, in Siimtliche Werke (Leipzig, 1887), III, 186; Thomas 
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In Nova/is und die franzosischen Symbo!isten (Stuttgart, 1963) W. Vordtriede 
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fails to take notice of important translations in the Nouvelle Revue Germanique 
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Navalis and Nerval. 
• Nova/is. Schriften, ed. P. Kluckhohn and R. Samuel, III (Stuttgart, 1968), )78. 
All subsequent references will be made in the body of the text to the first three 
volumes of this edition still in progress (Stuttgart: I, 1960 and II, 1965), and the 
fourth volume of the first critical edition (Leipzig, 1929). References in the text 
will also be made to "Nachlese" =Friedrich von Hardenberg (genannt Nova/is). 
Eine Nachlese aus den Que/len des Familienarchivs herausgegeben von einem Mitglied 
der Familie, znd ed. (Gotha, 1883); Sch= F. W. J. Schelling, Werke, ed. Manfred 
Schroter (Miinchen, 1927). 
• The following works are indicative of the renewed interest in Hardenberg's 
science: Kate Hamburger, "Navalis und die Mathematik" in Romantik-For-
schungen (Halle, 1929), reprinted in Hamburger's Philosophic der Dichter 
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(Stuttgart, 1966); Martin Dyck, Nova/is and Mathematics (Chapel Hill, r96o); 
Theodor Haering, Navalis als Philosoph (Stuttgart, 1954). 
' Heinz Ritter (pp. 3 54 f.) writes that this picture disappeared. However, it survived 
in the archives of the East German town of Hettstedt, where, after some difficul-
ties, I was permitted to see it in the summer of r 966. Recently it was transferred 
to the Municipal Museum in Weissenfels. 
8 Carlyle, II, I 5. 
9 "[Die Beriihrung gewisser Fragmente mit Formulierungen anderer Denker] 
beweisen doch aile nur, wie Navalis Verwandtes aufnahm, wo er es fand; daB 
aber kein einziger dieser Einfhisse wirklich auch nur als 'Anreger' Novalisscher 
Gedanken bezeichnet werden darf" (Haering, p. 6o6). 
10 Seen from another angle, this attitude does imply that the nature of the object 
itself is of secondary importance. This is what led Schelling to the famous 
remark: "Ich kann diese Frivolitat gegen die Gegenstande nicht gut ertragen, an 
allen herum zu riechen, ohne Einen zu durchdringen" [G. L. Plitt, AusSchellings 
Leben, I (Leipzig, r 869), 43 r f.]. While Schelling's remark does contain an element 
of truth, it is unjust because in theory and in practice Navalis maintained deep 
attachments to things, ideas, or persons he had chosen from the sea of po-
tentials available to him. 
11 Such a contention is more applicable to Navalis' poetry than to his notebooks; it 
forms the basis of Bruce Haywood's hermeneutic interpretation in Nova/is. The 
Veil of Imagery (Cambridge, Mass., 1959). 
12 Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, II (Paderborn, 1967), 197. 
13 This has been noted already by Anni Carlsson in Die Fragmente des Nova/is (Basel, 
1939), pp. 6 ff. 
14 "Navalis and Plotin. Untersuchungen zu einer neuen Edition und Inter-
pretation des 'Allgemeinen Brouillon'," Jahrbuch des freien deutschen J1ochstifts 
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name only. 
15 W. Dilthey, Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung. 13th ed. (Gottingen, 1957), p. 324· 
The article appeared first in r 865 in the Preuj!ische Jahrbiicher. 
" Friedrich von Hardenbergs (Nova/is) Beziehungen zur Naturwissenschaft seiner Zeit 
(Leipzig, 1905). 
17 "Das Ergebnis der Untersuchung von Hardenbergs Beziehungen zur Natur-
wissenschaft seiner Zeit ist daher einerseits ein negatives. Es hat sich ergeben, 
daB er nicht soweit in die Erkenntnis der empirischen Tatsachen der Natur-
wissenschaften eindrang, urn ihre Probleme selbstandig erfassen und etwa 
weiter bilden zu konnen. Er war daher auch nicht imstande, eine philosophische 
Behandlung der Ergebnisse und Fragen der naturwissenschaftlichen Forschung 
seiner Zeit zu unternehmen. Wissenschaftliche Bedeutung haben darum weder 
seine naturwissenschaftlichen noch die naturphilosophischen Fragmente" 
(Olshausen, p. 75). 
18 The most important of these are K. Th. Bluth, Medizingeschichtliches bei Navalis 
(Berlin, 1934) and Lydia Elisabeth Wagner, The Scientific Interest of Friedrich von 
Hardenberg (Navalis )(Ann Arbor, r 9 3 7 ). 
19 R. Unger, Herder, Nova/is und Kleist. Studien iiber die Entwicklung des Todesproblems 
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Nova/is, Holder/in, Rilke (Dusseldorf, I95o). 
20 A list of secondary literature relating to Navalis and Romantic Medicine is 
included in my bibliography. Among the titles listed, Hirschfeld gives a 
thorough although unsympathetic summary ofRomantic Medicine and a detailed 
bibliography; Leibbrand is appreciative but often inaccurate and mushy; the 
essays by Fischer, Diepgen, and Schipperges, as well as the dissertations of 
Bluth (from which Diepgen draws) and Heller (mainly on Navalis' contact with 
physicians), are now inadequate in the light of the additional material available. 
21 Paul Diepgen, Geschichte der Medizin, II/r (Be~lin, 195 I), 27. 
22 T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962), pp. 2 f. 
23 Ch. C. Gillispie, The Edge of Objectivity (Princeton, 196o), p. 199. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER I 
ASPECTS OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SCIENCE 
1 This essay fragment, entitled De Arte Medica, is dated r669 and printed in 
H. R. Fox Bourne's The Life of John Locke (New York, 1876), I, 222-27. 
According to K. Dewhurst [John Locke (London, 1963), p. 38], Locke merely 
recorded the dictation as secretary of Dr. Sydenham. 
2 On the relation between Locke's medical training and his mature philosophy 
seeP. Romanell,Journal of the History of Ideas, XXV (I964), 107-I6, and Bulletin 
of the History of Medicine, XXXII (1958), 293-321. 
• "The Great Instauration" in The New Organon and Related Writings, ed. Fulton 
H. Anderson (New York, r96o), p. 12. 
• Bacon, p. r r. 
• G. W. v. Leibniz, Selections, ed. Philip Wiener (New York, 1951), p. 370. 
• Leibniz, p. 5 34· 
' Leibniz's objections against Stahl's theory that the anima of the body might 
change both the momentum and the direction of its motion are printed in 
Clio Medica, III (1968), 21-40. 
• "A Dissertation on the Sensible and Irritable Parts of Animals", reprinted in 
Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine, IV (1936), 658 f. 
9 Lehrsiitze aus der Physiologic des Menschen (Wien, 1797). 
1° Cf. Navalis' definition: "Vernunft und Individuum in harmonischer Thatigkeit 
- ist Lebenskraft. Theorie der Lebenskraft" (II, 2 59). The last short sentence, 
meaning something like "I must think about the meaning and the function of 
'Lebenskraft"', shows that in the early studies of Fichte, where the note occurs, 
Navalis was already groping for an organic view of nature. 
11 Gottingisches Magazin der Wissenschaften und Literatur, I/2 (q8o), 249. 
12 , • • • daB schlechterdings Zeugung, Ernahrung und Wiederersetzung im 
Grunde blosse Modificationen einer und eben derselben Kraft sind, die im 
ersten Fall baut, im andern unterhalt, im dritten reparirt" (Blumenbach, p. 2)2). 
18 "Bei jedem lebendigen Geschopf scheint der Cirkel organischer Krafte ganz und 
vollkommen; nur, er ist bei jed em anders modificirt und vertheilet. Bei diesem 
liegt er noch der Vegetation nahe und ist daher fiir die Fortpflanzung und 
Wiedererstattung seiner selbst so machtig; bei andem nehmen diese Krafte ab, je 
mehr sie in kiinstlichere Glieder, feinere Werkzeuge und Sinnen vertheilt 
werden .... Ueber den machtigen Kraften der Vegetation fangen die lebendigen 
Muskelreize zu wirken an ... Je mehr die Muskelkrafte in das Gebiet der Nerven 
treten, desto mehr werden auch sie in dieser Organisation gefangen und zu 
Zwecken der Empftndung iiberwaltigt. Je mehr und feinere Nerven ein Thier 
hat, je mehr diese einander vielfach begegnen, kiinstlich verstarken und zu 
edlen Theilen und Sinnen verwandt werden, je groBer und feiner endlich der 
Sammelplatz aller Empfindungen, das Gehirn ist: desto verstandiger und 
feiner witd die Gattung dieser Organisationen." [Herders Siimmtliche Werke, ed. 
Bernhard Suphan, XIII (Berlin, 1887), 91-92.] 
14 Thelist(see IV, 471-75) contains also four other books by Herder. 
15 Ueber die Verhiiltnijfe der organischen Kriifte unter einander in der Reihe der verschiedenen 
Organisationen, die Geseze und Folgen dieser Verhiiltnijfe (Stuttgart, 1793). The 
essay is reprinted in Sudhoffs Archiv, XXIII (1930), 247-67. Two consecutive 
remarks in Navalis' notebooks are in direct reference to Kielmeyer's ideas: 
"Kielmeyers Idee vom Ubergang einer Kraft in die Andre -(von ihrer Succes-
siven und Simultanen Existenz.) (Synth[esis] d[er] Antike und Moderne)" 
"Reproduktionskraft ist organische Elasticitaet" (III, 432). 
16 The five forces in Kielmeyer's definition: "r. Sensibilitat oder die Fahigkeit mit 
Eindriiken, die auf die Nerven oder sonst gemacht werden, gleichzeitig Vor-
stellungen zu erhalten, 2. lrritabilitat oder die Fahigkeit mancher Organe, 
vorziiglich der Muskeln, auf Reize sich zusammenzuziehen, und Bewegungen 
hervorzubringen, 3· Reproductionskraft, oder die Fahigkeit der Organisationen, 
sich selbst ahnliche Wesen Theilweise oder im Ganzen nach- und anzubilden, 
4· Sekretionskraft oder die Fiihigkeit a us der Saftmasse dieser selbst unahnliche 
Materien von bestimmter Beschaffenheit wiederholt an bestimmten Orten abzu-
sondem, 5. Propulsionskraft oder die Fiihigkeit, die Fliissigkeiten in den vesten 
Theilen in bestimmter Ordnung zu bewegen und zu vertheilen" (Kielmeyer in 
Sudhoff, p. zp). 
17 Information about Cullen may be found in his biography by John Thomson, 
William Thomson, David Craigie, An Account of the Life, Lectures, and Writings of 
William Cullen (Edinburgh, 1859), and A. Kent, ed., An Eighteenth Century 
Lectureship in Chemistry (Glasgow, 1950). 
18 Brown is briefly mentioned in the Introduction of Ford Madox Ford's(Hueffer's) 
biography of his maternal grandfather, who was Dr. John Brown's grandson. 
See, Ford Madox Brown (London, 1896). 
19 London, 1780. References will be made to The Works of Dr. John Brown, ed. 
William Cullen Brown (London, 1804), which uses the author's own English 
translation of the Elementa and contains a biography by his son, the editor. 
There exists another English translation of the Elementa by Thomas Beddoes 
(London, 1795) which contains another biography of Brown, written by 
Beddoes, the father of the poet Thomas Beddoes. 
20 Brown, II, 12 5. 
21 Brown, II, 12 5. Direct references to Newton are found in several passages of 
Brown's works. 
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22 Brown, II, 134. 
23 Brown, II, 138. By not probing into the meaning of "excitability" Brown 
thought to follow the example of Newton, who had left the ultimate nature of 
gravitation undefined. Whether, as Schelling and the more philosophically 
minded physicians believed, the concept ought to receive a philosophical a 
priori grounding became a major issue in Germany. Brown ignored Haller's 
distinction between irritability and sensibility. 
•• Brown, II, 13 5. Coleridge, who knew about Brown from his Manchester friend 
Beddoes, remarked in his notebook: "Strange Assertions, that we receive a given 
quantity of Incitability at our birth-yet that this is given out only in small 
quantities- and these small quantities can not be used suddenly without death-
as in the case of those who die of fright or joy- however large the reservoir may 
be. As a Merchant who has a sudden run on him, stops, altho' his capital may 
exceed the Sum threefold-yet if all his ready Cash is exhausted, he must stop." 
[The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. K. Coburn (New York, 1957), I, 
entry 388.] 
25 Brown, III, 41. 
26 Cf. Navalis: "Nach dem Brownischen System miissen die Abfiihrenden Mittel 
schwachend und starkend zugleich seyn-wenn schwachen- Vermehrung der 
Erregbark[ eit ]- und Stark en- V ermindern der Erregbarkeit bedeutet- und 
nach Brown kann es nichts anders bedeuten. Mir scheint bey vielen abflihrenden 
Mitteln die Starkung, oder Erregung, betrachtlicher, als die Verminderung zu 
seyn" (II, 595). 
27 Brown, II, 230. 
28 Brown, II, 188. 
29 Coleridge, Notebooks, entry 3 89. 
30 Journal de Physique, XXXVI (1790), 139ff. and 422ff. The article was translated 
and published by Thomas Beddoes in Observations on the Nature and Cure of 
Calculus ... (London, 1793). 
31 Girtanner (q6o-r8oo) studied medicine in Gi:ittingen and later made a brief 
visit to Edinburgh where he learned about Brown's ideas. He returned to 
Gottingen in 1787 and starting in 1791 he published many volumes of news 
about the French Revolution (Historische Nachrichten und politische Betrachtungen 
uber die franzosische Revolution). In the MS of the "Vermischte Bemerkungen", 
the early version of Bluthenstaub, there exist a crossed-out reference to Gir-
tanner (II, 746) among remarks on the revolution, which suggests that Novalis 
was acquainted with this work. It seems likely that he did not know the 
article in the Journal de Physiq:te since this was published earlier. There can be no 
doubt, however, that the article in question was widely known. Several 
scientific journals debated the issue, and in 1793 there appeared a book which 
was stimulated by it: J. U. G. Schaeffer, Vber Sensibilitiit als Lebensprincip (Frank-
furt). 
3 ' C. Girtanner, Ausfuhrliche Darste!!ung des Brownischen Systemes der praktischen 
Heilkunde, II (Gottingen, 1798), 6z4. 
33 "Die Schlul3art, auf welche Brown sein ganzes System grlindet, ist die durch 
Analogie und Induktion" (Girtanner, II, 6II). 
34 Coleridge, Notebooks, entry 389. 
35 A. Roschlaub, Untersuchungen fiber Pathogenic, 2nd. ed. (Frankfurt, r8oo-r8o3), 
par. 444· Further references will be made to the pars. in this edition to facilitate 
comparisons with the first edition (Frankfurt, 1798-r8oo), the edition that 
Novalis read. 
•• Frankfurt, 1795. 
37 Medizinisches-pracktisches Handbuch auf Brownische Grundsiitze und Erfahrung 
gegriindet(Heilbronn, 1 796), and Magazin der verbesserten theoretischen und praktischen 
Arzneikunst (Heilbronn, I 796-97). 
'' Kerner's Werke, ed. Raimund Pissin (Berlin, 19I4), I, II4 f. Kerner himself 
became a leading figure in "Romantic Medicine" by adopting Mesmerism. That 
the practice of Brownian medicine often boiled down to the decision whether 
the disease at hand was sthenic or asthenic was ridiculed also in a farce by 
Kotzebue, entitled Das neue Jahrhundert, in which a "Dr. Reiz" and a" Dr. Po-
tenz" are led to long disputations about a fake disease. As a reply, Roschlaub's 
magazine published a story about a hypochondriac cured with Brown's methods, 
making it obvious that the patient was Kotzebue. The latter then closed the 
feud by retracting. 
39 Marcus (1753-I8r6) was a patron of the theater at Bamberg and became a friend 
of E. T. A. Hoffmann during the latter's stay in the city. 
•• Further material on this issue may be found in G. L. Plitt's Aus Schellings Leben 
and R. Haym's Die Romantische Schule, photogr. reprod. of the 1870 ed. (Darm-
stadt, 1961), pp. 736 f. 
41 Propyliien Ausgabe (Munchcn and Berlin, 1909-32), XXXVIII, 244. 
42 Propyliien Ausgabe, XIV, 146. However, Goethe had also favorable comments 
on Brown; see letter to Schiller, March 19, 1802. 
43 "Es scheint besonders der Gedanke manchem Anhanger dieses Systems vie! 
Vergniigen zu machen, eine Revolution in der Medizin zu bewirken. Diesen 
Herren habe ich nichts weiter zu sagen, als diell: Im Reiche der Wahrheit sind 
nicht Revolutionen sondern Evolutionen der passende Weg zur Verbesserung" 
[journal, IV (1797), 136]. 
44 ,Die ganze Medizin mull aus Erfahrung ausgehen und wieder auf Erfahrung, 
als Zweck, bezogen werden, der wahre Stoff, das Constituirende der Medizin, 
kann nichts als Erfahrung seyn, die Theorie client ihr bios als Regulatif, mull 
aber immer bereit seyn, sich umzuandern und der Erfahrung anzuschmiegen, 
sobald sich diese andert'' (journal, IV, 143). 
45 "Freyheit des Geistes ist von jeher die Wiege der Wahrheit, Sectengeist und 
Geistesdespotie ihr Grab gewesen .... Der gliicklichste Zustand fur die Wissen-
schaft ist unstreitig der, wenn gar kein Nahme, keine Auctoritat herrschen, 
sondern eine allgemeine Freyheit, die Dinge zu nehmen und zu erklaren, wie 
man will, vorausgesezt, dall man die Gesetze der gesunden Vernunft und die 
Erfahrung respectirt" (journal, IV, I 30 f.). 
•• See reference to an article by Girtanner which appeared in Hufeland's journal: 
III, 3 9 and 841. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER II 
SOURCES AND IMPULSES 
' R. Samuel, "Karl von Hardenbergs Biographie seines Bruders Navalis," 
Euphorion, LII (1958), 178. The account of Novalis' early life in Tieck's 
well-known biography (IV, 449-58) is a touched up version of this text. How-
ever, Tieck's "smoothing" of Karl's style is often misleading. He adds, for 
instance: "er war triiumerisch still und verriet nur wenig [Karl: "keinen aul3er-
ordentlichen"] Geist, er entfernte sich von andern Knaben ... " Clearly, by 
adding these cliches Tieck wished to indicate Hardenberg's early poetic 
inclinations. 
' "Es ist auffallend, da/3 auch die 'Bekenntnisse einer schonen Seele' mit der 
Erziihlung einer ganz iihnlichen Verwandlung beginnen ... und es scheint diese 
Fiihigkeit, in friihestem Alter mit korperlichen Krankheitsprozessen seelische 
Vertiefungen sowie positive Entwicklungsbeschleunigungen zu erleben, 
sehr viele echte Mystiker auszuzeichnen. Es ist eine sehr friihe entscheidende 
Katharsis, die die Physis stark veriindert und verfeinert und die Seele zum 
erstenmal auf sich aufmerken liil3t" [K. J. Obenauer, HolderlinfNovalis (Jena, 
1925), p. 147.] 
3 There is a remote possibility that Navalis attended in Leipzig the lectures of 
Ernst Platner (1744-r8r8) who was professor of physiology with a bent for 
philosophy. According to notes in the "Brouillon", Navalis intended to use for 
his encyclopedic project the two best known works of Platner: Neue Anthropo-
logie fur Aerzte und Weltweise (Leipzig, 1790) and Philosophische Aphorismen(Leip-
zig, 1776-82); cf. III, 333 and 356. Indeed, Professor Miihl found that the last 
work led Navalis to a number of other books which were listed in Platner's 
bibliography, among them the important history of philosophy by Tiedemann 
(Miihl, pp. 147 and 151 f.; on Tiedemann, see below). 
• IV, 47 f. Erasmus' hypochondria was the subject also of other letters by Navalis. 
See letters from March 1794 and January 20, 1797· 
5 "Fichtens prod[uctive] Einb[ildungs]Kr[aft] ist nichts, als durch Vernunft-
durch Idee und Glauben und Willen erregter Sinn" (III, 435). See also III, 252., 
408, and 412. Characteristically, Navalis describes the Fichtean concept with 
very personal terms: "Idee", "Glauben", and "Wille". 
• That Novalis should consider Schiller's works as harmful strikes one as ironic, 
since it was Schiller who counseled against an indulgence in the imagination to 
the young Harden berg. Incidentally, Schiller gave the same advice to Holderlin, 
the only other poet in Hardenberg's generation who felt a strong need to 
restrain his imagination. 
' The letter appeared in Hufeland's Journal (April 1798) and forms today the last 
section of Streit der Facultiiten (Konigsberg, 1798). Navalis' notebooks 
contain several additional critical remarks concerning this work of Kant (see 
Miihl, pp. 219 f.) 
• II, 378. See also II, 5 52 and 589. An interesting analogy and contrast to these 
remarks is contained in an aphorism of G. Ch. Lichtenberg: "Mein Korper ist 
derjenigc Theil der Welt, den meine Gedancken veriindern konnen. Sogar 
eingebildete Kranckheiten k6nnen wiirckliche werden. In der iibrigen Welt 
konnen meine Hypothesen die Ordnung der Dinge nicht stohren" [Georg 
Christoph Lichtenberg, Aphorismen, ed. A. Leitzmann, IV (Berlin, I9o8), 
20I]. Lichtenberg believed in a limited power of hypochondria: he held 
that concrete physical maladies might be created by a hypochondria! disposition, 
but he did not believe that such spiritual powers can alter the world beyond the 
body. What interested Navalis in hypochondria was precisely the mode in 
which the subjective impression might be modified, and spiritual powers of an 
individual might assert themselves in the world at large. Hence his conviction: 
"Die Welt hat eine urspriingliche Fahigkeit durch mich belebt zu werden ... " 
(II, 5 54). 
• It is a recurring difficulty in the understanding of Hardenberg that he denotes 
with one and the same word a concept of the existing world and its future 
transformed or elevated version. These two meanings are often fused 
into an ambiguous statement. In the "Brouillon", for instance, one finds the 
following remark: "PHYS[IOLOGIE]. Hypochondrie ist pathologisirende 
Fantasie-mit Glauben an die Realit[aet] ihrer Produktionen-Fantasmen ver-
bunden" (III, 359). It would seem that this definition refers to the "untrans-
formed" and negative kind ofhypochondria, since Navalis rejected "pathological 
fantasy" in his letter to Erasmus and elsewhere. However, his definition of the 
creative genius is almost identical with hypochondria: "So ist also das Genie, 
das Vermogen von eingebildeten Gegenstanden, wie von Wircklichen zu 
handeln, und sie auch, wie diese, zu behandeln" (II, 420). 
10 IV, I77. This passage clearly shows that Navalis did not naively expect 
instantaneous results from the sciences as Leta Jane Lewis contends in her 
article "Navalis and the Fichtean Absolute" [German Quarterly, XXXV (I962.), 
464-74]. Apart from the fact that at the time of Sophie's illness Navalis had 
no clear notion yet of "magic" and "produktive Einbildungskraft", this kind of 
argument establishes a misleading equation between experience and thought, 
because it suggests that Navalis adopted philosophical tenets for immediate 
practical use. As he himself remarked once, philosophy doesn't tell us how to 
bake bread. 
11 IV, I92.· See also the letter to Schlegel from April I 3, 1797· 
12 IV, 377· It is not clear to which work of Schelling Navalis refers here. 
18 IV, 379-98. The references are to: Vom lch als Princip der Phi!osophie oder tiber 
das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen (Tiibingen, 1795), "Philosophische Briefe 
tiber Dogmatismus und Kriticismus", Philosophisches Journal (1795), and Ideen 
zu einer Philosophie der Natur (Leipzig, I 797). 
14 On June 14, 1797 Novalis wrote to Schlegel: "Fichte ist der gefahrlichste unter 
allen Denkern, die ich kem1e. Er zaubert einen in seinem Kreise fest" (IV, 208). 
15 The literature on the relationship between Schelling and Navalis is extensive 
and very contradictory. Olshausen found Schelling's influence negligible 
because ofHardenberg' s "mystic predisposition" (pp. r 6 f.). Thereby he missed the 
link through Spinoza. Pixberg's positive conclusions rest on shaky foundations, 
for which they were criticized by Haering (pp. 6o5 f.) and Mahl. Bluth, Diepgen, 
and Leibbrand erroneously assume that Novalis exerted a decisive influence on 
Schelling during his stay in Leipzig (1791-93). 
16 This was pointed out already by Professor Mahl (pp. 192 f.). Neither Professor 
Mahl nor Professor Samuel in his commentary emphasize sufficiently that in 
the Philosophische Briefe "intellektuale Anschauung" is not, properly speaking, 
part of Schelling's own philosophy, but rather a term with which he wishes to 
characterize Spinoza. Since the extent to which Schelling adopted Spinoza's 
view is not clear, the association is not so much between Novalis and Schelling 
as between Novalis and Spinoza. 
17 Tieck shows naivite when he mentions Hardenberg's study of Fichte and Spino-
za in one breath: ,In der Philosophic hatte er vorziiglich Spinoza und Fichte 
studiert; aber er suchte nachher eine eigne Bahn, die Philosophic mit der 
Religion zu vereinigen, und so wurden ihm, was wir von den Neuplatonikern 
besitzen, sowie die Schriften der Mystiker sehr wichtig" (IV, 457). One has to 
take exception to this statement on at least three accounts: I. Novalis' study of 
Spinoza was by no means as extensive as his study of Fichte, and it is unlikely 
that he read the former in the original; 2. in spite of this, even before reading 
Schelling, Novalis found in Spinoza's philosophy a counterpart to Fichte's 
Wissenschajtslehre; 3. since he was attracted to the mystic and neo-Platonic strain 
in Spinoza's philosophy (he associated him with Zinzendorfl), this continued 
to be important to him even when he tried to find his own way. 
18 J. Fichte, AusgeJviihlte Werke, ed. F. Medicus (Darmstadt, 1962), I, 292. 
19 Sch, I, 696. The word "Weltseele" in this passage raises some questions 
about Navalis' use of it. Earlier it was assumed that he adopted the term from 
Schelling's work of the same title. Since Schelling's Weltseele did not appear 
until the spring of 1798 and since according to the newest dating Navalis had 
already used the term earlier, the editors of the new critical edition assumed that 
the concept caught Hardenberg's attention in Baader's Beytriige zur Elementar-
phisiologie which he had probably read as early as 1797 (cf. II, 513). Yet in 
Baader's work the word appears only in a rather innocuous footnote, while it is a 
central one in Schelling's ldeen, even if mentioned only once. 
•• S. Th. Sommering, Uber das Organ der Seele, nebst einem Schreiben von I. Kant 
(Konigsberg, 1796). Eschenmayer's book was published in Tiibingen, 1797· 
01 I. Kant, Werke, IV (Berlin, 1903), 468. Kant also uses "rein" for "eigentlich" 
and "angewandt" for "uneigentlich". 
22 Kant, IV, 470. 
•• "Die Rationalitat der Plincipien ware es demnach, welche die Kunst zur Wissen-
schaft erhobe; Sieht man die Richtigkeit hievon ein, und vergleicht den gegen-
wartigen Zustand der Wissenschaften damit, so wird man gestehen miissen, daB 
wir biB jezt weder in der Chemie noch in der Medicin ein System aufzuweisen 
haben, nirgends sind Principien, von welchen cine Deduction aus natur-
metaphysischen Sazen versucht worden ware, welches doch zum Behuf cines 
Systems gefordert wird. 
Alles was wir haben, sind empirische Principien, aus der Erfahrung riickwarts 
gefolgert, die aber bloB eine komparative Allgemeinheit zulassen, es sind 
Hypothesen, in denen allemal eine Voraussezung angenommen wird, welche, ob 
Ip. 
sie gleich wahr seyn kann, dennoch eines weitem Beweises bedarf. .. "(Eschen-
mayer, pp. VIII-IX). 
•• "Die Dynamik belehrt uns, daB sich die Existenz der Materie bios unter der 
Annahme der Konkurrenz zweier urspriinglichen Krafte denken lasse- diese 
Kriifte sind die Attractions- und Repulsionskraft" (Eschenmayer, p. z). , ... die 
Materie erfiillt nicht durch ihre bloBe Existenz, sondem durch Kriifte einen 
Raum. Da nun die empirische Erfiillung des Raums unserer Anschauung 
unendlich verschieden gegeben ist, das Mannigfaltige einer Kraft aber bios in 
Graden bestehen kann, so hat man diese Verschiedenheiten auch als Grade an-
zusehen. Qualitiiten sind daher Grade, und ein Grad Materie ist irgend ein 
GraBen VerhiiltniB, in welchem die Attractions- und Repulsionskraft zu ein-
ander stehen. In diesem Punkte ist es, wo sich die dynamische Naturphilosophie 
von der mechanischen unterscheidet" (Eschenmayer, pp. 5 f.). 
" "Am Ende deducirt sich ein solcher Dualismus aus der Nothwendigkeit des 
urspriinglichen Sezens und Gegensezens, welches Bedingungen sind, unter 
denen selbst die Moglichkeit unseres Bewusstseins steht" (Eschenmayer, p. 4). 
Although the book shows undeniable associations with Fichte's Wissenschafts-
lehre by employing these categories, the traces of Kant's philosophy, which 
are apparent even in the title ("Naturmetaphysik"- "Metaphysische Anfangs-
griinde"), are still more important. 
•• The mechanical and chemical foundations of Eschenmayer' s theory are polem-
ically discussed in the "Brouillon" (III, 246). It has not been noticed by the 
editors of the new critical edition that a note in the "Freiberger Studienhefte" 
(III, 45), which was later included (III, 428) and elaborated upon (III, 341) in the 
"Brouillon", may also be traced to Eschenmayer's book. They all deal with 
Eschenmayer's contention that the degree of a matter and its chemical inter-
actions are determined by the relationship between the attractive and repulsive 
forces. Hence probably also Navalis' important expression, "Grad der Materie ". 
2 7 "DaB seine Principien die Ersten seyn miissen, von welchen fiir die Arznei-
wissenschaft auszugehen ist, und auf welche allein eine nosologische Ordnung 
gegriindet werden kann, diB haben wir oben wenigstens erortert .... So wenig 
sich dieses auch derjenige, der bios Arzt ist, eingestehen mag, so gewiB erkennt 
es der Naturphilosoph, der bios fiir Form und System der Naturwissenschaft 
arbeitet" (Eschenmayer, pp. 90-91). 
• • This led Professor Mahl to the suggestion that instead of reading the medical 
section of Eschenmayer's work Navalis turned to C. H. Pfaff's translation of the 
Elements (Kopenhagen, 1796) and made excerpts from the first part only after 
having read this book. In this way Navalis would have "discovered" Brown 
while reading Eschenmayer. Although Professor Miihl's assumption cannot be 
refuted factually, the repeated reading of Eschenmayer's book seems unlikely, 
and the marginal notes provide no evidence that Navalis actually read Brown's 
work itself. His extensive notes on medicine, physiology, and psychology, the 
use of medical terminology in his philosophy, and the large number of medical 
books in his library, all show that he read about Brown's theory, but nowhere do 
we find quotations or direct references that would conclusively prove that he 
read the Elements itself. As already the first remarks show, Navalis understood 
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and studied Brown within the framework of German medical and philosophical 
discussions; his sources were articles in Hufeland's journal and Bibliothek, in 
Gren' s Journal, or in Kausch's Geist und Kritik, and books by Roschlaub, Marcus, 
Monch and others. 
29 Eschenmayer, p. 30. In Kant's formulation: "Lehrsatz 3· Zweites Gesetz der 
Mechanik. Aile Veranderung der Materie hat eine au!3ere Ursache. (Ein jeder 
Korper beharrt in seinem Zustande der Ruhe oder Bewegung, in derselben 
Richtung und mit derselben Geschwindigkeit, wenn er nicht durch eine 
au!3ere Ursache genothigt wird, diesen Zustand zu verlassen.)" (p. 543). 
3o Fichte, III, r6. 
31 Fichte, III, 17· 
•• Eschenmayer, p. 53· Kant's definition: "Materie ist das Bewegliche im Raume" 
(p. 480). 
33 Haering, p. 5 I 5. 
34 Olshausen has his dates wrong (he did not know of the Eschenmayer excerpts) 
and he wrongly believes that Navalis had read Brown's work; he is never-
theless right in remarking that Navalis' acquaintance with Brown's theory 
coincides with his reading of Hemsterhuis' works. There is no evidence, 
however, that the ideas of Brown and Hemsterhuis were combined by him as 
Olshausen claims (p. 15). As the Eschenmayer excerpts show, Navalis 
immediately rejected the philosophical tenets of Brown, while Hemsterhuis left 
a deep and lasting impression on him. 
35 Upon Hemsterhuis' request Diderot wrote extensive commentaries on the 
former's Lettre surl'homme. Although Diderot was at times highly critical of the 
work, he concluded by saying: "II y a des idees tres belles, tres neuves et tres 
fines" [Lettre sur l'homme et ses rapports, ed. Georges May (New Haven, 1964), 
p. 5 13]. Compared to Diderot's analytical notes Navalis' excerpts and commen-
taries show more enthusiasm, but they appear less critical and at times even 
naive. 
36 Cf. Simon ou des jacultes de I' ame in Oeuvres Philosophiques (Paris, 1792), II, 233. 
37 "Ich habe jetzt seine altere Abhandlung vom Warmestoff gelesen-Av. Sf. 
welcher Geist? Ich denke an ihn zu schreiben.- Konnte er nicht zum ,Athe-
naum" eingeladen werden? Vereinige Dich mit Baadern, Freund-Ihr konnt 
ungeheure Dinge leisten." Letter to Schlegel, November 7, 1798 (IV, 241). 
38 Letter to Schlegel, January 20, 1799 (IV, 261). On the same day he wrote to 
Karoline Schlegel and compared Baader with J. W. Ritter who was not only a 
speculative mind but also an experimentalist: "Ritter ist Ritter, und wir sind 
nur Knappen. Selbst Baader ist nur sein Dichter" (IV, 263). 
39 Baader, Siimtliche Werke(Leipzig, 185o-6o; reprint: Aalen, 1963), III, 216. 
•• Baader, III, 220 f. 
41 "Die Moglichkeit aller Philosophic beruht darauf- daB sich die Intelligenz 
durch Selbstberiihrung eine Selbstgesezma13ige Bewegung- d.i. eine eigne 
Form der Thatigkeit, giebt. (Siehe Baaders Theorie der Gliedrung)" (II, 530). 
See also II, 540, no. 70. 
u II, 582. Cf. Baader: "[Ich wiirde behaupten], class die Materie, insofern sie aus 
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Grundkraften entsteht und in ihnen besteht, allerdings aus Monaden bestehe" 
(III, 234)~in answer to a passage in Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde. 
•• Baader, III, 3 3. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER III 
THE ANTHROPOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY OF MAGIC 
1 My analysis will be based mainly on the following notes in Section VI of the 
new edition; nos. 105, III, II2, II5, II7, rr8, II9, r2o, 125,225,233,235,247, 
248, 249, and 256. A number of other passages from this section and the 
Bliithenstaub collection are also relevant. While these notes do form a unity, 
they remain ambiguous with respect to the proposed free association between 
mind and body. At times Novalis seems to uphold a theory of correspondences, 
while at others he advocates a manipulation or domination of nature. I believe 
that the second version forms the basis of Harden berg's aesthetics, and I would, 
therefore, disagree with Professor Miihl who holds that in Navalis' mature 
philosophy and poetry the "theory of magic" is absent and only the "theory of 
correspondences" is upheld. The vocabulary and the field of attention changes 
(already in the "Brouillon"), but not the basic principle. See Mahl, Die Idee des 
goldenen Zeitalters im Werk des Nova/is (Heidelberg, 1965), pp. 306 and 343· 
2 "Romantic Psychology and the Inner Senses; Coleridge" by Judson S. Lyon 
[PMLA, LXXXI (1966), 246-z6o] discusses this problem in connection with 
Coleridge and some of the other English romantics. 
3 II, 54 7. In II, 58 3, no. 24 7 even the idea of restauration of lost members is 
mentioned. In Hemsterhuis' Simon Socrates tells a Promethean myth about the 
lost senses of man which could be regenerated once the tyranny of reason is over. 
• Recent research on this topic may be found in: Psychopathology; A Source Book, 
ed. Charles F. Reed, Irving E. Alexander, Sylvan S. Tomkins (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1963), especially "Schizophrenia; A New Approach. II. Result of a 
Year's Research," pp. 640-659; also; Hallucinations, ed. Louis Jolyon West 
(New York, 1962). On the effects of sensory deprivation see J. A. Vernon, 
Inside the Black Room (New York, 1964). 
• See Heinz Ritter, Nova/is' Hymnen an die Nacht (Heidelberg, 1930). 
• I. Strohschneider-Kohrs, Die romantische Ironie in Theorie und Gesta!tung (Tiibin-
gen, r96o), pp. roo f. It is somewhat surprising that after having established the 
mystic unity of Hardenberg's thought Professor Strohschneider-Kohrs gives a 
detailed analysis of a little prose piece by Harden berg~ only to show its all-
pervading irony. 
' Strohschneider-Kohrs, p. ro9. The phrase "indifferente Einheit von Welt und 
Ich" was coined by Hugo Kuhn in "Poetische Synthesis," Zeitschrift fur philo-
sophische Forschung, V (1950), r6r-r78 and 358-384. 
8 II, 55 r f. In the "Brouillon"; "Wir verstehn natiirlich alles Fremde nur durch 
Selbstfremdmachung ~ S elbstveriinderung ~ Selbstbeobachtung" (III, 429). 
• This idea appears in Hemsterhuis' Sur !es desirs and, in slightly different form, in 
Baader's Beitriige (III, 2 17). 
Ijj 
10 "Mein Korper wiirde mir nicht specifisch vom Ganzen verschieden-sondern 
nur als eine Variation desselben vorkommen. Meine Erkenntnil3 des Ganze[n] 
wiirde also den Character der Analogie haben-diese wiirde sich aber auf das 
innigste und unmittelbarste auf die directe und absolute Erkenntnil3 des Gliedes 
beziehn" (II, 551). Cf. also II, 65o, no. 485. The analogy between micro-
cosm and macrocosm is a central idea in the works of Paracelsus; his name 
occurs in Hardenberg's notebooks, but probably only in connection with the 
reading of Tiedemann's Geist der spekulativen Philosophie. 
11 II, 589. In the "Brouillon": "Denken ist Wollen oder Wollen-Denken" 
(III, 464). "Das achte Denken erscheint, wie ein Machen-und ist auch solches" 
(III, 404). 
12 In these early notes there is little difference between Schelling's and Navalis' 
use of the "Weltseele". Navalis saw in it an idea of the whole which permeates 
every particle and secures the necessary harmony (II, 55 I). The self was a 
"Weltglied", whereby Navalis defined the meaning of "Glied" as " ... eine 
Variation des Ganzen-es besteht aus denselben Elementen-die nur auf eine 
verschiedne und d[urch] d[ie] Gesetze des Ganzen bestimmte Weise in densel-
ben geordnet sind" (II, 5 52). 
13 B. Croce, Aesthetic, trans!. D. Ainslie, 2nd ed., (London, I922), p. 277. Mentions 
of the "lex continui" and "lex parsimoniae" (II, 670 and III, 4I9) might be 
references to Kant's Introduction in Critique of Judgement. 
14 W. H. Wackenroder, Werke und Briefe (Heidelberg, I967), p. I 3· 
15 Poetical Works of Wordsworth, ed. T. Hutchinson (London, I96o), pp. 735 and 
738. 
16 These differences may be traced to Hardenberg's Kantian and Fichtean schooling 
and to his greater concern for science. The quoted note continues by saying 
that the non-artist is yet incapable of producing ideas without external solicita-
tion for he seems to suffer under the yoke of mechanics, namely "that all changes 
presuppose an external cause". The last phrase, adopted almost word for word 
from Eschenmayer, shows how inseparable Hardenberg's thoughts on science 
and poetry are. 
" II, 5 75. Navalis originally compared poetry with painting, and only later 
substituted music for poetry. 
18 A similar analogy is made between external and indirect stimuli in Roschlaub's 
Untersuchungen. See ch. V below. Since the first volume of Roschlaub's book 
appeared in I 798 and the note in question was written in May of that year, it may 
be related to the reading of this book, See notes on II, pp. 56 I, 594, 598 and 
III, 352. 
19 Cf. Die Lehrlinge(I, 104) and Baader, III, 226. 
•• "Eben darum geht auch alle Umbildung und Assimilation, alle Zeugung und 
Zerstorung, durch die Mittelstufe des Fliissigen.-Letzteres ist gleichsam der 
zartere Schleier am Gewande der Mutter Isis ... " (Baader, III, 226). 
21 III, 327. It is curious to observe that the English adjectival compounds (e.g., 
"indirectly asthenic") acquire a certain substantiality by being turned into 
nouns (e.g., "indirecte Sthenie"). 
•• "Das Schwachungs und AbtodtungsSystem der strengen Moralisten und 
strengen Asceten ist nichts, als das bekannte, bisherige Heilungssystem in der 
Medicin. Ihm entgegen muB man ein Brownisches Starkungssystem setzen, 
wie dem leztern" (II, 6o2). 
•• II, 573· Whether Novalis means that drama is a mixture of two sthenic or of 
sthenic and asthenic symptoms is not quite clear. In the "Brouillon": "Alle 
Leidenschaften endigen sich, wie ein Trauerspie!. Alles Einseitige endigt sich 
mitTod ... "(lll, 3o6). 
•• II, 563. Novalis cites the example of Hamlet, who is asthenic at the outset 
(passive and introverted) but asserts himself at the end of the drama. No doubt, 
his scheme would also fit the epitome of romantic "Trauerspiel", 
Tristan und Isolde, where the subject is "Selbstauflosung des Triebes" (II, 562). 
It starts with an excess of excitement and ends with a passive, asthenic dissolution 
of form and life. 
•• II, 6I6. For a further example see II, 649, no. 479· 
•• Mahl, p. I42. 
17 F. Schlegel, II, I 5 5 • 
•• The letter to Schlegel from December 26, I 797 which also mentions Brown and 
medicine communicates about a "Traktat vom Lichte" for which Novalis had 
some material available. Professor Samuel suggests that the fragments from 
Teplitz might be related to this project (see II, 5I7), while H. Ritter in his 
Der unbekannte Nova/is has recently claimed that the "Traktat" found expression 
in the hymns. The common medical background of the fragments and the 
hymns shows that probably both of them are right. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 
IDEAS FOR AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
1 I shall not deal with these notebooks separately, but will include them in my 
discussion of the "Brouillon". 
1 One should keep in mind the grandiose ambitions of the "Brouillon" and that 
Novalis later criticized the prosaic nature of Goethe's Wilhelm Meister. 
3 About the "Brouillon" and the French encyclopedia see III, 300 and Mahl, 
pp. 2IO f. 
• "Jedes Stiick meines Buchs, das in auBerst verschiedner Manier geschrieben 
seyn kann-In Fragmenten-Briefen- Gedichten -wiss[enschaftlich] strengen 
Aufsatzen etc.-Einem oder einigen meiner Freunde dedicirt" (III, 4 5o). 
5 The disagreement with Schlegel's famous Athenaeum fragment no. n6 
(Schlegel, II, I82 f.) may be indicated by saying that Schlegel hoped to give a 
modern definition to literature, while Novalis was more directly concerned with 
the artistic reconstitution of life itself. About Novalis' criticism of the Athena-
eum fragment see: II, 623. 
8 Leipzig, I774· An English translation of this book is now available: On the 
External Characters of Minerals, trans!. Albert V. Carozzi (Urbana, I962). 
7 "Im Classificiren und definiren etc. will ich mich an Wemers System und an den 
Wissenschaften iiben" (III, 363). See also III, 367 (no. 58o), and 394 (no. 67o). 
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8 III, 358. Also: "Werners Beschr[eibungen] sind zu individuell-zu sehr auf die 
individuelle Stufe, die er vor sich hatte, gerichtet" (III, 375). 
• ,Die Basis aller Wissenschaften und Kiinste muB cine W[issenschaft] und 
Kunst seyn-die man der Algeber vergleichen kann" (III, 257); ,Die hochste 
Elementarwissenschaft ist diejenige, die schlechterdings kein bestimmtes 
Obj[ect]-sondern ein reines N. behandelt" (III, 257). 
10 Johann Heinrich Lambert, Neues Organon (Leipzig, 1764). Photomechanically 
reproduced as vols. I-II in Lambert's Philosophische Schriften (Hildesheim, 1965). 
11 From the Introduction to the Neues Organon by Hans-Werner Arndt: Philo-
sophische S chriften, I, x. 
12 "Allerdings ist das absichtslose Zusammentreffen unsrer biblischen Projekte 
eines der auffallendsten Zeichen und Wunder unsres Einverstandnisses und 
unsrer MiBverstandnisse" (IV, 247). 
13 "Comme l'organe du tact developpe a l'homme individu l'univers en tant que 
tangible, comme l'ouie & !'air lui developpent l'univers en tant que sonore, 
comme Ia vue & Ia lumiere lui developpent l'univers en tant que visible; ce 
qu'il appelle coeur ou conscience, & Ia societe avec des Etres homogenes, lui 
developpent l'univers en tant que moral" (Lettre sur I' homme, ed. May, p. 226). 
14 Lettre surl'homme, ed. May, p. 416. 
16 I disagree here with Professor Samuel who suggested that the extraterrestial 
examination of man (cf. II, 616) constitutes the meaning of the phrase (II, 517). 
"Moral astronomy" seems to be, rather, a special case of what Dilthey called 
"Realpsychologie" in Navalis' philosophy, i.e., a science of the interior dimen-
sion. 
10 To A. W. Schlegel: "Mit Schelling bin ich sehr Freund geworden. Wir haben 
einige kostliche Stun den symphilosophiert" (IV, 21 8). To Friedrich: "Er hat 
mich zum Briefwechsel eingeladen. Diese Tage tiber werde ich auch an ihn 
schreiben. Er hat mir sehr gefallen-achte Universaltendenzin ihm-wahre 
Strahlenkraft-von Einem Punkt in die Unendlichkeit hinaus" (IV, zzo). The 
correspondence probably never started: neither letters nor other indicators 
survived. 
17 See IV, 233, 238, 241, and 263. Whether, as Professor Samuel believes, Navalis' 
sixth "Dialog" is directed against Schelling is open to question, because the 
remarks are not very applicable to Schelling's "Naturphilosophie". Cf. II, 
65 8 f. and 669-71. 
18 See Friedrich Schlegel und Nova/is, ed. M. Preitz (Darmstadt, 1957), pp. 83, 84, 93· 
19 Upon the possibility of rivalry Navalis touched only once and even then with 
tact: "Schelling konnte in der Kraft Dein Rival sein; er iibertrifft Dich vielleicht 
an Bestimmtheit aber wie eng ist seine Sphare gegen die Deinige" (IV, 2o8). 
20 ,Seine Denkungsart scheint mir zu jenem fragmentarischen Wesen, woman die 
Natur gleichsam auf witzigen Einfallen zu ertappen sucht und alles nur auf ein 
regelloses Zusammenhaufen solcher Einfalle hinauslauft, kurz: auf Schlegelia-
nismus der Naturwissenschaft zu fiihren ... "(IV, 463). 
21 Cf. Mahl, pp. I 8 8 f. A reference to Plotinus' concept is to be found, for instance, 
in the following note: "Ober d[as] irrdische Individuum-das himmlische 
Individuum und ihre Verhaltnisse.f (Gott ist die Weltseele der Idea/welt)" 
(III, 445). 
•• Thirteenth Letter in the Asthetische Erziehung: Schiller, Siimt!iche Werke, V 
(Miinchen, I959), 6o8. 
23 Still an other relevant passage from Navalis: "Die Natur soil moralisch werden. 
Wir sind ihre Erzieher-ihre moralischen Tangenten-ihre moralischen Reitze" 
(III, 252). 
24 Fourteenth Letter: Schiller, V, 6Iz f. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER V 
SENSIBILITY AND MEDICINE 
1 P. Trahard, Les maltres de Ia sensibiliflf franfaise au XVIII• siecle, I (Paris, 193 1), 
p. 7· 
' There has been recent discussion whether the designation "Age of Sensibility" 
could be applied to the pre-romantic age in English literature. See N. Frye, 
"Towards defining an Age of Sensibility" in Fables of Identity (New York, 
1963), and From Sensibility to Romanticism, ed. Frederick Whiley Hilles (New 
York, 1965). 
3 All English quotations were taken from the OED which gives seven different 
meanings of the word. 
• Novalis was probably not familiar with Haller's classic report [he planned to 
read his book on physiology (III, 58 5) ], but he must have read about sensibility 
in Herder's Ideen and the medical works of Hufeland, Ith, Schaeffer, and Stark. 
All these authors use the term, although the meaning they attach to it does not 
coincide with that in Novalis' notebooks. More relevant are Kielmeyer's Rede, 
where sensibility was the highest of the five organic forces, and Roschlaub's 
Untersuchungen, where it designated the contractility of nerves. 
• According to Schelling, both stimuli and excitability were negative conditions 
for life: "Der Schottlander Joh. Brown lal3t zwar das thierische Leben aus zwei 
Faktoren (der thierischen Erregbarkeit und den erregenden Potenzen, exciting 
powers) entspringen, was allerdings mit unserm positiven und negativen Princip 
des Lebens iibereinzustimmen scheint; wenn man aber nachsieht, was Brown 
unter den erregenden Potenzen versteht, so findet man, daB er darunter 
Principien begreift, die unsrer Meinung nach schon zu den negativen Bedingun-
gen des Lebens gehoren, denen also die Dignitat positiver Ursachen des Lebens 
nicht zugeschrieben werden kann" (I, 573); "Erregbarkeit ist ein synthetischer 
Begriff, er driickt ein Mannichfaltiges negativer Principien aus ... " (I, 574). 
• III, II3 and 850. The following confused and confusing "Brouillon" note 
ought to be read in the light of this theory: "Schelling geht nur von dem 
Irritabilitiitsphaenomen der Welt aus-er legt den Muske/ zum Grunde.-Wo 
bleibt der Nerv-die Adern-das Blut-und die Haut-der Zellstoff Warum 
geht er, der Chymiker, nicht vom Process aus-von dem Phaenomen der 
Beriihrung-der Kette?" (III, 470). Novalis had some justification in claiming 
that Schelling placed too much emphasis upon irritablity; but, as the passage 
from Schelling clearly shows, irritability was precisely the oxygen capacity of 
nerves (in this he deviated from Haller and Roschlaub) and therefore Novalis' 
accusation that Schelling neglected the nerves seems unfounded. Similarly, it 
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cannot be said that Schelling was a chemist, since he expressly repudiated the 
physiological and pathological theories of the humoral pathologists. 
7 The only note which does not fit this interpretation is an earlier one, from the 
summer of 1798. Using "Reitzbarkeit" for "Irritabilitiit" (these were inter-
changed in later notes too), Novalis states here that "Reitzbarkeit" (and not 
"Sensibilitlit") is inversely proportional to capacity: "Je geringer die Capacitaet 
ist, desto schneller die Wirkung des Reitzes- desto empfindlicher der Stoff oder 
das E"egbare-(desto Ieichter entziindbar.) Reitzbarkeit und Capacitaet stehn 
in umgekehrten Verhliltnisse. C[apacitaet] und E[rregbarkeit] stehn im Ver-
hliltnisse, wie O[xigene] und Phlogiston" (II, 555). The mix-up may be a slip 
of the pen (when reworking his notes Novalis crossed this one out). Anyway, 
the remark was probably written before reading Schelling's Weltseele. 
8 "Aufnahmeflihigkeit fiir Reize", Bluth's definition of "Capacitlit", actually 
describes "Erregbarkeit". A body with a large reservoir of excitability is indeed 
capable of receiving much stimulation, but only a body with high capacity is 
capable of receiving the stimuli without becoming overstimulated. Interpreting 
Novalis' statement "Die Erregbarkeit ist Repulsivkraft-die Capacitaet-
Attractionskraft" (III, 276), Bluth associated the attractive force with capacity: 
"Die Kapazitiit vermag den Reiz gleichsam zu sammeln, aufzusaugen, an sich zu 
ziehen, weshalb auch ... von einer Attraktionskraft gesprochen wird, die in ihm 
wirksam sei" (Bluth, p. 35). But for Novalis the attractive force was the gravi-
tational force, the force of stability (the attractive force on earth is the gravi-
tational force) which prevents the positive force from compelling objects to an 
unceasing motion towards an infinitely remote goal. 
• Schelling was careful to define "Weltseele" as a mere stimulating and coordi-
nating principle: "Davon freilich kann nicht die Rede seyn, daB dieses Princip 
die todten Krlifte der Materie im lebenden Korper aufhebe, wohl aber, daB es 
I. diesen todten Krliften eine Richtung gebe, die sie, sich selbst iiberlassen, in 
einer freien ungestorten Bildung, nicht genommen hlitten; 2. daB es den 
Conflikt dieser Krlifte, die sich selbst iiberlassen, sich bald in Gleichgewicht 
und Ruhe versetzt hlitten, immer neu anfache und continuirlich unterhalte" 
(Sch. I, 636). 
10 Haering, who contemptuously dismissed all influences on Novalis, misinter-
preted the meaning of "sensibility" by not being acquainted with the back-
ground: "[Unter den positiven Aspekten von Browns Lehre] wares die starke 
Betonung des stlindigen Zusammenwirkens von Reizbarkeit (Itritabilitiit) und 
Sensibilitiit, die ihn anzog, wobei erstere die vorwiegend passiv-rezeptive 
('objektive'), letztere die vorwiegend aktiv-'subjektive' Seite der Ichfunktion 
betonen soU" (p. 5 I 5 ). Apart from the error of attributing the terms to Brown, 
Haering makes a mistake in terming irritability active and sensibility passive. 
According to Novalis both irritability and sensibility have active and passive, 
positive and negative components. 
11 See also II, 560 (no. I64) and 570 (no. 208). 
u "Aufmercksamkeit" seems to have been widely used in the fight against me-
chanistic theories. In arguing against Hartley's association theory, Coleridge 
wrote in the Biographia Literaria: "But the will itself by confining and intensi-
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fying the attention may arbitrarily give vividness or distinctness to any object 
whatsoever ... " (ch. VII). 
In Schiller's first medical dissertation, entitled Philosophic dcr Physiologic, the 
parallel to Navalis is even stronger: "Die Seele hat einen tatigen Einflu/3 auf das 
Denkorgan. Sie kann die materiellen Ideen starker machen unci nach Willkiir 
darauf haften, unci somit macht sie auch die geistigen Ideen stii.rker. Dies ist 
das Werk der Aufmerksamkeit. Sie hat also Macht auf die Starke der Beweg-
griinde; ja sie selbst ist es, die sich Beweggri.inde macht .... Alle Moralitat des 
Menschen hat ihren Grund in der Aufmerksamkeit, d. h. im tatigen Einflu/3 der 
Seele auf die materiellen Ideen im Denkorgan" (Schiller, V, 265 f.). 
18 III, 317· See also II, 546. Navalis deviates from Schelling inasmuch as he 
makes "Kraft" the shaping force of the physical world; Schelling followed 
Leibniz and saw no possibility for interaction between spiritual and physical 
forces (Sch, I, 700 ). This view was criticized by Navalis in the earlier notes on 
the Weltscclc (III, I 14). 
u Novalis was probably not acquainted with the third volume (Frankfurt, 18oo). 
15 Leibbrand, p. 229. 
16 In the group of notes under discussion (nos. 593-596) the following points 
testify to Roschlaub's influence: 
a. only Roschlaub made a distinction between "Stoff" and "Kraft", 
b. the terms "Warmestoff" and "elektrischer Stoff" were not used by Brown, 
c. the passage: "Die Luft ist so gut Organ des Menschen, wie das Blut. Die 
Trennung des Korpers von der Welt ist, wie die der Seele vomKiirpcr" (III, 370) 
is a direct reference to pars. 1424-25 in Roschlaub's book, where it was asserted 
that the air in the inner cavities of the body was not part of internal stimulation 
(see the discussion below of Roschlaub's "Theorie der Potenzen"), 
d. Navalis explicitly refers to Roschlaub's contention that oxygen reduces 
excitement and is therefore a negative stimulus. 
11 Roschlaub, § 53. 
18 ,Der Grund der Wirklichkeit des Lebens liegt in einer aul3eren Ursache. Unci 
hier ist das allgemeine Gesetz der Mechanik auch in der lebenden Natur besta-
tigt: Jede Bewegung (Veranderung der Materie) hat eine liul3ere Ursache" 
(§ 442). 
19 "Kraft ist Grund der Wirklichkeit der Handlung aus sich" (§ 236). 
•• Roschlaub, § 287. 
21 Navalis, III, 327. Roschlaub's name in the first sentence indicates that these 
remarks were made in direct response to his book. Nevertheless, the idea of 
organic development, as well as the use of such terms as "Bildung ihres Werk-
zeugs" and "Korrespondierender Gegenstand", shows that the position is con-
sistent with Hardenberg's earlier physiological and psychological theories. 
•• ,Erregbarkeit, als die innerliche Bedingni/3 zur Moglichkeit des Lebens, ist 
kein Gegenstand moglicher Wahrnehmung, ist Begriff, a priori ... " (Roschlaub, 
§ 444). 
" "Die ganze Lehre von den speciellen Kr[ anckheiten] und ihrer Kur gehort in die 
specielle Lebenslehre-die Erregungsth[eorie] gehort in die theoretische 
Lebenslehre ... " (III, 324). The view that the theory of excitability was not 
merely a method of cure but a theory of life (III, 419) was expressed 
already in Roschlaub's book: "Die meisten Betrachtungen betreffen die Er-
scheinungen des Lebens ohne Riicksicht auf Wohlbefinden und Gesundheit" 
(§ 22). 
14 "Fichte ist, wie Brown zu Wercke gegangen-nur noch universeller und 
absoluter" (II, 546). ,Browns Theorie handelt (wie die Fi&htische), vomphysio-
logischen Ideal ... Er stellt auch nur das Ideal der Rei/methode auf" (III, 409). 
•• Brown, II, I 34 f. 
18 Roschlaub, §§ 1424and 1425. 
17 Novalis owned a book by an anonymous author on this particular issue: 
Prae!iminarien zum medizinischen Frieden, oder Vereinigungspunkte z1vischen Brown und 
seinen Gegnern (Leipzig, 1798). 
•• "Relativitaet der Ausdriicke, stiirkend, schwiichend, entziindlich etc. Triiglich-
keit der Symptome bey Individuen-Der Arzt muB sich hier oft nach der Indika-
tion der Zeit-des Orts-der Epidemie etc. richten-und tiber die einzelnen 
Symptome weg sehn" (III, 475). 
•• III, 327. The note starts with a specific reference to Roschlaub's theory of 
diseases. 
1 Dilthey, p. 324. 
1 Haym, p. 348. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI 
THE CASE OF Die Lehrlinge zu Sais 
• Only in a few recent studies has the work been treated in any detail. In Nova/is, 
Die Lehrlinge zu Sais; Versuch einer Erlauterung (Winterthur, 1954), H. Bollinger 
paraphrases the text with the help ofNovalis' notebooks, but refrains from any 
analysis. J. Striedter's ,Die Komposition der 'Lehrlinge zu Sais"' [Der 
Deutschunterricht, VII/2 (195 5), 5-23) is a thorough, although overstated study of 
the novel's structural unity. I was unable to consult the typewritten dissertation 
of H. D. Schmid, Friedrich von Hardenberg (Nova/is) und Abraham Gottlob Werner 
(Tiibingen, 1952), which is supposed to contain a discussion of Die Lehrlinge 
(see I, 592). 
• According to Professor Miihl (pp. 205 f.), ch. I was written at the beginning of 
1798, ch. II at the tum of 1798 and 1799, the sketch entitled "Naturlehre" 
immediately before ch. II, while the tale dates from the summer or the fall of 
1798. 
• See for instance the negative comment on scientists: "Unter ihren Hiinden starb 
die freundliche Natur, und lieB nur tote, zuckende Reste zuriick ... "(I, 84). 
8 Schelling's famous postulate from the Weltseele, "Die Natur soli der sichtbare 
Geist, der Geist die unsichtbare Natur seyn", is echoed, for instance, by one of 
the travelers in Novalis' novel: "Die Natur ware nicht die Natur, wenn sie 
keinen Geist hiitte ... "(I, 99). 
7 Sttiedter showed with great skill that the first chapter is arranged in a tightly 
knit ttiadic pattern which proceeds from the general to the specific and from the 
impersonal to the personal. While he makes a convincing case for the structural 
unity of the first chapter, his analogical argument for the second is weaker. 
There is in fact a very strong discontinuity between these two chapters, and 
the "Verwandlung" outline suggests that a similar discontinuity would have 
appeared in the novel's progression towards "higher realms". 
• For anti-empiricist interpretations see, for instance, Luitgard Albrecht, Der 
magische Idealismus in Nova/is' Marchentheorie und Miirchendichtung (Hamburg, 
I948), p. 85 and the commentary in the revised critical edition: I, 74· 
• I, 9I. In my view this passage describes the state of interrupted communication 
after the old man's visit, not the primitive happiness that preceded it. The 
condition where Hyazinth was "frohlich und Iustig ... wie keiner" is a few years 
back in the past, and his present "narrisches Zeug zum Totlachen" is as un-
intelligible to trees and animals as it is to man. 
10 So far only Professor Mahl took notice of this visionary "dann" passage and 
even he misses the subsequent ironic inversion. His interpretation of the 
whole section preceding the fairy-tale is somewhat inconsistent, because he 
regards the opinions voiced there as alien to Novalis' own, but at times, as in the 
case of the "dann" passage, he admits that the poet himself is the speaker. (See 
Mahl, Die Idee, pp. 356 f.) 
11 As Professor Mahl pointed out (see reference in note 10), Novalis is directly 
referring here to passages in Fichte's Einige Vorlesungen iiber die Bestimmung des 
Gelehrten. Cf. Fichte, I, 2 5o f. 
12 See Striedter, p. I 5 and also R. Samuel in I, 75. 
13 It is not clear from the context whether this youth is one of the travelers or 
not. 
14 See for instance the following passage from the notebooks: "Ich wiirde meinen 
Sinn, oder Korper, theils durch sich selbst, theils durch die Idee des Ganzen-
durch seinen Geist-die Weltseele bestimmt linden und zwar beydes als 
unzertrennlich vereinigt .... Mein Korper wiirde mir nicht specifisch vom Gan-
zen verschieden-sondern nur als eine Variation desselben vorkommen" (II, 
55 I). To this many more relevant quotations from the notebooks could be 
added. Hence it is erroneous and misleading to trace the passage from the novel 
to Schiller's "Spieltrieb", as F. Hiebel did. See Nova/is (Chapel Hill, I954), p. 
57· In general, Biebel's book vastly underrates the scientific background of 
Die Lehrlinge by relating it to Hardenberg's studies of Plato and Plotinus 
(p. 55). It is now evident that Navalis read neither Plato nor Plotinus. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII 
THE LAST YEARS 
1 The following two passages reflect this change from "learning" and "knowing" to 
"doing" very clearly: "Die Philosophic ruht jetzt bei mir nur im Biicherschranke. 
Ich bin froh, daB ich dutch diese Spitzberge der reinen Vernunft durch bin und 
wieder im bunten crquickenden Lande der Sinne mit Leib und Seele wohne" 
(IV, 329); "Ich habe viele Jahre nicht daran gekonnt einen grofieren Plan mit 
Geduld auszufiihren, und nun seh ich mit Vergniigen diese Schwierigkeit 
hinter mir. Eignes Arbeiten bildet in der Tat mehr, als wiederholtes Lesen. 
Beim Selbstangriff findet man erst die eigentlichen Schwierigkeiten und lernt 
die Kunst schatzen" (IV, 335). 
2 One of the most puzzling documents in this respect is a letter that was errone-
ously assigned to the beginning of 18oo in the 1929 critical edition, but actually 
belongs to the first days of Hardenberg's stay in Freiberg [cf. G. Schulz, "Bin 
neuer Brief von Navalis," Deutsche Vierteijahrsschrijt, XXXV (1961), 216-223]. 
Navalis wrote to Rabel Just: "Die Schriftstellerei ist eine Nebensache-Sie 
beurteilen mich wohl billig nach der Hauptsache- dem praktischen Leben .... 
Ich behandle meine Schriftstellerei als ein Bildungsmittel-ich Ierne etwas mit 
Sorgfalt durchdenken und bearbeiten-das ist alles, was ich verlange .... Nach 
meiner Meinung muB man zur vollendeten Bildung manche Stufe iibersteigen. 
Hofmeister, Professor, Handwerker sollte man eine Zeitlang werden wie 
Schriftsteller. Sogar das Bedientenfach ki:innte nicht schaden-dafiir mi:ichte 
der Schauspieler wegbleiben, der manche Bedenklichkeiten erregt" (p. 217). 
There is some danger in reading such documents as literally as Professor Schulz 
does in his commentary: "Einmal zeigt sich bier deutlich die Schlichtheit 
und Einfachheit von Hardenbergs Wesen, zum anderen aber auch, wie er ganz 
bewuBt die Gefahren des romantischen Subjektivismus- wie sie sich spater 
etwa in dem Schauspielertum eines Roquairol verki:irpern-erkannt hat und zu 
vermeiden trachtet" (p. 223). The letter can hardly be read as proof of Navalis' 
simplicity. For once the quoted passage contains a barely hidden irony: 
the educational value of acting may safely be ignored once the process of edu-
cation becomes a continuous change of professions, that is, a changing of roles in 
life. Navalis might have had the education and acting career of Wilhelm 
Meister in mind here, in which case he only repeats the idea of the novel; if to, 
one has to remember that his later answer to this novel, his Heinrich von Ofter-
dingen, was precisely an affirmation of art in face of the "practical life" mentioned 
in the letter. Besides, in such letters his style and views often take on fine 
changes according to the personality of the addressee- a sign of his mimetic 
talents which found a philosophical expression in the supreme versatility 
advocated by Magic Idealism. An awareness of the dangers inherent in 
"subjectivism" is, of course, not only not incompatible with indulging in it, 
but even to be expected, since all forms of "romantic subjectivism", including 
that of Roquairol, are characterized by a high degree of self-awareness. If not a 
reference to Wilhelm Meister, the suspicion concerning acting may well be 
Novalis' reflection on his own nature. 
3 The third of the six Hymnen an die Nacht, the so-called "Urhymne", was probably 
written in the summ~r of 1797, while early versions of hymns 1, z, 4, and 5 
might lead back to the year at Freiberg(see H. Ritter, Der unbekannte 1\fovalis, pp. 
94 f.). But the final version was written around Christmas 1799 (the revised prose 
version in January 18oo), i.e., after Die Lehrlinge, and the differences in content 
and form are in my opinion much too great for a meaningful analogy between 
the two works ( cf. Ritter, p. 96). The initial impulse of Die Lehrlinge is, rather, 
related to the "Brouillon". The first plans for Ofterdingen were probably 
made in the summer of 1799, i.e., after the year at Freiberg(see Ritter, pp. 183 ff. ). 
• W. Feilchenfeld [Der Einjluss jacob Biihmes auf Novalis(Berlin, 1922)] claims that 
an early indirect influence of Bohme was mediated by Lavater (pp. 3 6 ff. ), which 
is possible although there is no evidence to substantiate it. 
• "Abh[andlung] tiber Jac[ob] Boehme-Seinen Werth, als Dichter. Ober 
dichterische Ansichten der Natur iiberhaupt" (III, 646). It is interesting that 
both this note and the reference to Bohme in the almost simultaneously written 
letter to Tieck (IV, 329) is in the immediate vicinity of an attack on Goethe's 
Wilhelm Meister. Apparently Bohme's mystic and poetic nature appeared to 
Novalis as the counterpart to Goethe's '"Candide' against poetry" (IV, 331). 
• Surprisingly little attention has been paid so far to Novalis' religious unortho-
doxy and independence. In several of his remarks one may detect an ironic 
detachment with respect to organized religion and orthodox sentiments. About 
Matthias Claudius' religious and conservative "Urians Nachricht von der neuen 
Aufklarung" he wrote to Schlegel: "Vom Urian hab ich nur das Lied in der 
Zeitung gelesen, woriiber mein Alter besonders sein Fest hatte" (IV, 165). As 
late as 1799 he noted for himself: "Sonderbarer alter Schul und Erziehungsgeist 
im Herrnhuthismus- bes[onders] meines Vaters" (III, 557). The difference in 
religious views was surely a source of tension between Novalis and his father, 
and very likely Novalis had his father in mind when he wrote that theHerrnhuters 
annihilate reason (II, 548). The last notebooks contain a polemical remark 
about the "Kindergeist" of the Herrnhuters and a planned "proclamation" 
to them. Schlegel's indignant remark, recalling that on the first day of his 
visit to the Hardenbergs Novalis' "Herrnhuterei" greatly annoyed him (IV, 
420 ), should therefore be read in the proper light, taking into account that 
Novalis' behavior at home was probably conditioned by the prevailing atmos-
phere of piety. 
One should, however, separate Novalis' aversion to sectarianism from his 
consistent philosophical defense of mysticism, which is evident, for instance, in 
his quarrel with Kant. According to Professor Mahl's finding (pp. 219 f.), 
passages in the "Brouillon" represent a polemic on mysticism against Kant's 
Streit der Facultiiten. 
7 "Wahrend ... seiner Krankheit las er vie! von geistlichen Schriften auBer der 
Bibel besonders die Schriften von Zinzendorf und Lavater, die er ... geliebt 
hatte ... "(Samuel, "Karls Biographie", p. 181). Both Just and Tieck inserted 
this sentence in their respective biographies (cf. IV, 434 and 455). The interest 
in the works of Lavater had, however, a "scientific" angle too, for Novalis 
studied physiognomy and interpreted it as "Metrik des Innern und seiner 
V erhaltnisse" (III, 6 3 9 ). Next to Lavater' s Physiognomische Fragmente (see reference 
in a letter from 1797: IV, 199) he probably read the book by La Sue(see III, 284 
and Appendix IV) and, above all, books by the Dutch artist, physician, and 
physiognomist Peter Camper (1722-89). References to Camper (III, 172, 282, 
403, and 439) indicate that here too, Novalis was interested in the relationship 
between exterior appearance and interior makeup, physiology and psychology. 
Camper's medical and geographical "mapping" of the face was to Novalis a step 
towards "interior metrics". 
8 Zinzendorf's Deutsche Gedichte and two Herrnhuter songbooks were in Navalis' 
library. 
9 Olshausen, p. 67. 
10 See G. Schulz, "Die Berufslaufbahn Friedrich von Hardenbergs (Novalis)," 
Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschajt, VII (I963), 253-3I2-especially pp. 297, 
309, and 310. 
11 Schulz, pp. 291 f. 
12 Information about Hardenberg's readings in these last years may be gathered 
from the inventory of his library (IV, 4 70-8 I), and a notebook list which, among 
other things, contains a plan for purchasing or reading books (III, 754). Several 
books on this second list were later found in his library. Both lists contain a 
great many technical books and journals on mining and geology. 
13 Section XIII in Vol. III, entitled "Technische Aufzeichnungen und Schriften 
aus der Berufst:atigkeit", contains mostly unpublished material. Many additional 
papers are lost or still hidden in archives. 
14 Specifically mentioned are Jeremias Benjamin Richter the physicist (III, 574), 
Haller (III, 585), and Hufeland (III, 6r3). 
As the note on books (III, 754) indicates, Novalis intended to purchase or 
read the fourth volume of K. Sprengel's Versuch einer pragmatischen Geschichte 
der Arzneikunde (Halle, r 799); he read the first three volumes of this soberly 
written work earlier, and, as Professor Mahl discovered, he culled from it 
important information on mysticism and magic by ignoring Sprengel's 
rational tone (see Mahl, pp. r67-7o). 
The library inventory-which of course contains books that Novalis read 
earlier-shows that Novalis was particularly well read in medicine; it contains, 
among other things, Si:immering's five volumes on anatomy, textbooks on 
pharmacy by Ch. G. Selle, S. F. Hermbstadt, and K. Mi:inch, an issue of the 
Edinburgh Dispensatory, J. Ith's book on physiology, and several volumes on 
pathology, among which was a handbook by D. J. Ch. Stark, the family 
physician who had also treated Sophie. There was also the monumental System 
einer vollstiindigen medicinischen Polizry by J. P. Frank, the first great work on 
public health and preventive medicine. To the last work there are references 
in the notebooks (see II, 464 and III, 313 f.). 
In chemistry Navalis was familiar with Lavoisier's Traite e!ementaire de chimie 
(III, 5 I) and owned several other serious books. He took extensive notes 
on Laplace's Exposition du S,ysteme du Monde (German translation 1797) during 
his stay at Freiberg(III, 69 ff.), and he also read a history of physics by Murhard 
(II, 647). For complete list and titles see Appendix IV. 
There can be no doubt that Navalis continued to read solid scientific works 
even in those fields that were not related to his profession. In many earlier 
studies this fact was either ignored or distorted. A good example for this is 
L. Kleeberg's article "Studien zu Navalis. (Navalis und Eckartshausen)," 
[Euphorion, XXIII (I92I), 603-39], where it is suggested that Hardenberg's 
ideas were closely related to certain works by K. Eckartshausen on mysticism 
and magic: Mistische Niichte oder der Schliisse! zu den Geheimnissen des Wunderbaren 
and Auflosung der hoheren Geheimnisse der Magie (Munchen, q88-9I). If, however, 
one gets suspicious about the rather vague analogies of Kleeberg and inspects 
the various lists of Harden berg's readings, one finds Eckartshausen represented 
only by books which were on scientific topics, partly relating to Brown's theory 
of medicine(titles 92 and 93 in the inventory). [There is actually some confusion 
about these books. The inventory lists three works, and the critical edition of 
1929 gives the complete titles of these according to Heinsius and Kayser. I 
inspected, however, a book which is not listed in either bibliography, bearing 
the combined title of nos. 92 and 93 in the inventory: Ideen iiber das affirmative 
Princip des Lebens, und das negative Princip des Todes, zur Bestiittigung des Brownischen 
Systems. Since this volume was published in Leipzig (I 798) and the listed ones in 
Miinchen and Frankfurt, it seems more likely that Navalis owned the former. 
This rather inconsequential book tried to show that all constructs of nature 
consisted of fire, light, and heat, the first being the excitable, the second the 
stimulus producer, and the third the interaction of the two (p. 43).] 
15 It is still in doubt whether Navalis read the works of the neo-Platonist and 
Paracelsian scientists Johann Baptist van Belmont and Robert Fludd. A note-
book entry (III, 86) and a subsequent letter to Karoline Schlegel (IV, 237 f., 
Sept. 1798) indicate that he intended to. He asked A. W. Schlegel to borrow the 
works from the Royal Saxon Library, for he felt he needed them for his own 
important ideas on cosmogony. Several of the "Brouillon" notes carry cosmog-
ony in their title, but they can neither be pieced together into a coherent whole 
nor directly be linked with the works of van Belmont and Fludd. 
16 Vber thierische Electricitiit und Reizbarkeit(Leipzig, 1795). 
17 Versuche iiber die gereizte Muske/- und Nervenfaser (Berlin, 1797). 
18 "Ich fange von der Erscheinung des Galvanismus an, wei! ich durch die Art, 
wie ich diese Versuche anstellte, unwidersprechlich erweisen zu konnen glaube, 
daB der Stimulus in diesem wunderbaren Phanomen groBentheils von den 
belebten Organen selbst ausgeht, und daB diese sich dabei keinesweges bloB 
leidend, etwa als elektroskopische Substanzen, verhalten" (Humboldt, p. 2). 
19 Weimar, 1798. Navalis owned a copy of this book. 
•• Ritter, Beweis, pp. 162-63. 
11 "Der Geist galvanisirt die Seele mittelst der grobern Sinne" (II, 545); "Die 
Chymie ist schon Galvanism- Galvanism der leblosen Natur" (II, 644). 
•• In the new critical edition a newly published section (III, 195-200) contains 
Novalis' notes on various articles and books by Humboldt. The latter was a 
student of Werner and attended the academy a few years before Navalis. 
•• Novalis inquired at the Schlegels about Ritter even before he came to know 
him personally. One gets a vivid picture of Ritter's fanatic zeal from 
Karoline's answer: "Er wohnt in Belvedere und schickt vie! Frosche 
heriiber, von welchen dort DberfluB und hier Mangel ist. Zuweilen begleitet er 
sie selbst, allein ich sah ihn noch nie, und die andern versichern mir, er wiirde 
auch nicht drei Worte mit mir reden konnen und mogen. Er hat nur einen 
Sinn, soviel ich merke. Der soli eminent sein, aber der hochste, den man fiir 
seine Wissenschaft haben kann, ist es doch wohl nicht-der hochste besteht 
aus vielen" (IV, 267). 
•• The first encounter between the two men is nostalgically recorded in Ritter's 
Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse eines jungen Physikers. Novalis' high regard for 
Ritter may, for example, be seen in his letters to Karoline Schlegel(IV, 263) and 
Miltitz (IV, 327). 
•• The notebooks of the last years do contain some vague references to experiments 
with Novalis' fiancee and other members of his family (III, 6oz and 614). The 
first of these was apparently a plan to perform some Mesmerist (animal magne-
tism) experiments, the second refers to these again and to some primitive 
experiments on galvanism. None of these notes suggest any serious experi-
mentation; in fact, we know of no experimental work done by Novalis. 
•• Haering, p. 6o6. 
27 Schelling assumed that a similar tripartite arrangement, comprising magne-
tism, electricity, and chemical interactions, existed in the inorganic realm. 
Extensive speculations on these phenomena in Novalis' notebooks, [e.g., 
"Sollte Elektr[icitaet] wieder in Galv[anism] iibergehn?" (III, 665)] are surely 
related to the reading of Schelling's work. It is very likely that the sudden 
renewed interest in oxydation was also under Schelling's influence, although the 
speculative excursions are unmistakably Novalis' own. In one note oxygen 
is defined as "UniversalArzeneymittel" and oxydation is identified with fifteen 
different processes, such as "Auflosung", "Lichtbindung" ,"Verrninderung der 
Kohasion", "Demagnetisation", and "Verminderung der Acusticitat" (III, 6 58). 
Immediately following, the process is described as a "diminishing of the per-
sonality" and is attributed to the corrosive action of the devil (III, 659). Sur-
prisingly, these meditations on oxygen culminate in a remark which contains a 
profound scientific truth: "Der Trieb unsrer Elemente geht aufDesoxyd[ation]. 
Das Leben ist eine erzwungne Oxydation" (III, 687). Thomas Mann unkno-
wingly used reminiscences of Brown's theory when he later quoted this 
remark that fitted so well his sense of irony and drama. 
28 Novalis' diet during his illness could be related to his odd thoughts on the use 
of eating vegetables. According to Tieck's report: "Er selbst war auf seine 
Diat noch aufmerksamer als sonst, er trank wenig oder keinen Wein, genoB fast 
keine Fleischspeisen und nahrte sich hauptsachlich von Milch und Vegetabilien . 
. . . ich suchte daher seine Gewonheit zu bestreiten, wei! ich seine Entwi:ihnung 
von Wein und starkenden Nahrungsmitteln fiir irrig und falsche Angstlich-
keit hielt" (IV, 454). 
•• For instance, the above quoted note on sensibility and disease (III, 657) goes 
on to say: "Der sittliche Mensch muB auch eine freye Natur haben-eine 
gegenstrebende, eine zu erziehende, eine eigenthiimliche Natur" -it remains 
unclear whether the "freye Natur" is identical with sensibility, or has to be 
developed to curb it. 
80 III, 667. This could be the meaning of that "new conception of morality" to 
which there are three references in these notebooks. 
81 Devoting the last chapter of her book to medical doctors, Ricarda Huch was 
probably the first to associate the trend in medicine with the literary movement. 
•• See Huch (Tiibingen, 1951), p. 6o8 and W. Milch, "Zum Problem der Krank-
heit in der Dichtung der deutschen Romantik," Sudhoffs Archiv, XXIII (1930), 
213-35· 
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•• Among the literary records of these interests one may find E. T. A. Hoff-
mann's Der Magnetiseur, ]. Kerner's Die Seherin von Prevorst, and, above all, 
the works of Kleist (e.g., Das Kiitchen von Heilbronn, Prinz Friedrich von Hom-
burg) where somnambulism plays an important role. 
•• Mesmerismus, ed. K. Ch. Wolfart (Berlin, 1814). 
•• Franz Anton Mesmer aus Schwaben (Frankfurt a.M., 1856). 
•• Huch, p. 6oz. 
" ]. N. Ringseis, System der Medizin as summarized in his Erinnerungen, ed. E. 
Ringseis (Regensburg, 1886-94), III, 427. 
•• Ringseis, Erinnerungen, I, 67-68 :" ... miichtig aber wirkte auch der Verkehr mit 
christlich Gesinnten, theils personlich, theils in ihren Werken.. .. Vor Allem 
seien hier genannt: ... die an Glanz und Wirkung dem Blitze vergleichbaren 
Abhandlungen Franz Baader's, des Ersten, welcher die Philosophic wieder auf 
Bahnen der Objektivitiit lenkte und christianisirte; G. H. Schubert's Schriften, 
vorziiglich die iiber 'die Nachtseite der Natur', sodann Tieck, Novalis, die 
heiden Schlegel, iiberhaupt die Romantiker, von denen zwar ein Theil noch sehr 
im Unklaren schwamm, mancher aber doch schon das Ufer gewonnen hatte, 
wie z.B. der zum Katholizismus iibergetretene Friedrich Schlegel." Ringseis was 
a student of Roschlaub and wrote his dissertation on Brown, hence he had direct 
access to the sources of romantic medicine. 
38 E. Hirschfeld, "Romantische Medizin," Kyklos, III (1930), 1-89. 
•• "Aber es ist ebenso nutzlos, aus Novalis' Fragmenten ein medizinisches 
System herauszustellen wie es zu kritisieren- die Bedeutung dieser wirklich 
unvergleichlichen Aphorismen liegt fur das Thema der Medizin in einer ganz 
anderen Richtung" (Hirschfeld, p. z3); "Urnes noch einmal zu betonen, all 
diese und iihnliche Stellen zu vielen medizinischen Themen (Fieber, Entziin-
dung, spezielle Therapie usw.) lassen sich hochstens mit grol3er Vorsicht in 
ein subjektiv-gedankliches Philosophieren ihres Verfassers einbauen, bedeuten 
aber nur in der Perspektive dieses analogisierenden und exemplifizierenden 
Geistes etwas, objektiv fast nichts" (Hirschfeld, p. 24). 
u "Unbestrittener Protagonist aber und Psychagog des romantischen Kreises ist 
Novalis, Ideenfiihrer der romantischen Medizin auch er" (Hirschfeld, p. 21). 
u Although the dissertation was published in 1934, it made use of the old and 
very incomplete Minor edition of Novalis' works. Bluth not only assumed, 
without giving evidence, that Novalis influenced Ringseis, Windischmann, 
Volz, Stark, and Kieser, but also claimed that Novalis personally knew 
Schelling during his studies in Leipzig and that Schelling's early "Natur-
philosophie" was indebted to Novalis. His final conclusion: "Auch Albrecht 
von Haller und Andreas Gryphius waren Dichter, aber sie waren gleichzeitig 
Arzte. Novalis hat nur als Dichter auf die zeitgenossische Medizin eingewirkt. 
Damit ist ein hochst merkwiirdiger Fall aufgewiesen, in dem wissenschaftliche 
Berufsmedizin aus den Bezirken der Dichtung beeinflul3t worden ist" (p. 54). 
43 Diepgen's speech is included in the collection of his essays, Medizin und Kultur 
(Stuttgart, 1938). The following are representative passages: "Novalis ist die 
QueUe, aus der leitende Siitze der romantischen Medizin geschopft sind. Von 
ihm, dem Dichter, gehen gerade die merkwiirdigen Anschauungen a us, die uns 
manche Naturforscher und Arzte jener geistigen Stromung schwer verstehen 
lassen, Anschauungen, die man auf den ersten Blick nur mit weltfremder 
Unkritik und von allen Gottern verlassener Phantastik erkHiren mochte" 
(p. 243). "Navalis dachte nicht Kausal" (p. 244). For Diepgen's view in his 
history of medicine, see pp. 10 f. of my Introduction. 
•• Obviously echoing Bluth, Leibbrand writes: "Wo und wann hatte je ein 
Dichter arztliche Lehrsatze mitgestaltet, dem medizinischen Denken seiner 
Zeit Gehalt und Gestalt gegeben? Rabelais hatte die Heilkunde seiner Zeit 
geistvoll verspottet. Nach der Romantik hat Zola die Abstammungslehre und 
den Degenerationsgedanken Morels romanhaft verwertet, die physiologischen 
Theorien Claude Bernards verwendet. Dennoch ist all dies nicht mit der Ro-
mantik vergleichbar. Der EinfluB des Dichters Navalis war anderer Art .... 
Wichtig bleiben die Folgen, die sich aus Navalis' Gedanken fur die Berufsarzte 
ziehen lassen" [Die speku!ative Medizin der Romantik (Hamburg, 1956), p. 227 
and p. 232]. 
•• Following Bluth, Leibbrand mistakenly claims that Schelling knew Navalis in 
Leipzig, and, as mentioned, he writes that Roschlaub was a personal friend of 
Navalis. 
•• Appeared at Reimer in Berlin in 1802, 1805, 1815, 1826, and 1837. 
" In Lebenserinnerungen und Denkwiirdigkeiten, II (Leipzig, 1866), 317. 
•• Der Erwerb aus einem vergangenen und die Erwartung von einem zukiinftigen Leben 
(Erlangen, 1854-56). 
•• In spite of his hostility during Navalis' lifetime Steffens draws in Was ich 
erlebte, an excessively affectionate picture of Hardenberg, and vaguely men-
tions that the "poetically religious" words of Navalis were "wonderful 
and promising oracles" to many natural scientists of his age-which tells us 
nothing useful. 
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Apoplexy Confluent Small-pox 
Palsy Hydrothorax 
Plague Phthisis 
Malignant Fever Contagious Dysentery, 
Gangrenous Cynanche &c. 
Synocha Measles 
Phtenitis Petipneumony 
inflammatory Cynanche Dysentery 
Mild Small-pox Mania, &c. 
Synochus Miliary Fever 
Rheumatism Chicken-pox 
Catarrh Ophthalmia, &c. 
Scarlet Pyrexia 
The range of good health is with propriety ranked 
stimuli to which man is continually exposed, as meat 
degrees. 
Intermittent Fevers Hysteria 
Mild Colic Epistaxis 
Dyspepsy Menorrhrea 
Hypochondriasis Amenotrhll'a, &c. 
Rheumatalgia Rickets 
Cholera Haemoptysis, 
Epilepsy Scrofula, &c. 
St. Vitus's Dance 
Typhus Scurvy 
CoHea Pictonum Diabetes 
Gout Dropsy 
Tetanus Jaundice, &c. 
FROM: THE ELEMENTS OF MEDICINE 
(PHILADELPHIA, I8o6) 
Note: The columns of excitement and excitability are erroneously interchanged in this edition. 
from 
drink, 
TABLE OF EXCITEMENT AND EXCITABILITY 
Causes 
Noxious 
Excessive action of powerful stimuli; as heat, 
exercise, food, abundance of blood, violent passions 
0 f the mind, contagion, and the like. 
The same as above, but not to that excess which 
duces indirect debility; yet acting with greater force in 
tha n in the next range of disease. 
The same as above, but not acting with that force 
hichinduces high sthenic diathesis; yet greater than w 
in the state of health. 
Immediate 
Indirect debility 
Greatly increased excitement 




The indication of cure is to support the excitement. The remedies 
are powerful stimuli, as electricity, opium, aether, spirituous, liquors, 
wine, musk, cinchona bark, snake root, camphor, rich soups, and the like. 
The indication of cure is to diminish the excitement; which is to 
be effected by avoiding powerful stimuli, and employing slight or 
defective stimuli, as lying cool in hcd, tranquillity of mind, bleeding, 
I purging, spare diet, and the like. 
The indication of cure is, as above, to diminish the excitement, but 
with more moderation. 
th irty to fifty degrees in the scale; for perfect health, which consists in the middle point solely, or forty degrees, rarely occurs; in consequence of the variation of the 
and the passions of the mind; which sometimes act with more power, sometimes with less, so that the excitement commonly fluctuates between thirty and fifty 
A deficiency of the stimuli necessary to the main-
tenan ce of good health; and an improper application 
powers, which, though stimulant, do not stimulate 
a sufficient degree. 
Defective stimuli alone; as cold, diet sparing and 
t: of good quality, fear, and the like. no 
Dd ective stimuli alone 
I The indication of cure is to increase the excitement. The remedies 
I are powerful stimuli, such as are exhibited for the cure of indirect 
debility, but with this difference, that here it is necessary to begin with 
Diminished excitement, 
a small degree of stimulus, and increase it gradually. 
The indication of cure is here the same as above, but stimuli must he 
applied somewhat more cautiously. 
or 
Direct debility 
The indication of cure is the same here also, but still greater caution is 
necessary in the application of stimuli. 
TO 
JOHN BROWN, M.D. 
THIS TABLE IS DEDICATED, AS A TESTIMONY OF RESPECT, 
BY HI S FRIEND AND PUPIL, 
SAMUEL LYNC H 

Appendix II 
Brown's Disease Chart in German 
From Pfaff's translation (1804 edition); reproduced from P. Diepgen, Geschichte 
der Medizin, II, pt. i. 
173 
Appendix III 
A Diagram of Diseases from Navalis 




















BOUNDARY OF DIRECT 
DISEASES 
Appendix IV 
List of Scientific Books Read by N ovalis 
The following list is only tentative. Numbers behind the references show that 
the work was in Hardenberg's library and is listed under that number in the 
critical edition of 1929 (IV, 476-81). I put a question mark if it is doubtful that 
Novalis read the work. For journals that continued publication well beyond his 
death I only indicate the initial date. I chose those editions of books which were 
probably used by Novalis, but frequently I was able to consult other editions only. 
Since the list is intended only for surveying and judging the range of Harden berg's 
reading, I used mostly short titles. Complete but cumbersome titles are given when 
the auxiliary information is important. Some of the entries are also included in 
the BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
Al!gemeinesfournal derChemie, ed. A. N. Scherer. Leipzig & Berlin, 1798-1803. 
Almanach oder Taschenbuch fur Scheidekiinstler und Apotheker, ed. Johann Friedrich 
August Gottling eta!. J78o-18oo (5o). 
Annalen der Pf!ysik, ed. F. A. K. Gren (1797-1799) and L. W. Gilbert. (1799-) Halle, 
1797-18oo (zo) 
Annates de Chimie, ed de Morveau eta!. Paris, 1789-1800 (73). 
Archiv fur die theoretische Chemie, ed. Alexander Nik. Scherer. Jena, 18oo-18oz. 
Baader, Franz Xaver von. Beitriige zur Elementar-Phisiologie. Hamburg, 1797· (87) 
Ueber das pythagoriiische Quadrat in der Natur oder die vier We!tgegenden. Tiibingen, 
1798. (86) 
Vom Wiirmestoff, seiner Vertheilung, Bindung und Entbindung, vorziig!ich beim 
Brennen der Korper. Wien, 1786. 
Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich. Ober den Bildungstrieb und das Zeugungsgeschiifte. 
Gottingen, 178 I. (?) 
Bonnet, C. Philosophische Palingenesie, trans!. J. C. Lavater. Zurich, 1770. 
Biirja, Abel. Lehrbuch der Astronomic. 5 vols. Berlin, 1794-18o6. (47) 
Camper, Peter. Siimmtliche Kleinere Schriften die Arzn~-, Wundarzn~kunst und 
Naturgeschichte betreffend, trans!. J. F. M. Herbell. 3 vols. Leipzig, 1784-1790. 
Vorlesungen fiber den Ausdruck der verschiedenen Leidenschaften durch die Gesichtsziige; 
iiber die bewunderungswiirdige Ahnlichkeit im Bau des Menschen, der vierfiissigen Thiere, 
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der Vogel und Fische ... , ed. A. G. Camper, trans!. G. Schaz. Berlin, 1793· (?) 
Abhandlung iiber den natiirlichen Unterschied der Gesichtsziige in Menschen verschiedener 
Gegenden und verschiedenen Alters; ... , ed. A. G. Camper, trans!. S. Th. 
Si:immering. Berlin, 1792. (?) 
Chaptal, J. A. Anfangsgriinde der Chemie, trans!. Franz Wolf, preface and 
notations S. F. Hermbstadt. 4 vols. Konigsberg, 179I-I8o4. (u6) 
Chladni, Ernst F. F. Entdeckungen iiber die Theorie des Klanges. Leipzig, 1787. (8I) 
Crell, Lorenz Flor., ed. Chemische Annalen fiir die Freunde der Naturlehre, Arznry-
ge!ahrtheit, Haushaltungskunst und Manufacturen. Helmstadt, 1784-I8oo. (I) 
Darwin, Erasmus. Zoonomie, oder Gesetze des organischen Lebens ... , trans!. J. D. 
Brandis. 2 vols. Hannover, I795· 
Diderot, D., J. d'Alembert, eds. Encyclopidie. 35 vols. Bern, 1781. 
Eckartshausen, Karl von. Die neuesten Entdeckungen iiber Licht, Wiirme und Feuer,fiir 
Liebhaber der Physik und Chemie. Miinchen, I 798. (88) 
- Ideen iiber das affirmative Princip des Lebens, und das negative Princip des Todes, zur 
Bestiittigung des Brownischen Systems. Leipzig, 1798. (92-93) 
Emmerling, Ludwig August. Lehrbuch der Mineralogic. 3 vols. GieBen, I793-I797· 
(I I8) 
Eschenmayer, Carl August. Saze aus der Natur-Metaphysik auf chemische und medi-
cinische Gegenstiinde angewandt. Tiibingen, 1797. 
Versuch, die Gesetze magnetischer Erscheinungen aus Siitzen der Naturmetaphysik 
zu entwickeln. Tiibingen, I797· 
Frank, Johann Peter. System einer vollstiindigen medicinischen Polizry. 4 vols. Mann-
heim, 1779-1788. (4) 
Gehler, J. S. T. Physikalisches Worterbuch. 4 vols, Leipzig, 1787-91. 
Geist und Kritik der medicinischen und chirurgischen Zeitschrijten Deutschlands fiir Arzte 
und Wundiirzte, ed. J. J. Kausch. Leipzig, I798. (8) 
Gellert, Christ. Ehregott. Die Probierkunst. Leipzig, I75 5· 2nd ed. Leipzig, I773· 
(79) 
Gi:ittling, Joh. Friedr. Aug. Handbuch der theoretischen und praktischen Chemie. 3 vols. 
Jena, 1798-I8or. (?) 
Gren, Fr. Albr. K. Grundri}J der Natur!ehre. Halle, I787. (53) 
- Systematisches Handbuch der gesammten Chemie. 3 vols. Halle 1787-I790. 2nded. 
I794· (57) 
- ed. Journal der P~psik, Halle, I790-
Gruner, Christian Gottfried. Physiologische und pathologische Zeichenlehre, 3rd ed. 
Jena, I8or. (7) 
Hahnemann, Samuel, trans!. [with notations], Neues Edinburger Dispensatorium. 
2 vols. Leipzig, I797-1798. (I6) 
Heidmann, Joh. Anton. Vollstiindige auf Versuche und Vernunftschliisse gegriindete 
Theorie der Elektricitiit. 2. vols. Wien, 1799-I8o3. (I17) 
Hemsterhuis, Franciscus. Oeuvres philosophiques. 2. vols. Paris, I 792. 
Herder, Joh. Gottfr. Ideen zur Philosophic der Geschichte der Menschheit. 4 vols. 
Riga & Leipzig, I784-1791. 
Hermbstadt, S. F. Grundriss der theoretischen und experimentellen Pharmacie. 2 vols. 
Berlin, I792-I793· (I3) 
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Hufeland, Christ. Wilh., ed. Bibliothek der practischen Heilkunde. Jena & Berlin, 
1799- (?) 
Die Kunst, das menschliche Leben zu verliingern. 2 vols. Jena, 1796. 
ldeen iiber Pathogenic. Jena, 1795· (?) 
ed. journal der practischen Arzneykunde und Wundarzneykunst. Jena & Berlin, 
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